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Textual Criticism, Edition History, Interpretation: 
Philological and Hermeneutical Problems of Historical-Critical  
and Life-Work Editions* 
 
István FEHÉR M. 
Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest 
Andrássy Universität  Budapest 
 
Keywords: philology, hermeneutics, edition history, text criticism, historical-critical 
editions, meaning, interpretation, biography, chronology, doxography, Hegel, Kant, 
Heidegger 
 
Abstract:  In the case of text editions, or critical editions of texts handed down by 
classical authors, philology seems to precede, and thus to have a priority over, 
hermeneutics. In the traditional (positivistic) view, first comes the reconstruction of texts 
through critical examination of the sources and the different text variants in order to 
establish an authentic, reliable, possibly canonical version; then follows, in a second 
step, the interpretation of the texts thus established. Interpretation is supposed to need 
something as a solid "Textgrundlage# so as to set itself into motion; it is thus seen to be 
parasitic upon pre-given philological work. Although this description of the way 
scholarly work is ususally done in the humanities may be not wholly untrue, more often 
than not it does not hold, for the establishing and editing of texts is itself not something 
performed in a space entirely exempt from, and free of, pre-understanding and 
interpretation. The following paper illustrates this thesis through reference to, and case 






According to the traditional (positivist) approach, any work in the humanities is 
articulated in two steps, one preceding the other. In the first step we establish the text, 
that is, we critically compare the preserved or discovered textual variants for the purpose 
of creating or recontstructing a possibly final, canonical variant, and this is supposed to 
be the task of philology. The second step is interpretation (hermeneutics), that is, the 
interpretation from various perspectives of the textual variant established as a result of 
philological work.1 In this approach philology precedes hermeneutics and is ostensibly 
                                                 
* I am indebted to the Hungarian National Research Fund (OTKA) for supporting the research 
leading up to the present paper (project number: OTKA K-75840). The version published here 
was completed within the framework of MTA-ELTE Hermeneutics Research Group. 
1 Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, $Philosophie und Philologie. Über von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff,# 
in Idem, Griechische Philosophie II, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 6 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1985), 271!
277, 276. He says that during his university years, the following was customary on philology 
seminars: $Da hatte man erst den Text herzustellen (und sogar zu übersetzen), und dann hatte man 
Philobiblon  Vol. XVII (2012)  No. 1 
 ✞ ✞ ✄
separated from it; and interpretation is built upon the results of philology. This fair 
(ideal-typical) scheme might work indeed in some ! fortunate ! cases; however, during 
the redaction process of (historical-critical) life-work editions of important thinkers it is 
often doomed to failure. For, more often than not, the establishment of the ultimate text 
version is itself not something happening in a laboratory environment, in a space exempt 
from interpretation. In Hegel%s case, for instance, it seems that the situation was exactly 
the opposite: according to the main streamline of present-day Hegel-research Hegel%s 
disciples edited and published Hegel%s texts on the basis of their image (interpretation) 
of Hegel. In what follows, I wish to analyze the relation of textual criticism, 
interpretation, and editing history by way of case studies, starting from the conclusions 
drawn from, of all the important life-work editions, primarily Hegel%s and Heidegger%s, 
but with an eye also to Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Gadamer. 
 
I.  
I.1. As the new life-work editions of the prominent figures of German idealism began to 
gain ever more definite shape as a research project after WWII, the discussions 
regarding the necessity of the new editions obviously appeared embedded into the 
critical reflections on edition history. In Hegel%s case, this critical view on his edition 
history offered approximately the following summary picture.1  
 Hegel published only a small number of works in his lifetime. Apart from some 
lesser writings, reviews published in magazines, he only had two substantial, elaborated 
works published in his lifetime, which could be regarded as books in an appropriate 
sense: the Phenomenology and the Logic. The Encyclopedia and the Philosophy of Right 
are only $grounding lines#, $sketches#, which he annexed to his lectures for his students; 
however, he published not even similar abstracts for his other lectures (philosophy of 
                                                                                                                              
ihn zu interpretieren.# From his own hermeneutical viewpoint, Gadamer does not hesitate to add 
how naïve, how doubtful this description is: $Wie man einen Text herstellen und gar übersetzen 
soll, bevor alle Künste der Interpretation das Ihre getan haben, wurde dabei nicht gefragt. Das war 
natürlich eine didaktische Vereinfachung, die den wahren Prozeß des Verstehens nicht abbildet. 
Daß man einen Text erst herstellen kann, wenn man ihn verstanden hat, ist offenkundig. So 
lernten wir [...], wie sehr Interpretation nicht nur der zentrale Form des Weltzugangs. sondern 
auch die des Zugangs zu den Texten der Überlieferung ist. Wir befinden uns nie auf einem Punkte 
der bloßen Aufnahme des fraglos gegebenen Textes [...]. [...] Es ist nicht so, als ob der Text für 
uns eine frasglose Vorgegebenheit wäre und die Interpretation eine nachträglich engestellte 
Prozedur, die man an dem Texte vornimmt.# Gadamer%s such complementary remarks, and 
especially the two quoted sentences, are the fundamental formulations of exactly the thesis of this 
present study.  
1 For what follows, see: Lothar Wigger, $75 Jahre kritische Hegel-Ausgaben: Zu Geschichte und 
Stand der Hegel-Edition,# Pädagogische Rundschau 1 (1987): 101!116, and also: Christoph 
Helferich, G. W. Fr. Hegel (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1979), 217!228. I have dealt in more detail with 
the philological and hermeneutic problems of the Hegel-edition (primarily with reference to his 
Aesthetics) in the philological attachment of my study $»Az eszme érzéki ragyogása«: Esztétika, 
metafizika, hermeneutika (Gadamer és Hegel)# (»The perceptual brightness of the idea«: 
Aesthetics, metaphysics, hermeneutics [Gadamer and Hegel]), in Hermeneutika, esztétika, 
irodalomelmélet (Hermeneutics, aesthetics, literary theory), eds. István Fehér M. and ErnĘ 
Kulcsár Szabó (Budapest: Osiris, 2004), 264!332. The quoted place on pages 294!326. In the 
followings I shall make use of certain ideas used in this attachment.  
Philobiblon  Vol. XVII (2012)  No. 1 
 ✞ ✞ ☎
history, aesthetics, history of religion, history of philosophy). His works were prepared 
for publication in twenty-one volumes with the hard work of a group of his students 
between 1832 and 1845. (Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des 
Vereweigten [Complete edition published by the Association of the Friends of the 
Deceased], an edition usually referred to in scholarship as Freundesvereinsausgabe, 
hence the abbreviation I shall use hereinafter: FVA). Even today, this continues to 
appear like a remarkable accomplishment, which has decisively determined the Hegel-
image of subsequent ages; however, in the words of the eminent Hegel-scholar, 
Friedhelm Nicolin, the first head of the Hegel Archives founded in 1958, this edition 
contained neither the $complete#, nor the $real# Hegel.1 In the words of a researcher 
thirty years later, $the reception history of Hegelian philosophy has been influenced by 
the edition policy of the editors of his works to a greater extent than that of almost every 
other philosopher.#2 The disciples totally neglected Hegel%s evolution; they swept aside 
the early sketches and manuscripts preserved by the philosopher himself (part of them 
has been lost indeed ever since); by contrast, they published the Encyclopedia and the 
Philosophy of Right, representative for the Berlin period, in a considerably extended 
version. They compiled supplements taken from the most various places with the works 
published by Hegel himself, and composed the Berlin lectures preserved in his legacy as 
compact works, based on compilations of lecture manuscripts from various years, and of 
author%s and students% notes !reference to the sources appeared only in the introduction 
of the individual volumes,  with no further remarks made  in the body of the text. By this 
edition technique, highly questionable from a contemporary scholarly viewpoint, which 
had made the differences in Hegel%s development almost unrecognizable, they wished to 
suggest a well-defined Hegel-image: they defended and perpetuated Hegel, in harmony 
with their scientific and cultural political views, as the philosopher of the system, and the 
system itself as a closed and undefeatable fortress.3 It is thus becoming increasingly 
difficult to avoid the conclusion: what we know as the Hegelian system is in fact the 
work not of Hegel himself but of his disciples; $a document of Hegelianism, of the 
Hegel-school.#4 
 After many decades of forgetting and rejection, the interest in Hegel only 
gained new impetus around the turn of the century; Wilhelm Dilthey formulated then the 
need for an entwicklungsgeschichtlich study of Hegelian philosophy, and Hermann Nohl 
published the preserved writings of the young Hegel in 1907 on Dilthey%s advice. The 
so-called anniversary edition published by Hermann Glockner in the 1930s contained 
emendations compared to the original, however, it did not eliminate its fundamental 
shortcomings. The new critical edition started by Georg Lasson and continued through 
the 1930s by Johannes Hoffmeister, after several decades of hard work and repeated 
changes in its conception, remained unfinished in the mid-1950s.  
                                                 
1 Friedhelm Nicolin, $Probleme und Stand der Hegel-Edition,# Zeitschrift für philosophische 
Forschung 1 (1957): 117!129, 118. 
2 Lothar Wigger, $75 Jahre kritische Hegel-Ausgaben: Zu Geschichte und Stand der Hegel-
Edition,# Pädagogische Rundschau 1 (1987): 102. (My emphasis, I. F. M.) 
3 Friedhelm Nicolin, $Probleme und Stand der Hegel-Edition,# Zeitschrift für philosophische 
Forschung 1 (1957): 116!129, 118. 
4 Nicolin, $Probleme und Stand der Hegel-Edition,# 118. ($Dokument des Hegelianismus, der 
Hegelschule#) 
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 It had thus become clear that even the most respectful efforts of individual 
researchers were not sufficient to cope with the task of editing Hegel%s works. . The 
German Research Foundation (DFG) established a committee in 1957 for the historical 
critical edition of Hegel%s works, and in 1958 the Hegel Archives were founded in Bonn 
for this purpose, moving to Bochum a decade later, where it has been  functioning ever 
since as an independent institution of the Ruhr University in Bochum, under the 
patronage of the North Rhine!Westphalia Academy of Sciences. The new, major Hegel-
edition, designed for around forty volumes started at the end of the 1960s. The first 
series, consisting of twenty-two volumes, containing the works published in Hegel%s 
lifetime and his legacy, manuscripts and sketches, approaches its end after forty years of 
editorial work (only three more volumes awaiting publication), but the publication of the 
second series, presenting Hegel%s university lectures, is repeatedly delayed; the first 
volume of this series was only published in 2008. (Gesammelte Werke, vol. 25, 1. 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des subjektiven Geistes. Teilband 1; vol. 25,2 follows 
in 2012.) 
 The new academic edition understands itself as a historical-critical edition, but 
its title is more modest: Gesammelte Werke (taking this into account, it will not be 
referred to with the abbreviation HKA [Historisch-kritische Ausgabe], but GW); its 
purpose is to present Hegel%s development on the basis of the available sources, 
continuously collected by the Archives, and it is intended to be done using the original 
sources, preceding the disciples% edition. At any rate, the condition of the textual basis of 
Hegel%s lectures and the theoretical difficulties related to an adequate scholarly edition 
led to the decision that these lectures must be published first as a $test-edition#, in a 
series entitled Vorlesungen, outside of the critical edition (indeed, more than fifteen 
volumes were published in this series during the last twenty-five years). Then, only 
following the experiences gained during the preparation of this $test-edition#, and its 
echoes in the scholarship, would these texts be published in approximately ten volumes 
in the framework of the second series of the critical edition. The devious way of the 
$test-edition# explains the fact that the first volume of the second series was published 
only as late as 2008.1  
 Reaching behind the disciples% Hegel edition means that the manuscripts, notes, 
lecture notes, etc. which stood at the basis of the compilations, as far as they can still be 
found, will be processed and edited independently. However,  many of these sources 
have since been lost. The notes which the Hegel-students used to compile the volumes 
of the lectures not prepared for print by Hegel are no longer extant for their most part, 
therefore it is impossible to supervise these editions from a textual-critical point of view, 
or to come up with a new, alternative textual-critical edition. It is, of course, legitimate 
to criticize the principle of the edition ! the fact of compilation !, and indeed, 
contemporary philology is consistantly reluctant to follow it.  
                                                 
1 Although the summaries written in the 1970s and 1980s expected the forty-volume series to be 
ended shortly after the turn of the millennium. See Wolfhart Henckmann, $Fichte ! Schelling ! 
Hegel,# Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte, eds. Walter 
Jaeschke, Wilhelm G. Jacobs und Hermann Krings (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), 83!
115: 109, and Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, $Hegel Archiv und Hegel Ausgabe,# Zeitschrift für 
philosophische Forschung 4 (1976): 609!618, 610. 
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 The mentioned scarcity of the original Hegelian manuscripts which once were 
at the basis of the FVA, and the rejection of the method of compilation resulted in a new, 
individual interest in the lectures of different years, the preserved Hegelian manuscripts 
and the students% notes about the lectures (Mitschriften, Nachschriften). The Hegel 
Archives have been collecting all these documents systematically: both the Hegel-
manuscripts and the lecture notes. As for these latter ones, around 130 Nachschrifts were 
discovered in various sources before the 1990s, and the Archives managed to acquire 
ninety of these.1  
 
I.2. This short summary naturally communicates the self-image, the retrospective self-
interpretation of the Hegel Archives. At a distance of four decades, and considering the 
evolution of the Hegeledition ever since, the following remarks may be appropriate.  It 
may indeed be true that the disciples% Hegel-edition $contained neither the »complete« 
Hegel, nor the »real« Hegel#, however, it is highly doubtful whether either of the two 
could be a real goal to achieve at all. Apart from the $complete# Hegel, what would a 
$real# Hegel consist of? $What we know today as the Hegelian system# may well be 
$the work of the disciples [&], a »document of the Hegel-school«#; still, it is 
questionable, after forty years of work in the Archives, whether this present age could 
come up with anything better, whether it could present an alternative Hegeledition. This 
recognition is gradually becoming conscious in the Hegel Archives, and it may not be 
merely incidental that the optimistic and self-assured remarks about the »complete« or 
the »real« Hegel no longer tend to appear these days. And as for the criticism of the 
disciples% Hegel-edition: it is one thing to criticize a compilation because it is one, and it 
is quite another to claim to be able to put it aside and go back to the original sources; and 
it is again another thing to formulate the suspicion that the editors inserted their own 
ideas not pertaining to the compiled parts, that the preparation for printing is a highly 
biassed transcription.  
 The history, difficulties, and present state of the edition of Hegel%s life-work 
could be detailed and deepened in several other respects ! to some of them I shall return 
later on ! but from the perspective of this study the above considerations are a sufficient 
basis for some conclusions. Our initial thesis was the following: the philological work of 
preparation for print, the establishment of the text is not a work done in a laboratory 
environment as a space void of interpretation, and hopefully the summary presented 
above was an adequate illustration of this fact. The very expression of $edition policy# ! 
sounding even quite astounding, or at least unusual in Hungarian ! refers to preliminary 
interpretations, well determined preconceptions. One may conclude: it was not only the 
Hegel-edition that formed the Hegel-image, but also the other way round: the Hegel-
edition itself was made on the basis of a particular image of Hegel; what is more, this 
image not only reclined on preconceptions, but it implied definite cultural political goals 
and expectations connected to the future. It was not only a space not at all void of 
interpretation where the philological work of the disciples took place, but also one not at 
all void of $cultural policy# either.  
                                                 
1 See Wolfgang Bonsiepen, $Berichten über Nachschriften zu Hegels Vorlesungen. Einleitung,# 
Hegel-Studien 26/1 (1991): 11!15, 11. Cf. also Otto Pöggeler, $Nachschriften von Hegels 
Vorlesungen,# Hegel-Studien 26/2 (1991): 122f. 
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I. 3. The review of the historical circumstances and the particular constellation of these 
circumstances ! still not completely revealed ! would not only exceed the scope of this 
paper (and the competence and field of research of its author), but it would not be 
outstandingly relevant from the point of view of the theoretical question discussed here. 
However, it will not be superfluous to summarize these at least as an enumeration. 
Besides the disciples% sense of mission almost reaching the level of salvation history that 
the sudden end of Hegel%s life should be linked with the beginning of his immortality in 
the realm of thoughts in order to secure (in a different, more down-to-earth formulation) 
Hegel%s fame and influence amongst the cultural political battles of Berlin1 ! in his 
funeral speech uttered at the University of Berlin the Hegel-disciple Rector Marheineke 
compared Hegel to Christ the Saviour, who returns as a spirit to his community after his 
death and who gained eternal life and resurrection by his death, while Friedrich Förster 
said in his speech at the grave: $To safekeep, promote, and consolidate his teachings: let 
this be our mission from now on#2 ! in addition to this, the ambition of the family and 
mainly Hegel%s widow, Marie Hegel, to perpetuate and secure ! in an expressly 
conservative spirit ! the fame of her deceased husband as well as (last but not least)  to 
strengthen the family%s financial situation and support her sister-in-law, played an 
equally important role. Hegel%s widow took in her hands the issue of the edition without 
any further delay; only a few days after Hegel%s death the $Association of the Friends# 
was created, and less than a week later the Berlin-based Duncker Publishing House 
already presented a favourable offer to the widow for the publication of Hegel%s works 
(the contract stipulated that the royalties were all to go to the family, the disciples 
                                                 
1 On the Prussian cultural political ambitions of the 1810s and 1820s, and on the background of 
Hegel%s appointment in Berlin, see Kunsterfahrung und Kulturpolitik im Berlin Hegels. Hegel-
Studien, vol. XXII. (here in particular H. Lübbe, $Deutscher Idealismus als Philosophie 
preussicher Kulturpolitik,# 3!27 and W. Jaeschke, $Politik, Kultur und Philosophie in Preußen,# 
28!48), as well as Hegel in Berlin. Preußische Kulturpolitik und idealistische Ästhetik, ed. O. 
Pöggeler et al. (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 1981), in particular W. Jaeschke and K. R. Meist, $Von 
Humboldt zu Altenstein,# 29!39. 
2 Philipp Konrad Marheineke, $Trauerrede. Worte der Liebe und Ehre, vor der Leichenbegleitung 
des Herrn Professor Hegel, im großen Hörsaal der Universität, am 16. November [1831] 
gesprochen,# Hegel in Berichten seiner Zeitgenossen, ed. Günter Nicolin, Philosophische 
Bibliothek 245 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1970), 474f; Friedrich Förster, $Grabrede. An dem Grabe 
unseres Freundes und Lehrers, des in Gott ruhenden Königlichen Professors und Doktors der 
Philosophie Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel am16. November [1831] im Namen seiner Schüler 
und Freunde,# ibid., 475!478: 477. $He was our helper, our saver, and our liberator [&] To 
safekeep, promote, and consolidate his teachings: let this be our mission from now on. Although 
no Petrus will raise in our circle who might dare call himself his place-holder, but his realm, the 
realm of thought, although amongst attacks, but without opposition will always and eternally be 
spreading.# [Ja, er war uns ein Helfer, Erretter und Befreier aus jeder Not und Bedrängnis [...] 
Seine Lehre zu bewahren, zu verkündigen, zu befestigen, sei fortan unser Beruf. Zwar wird kein 
Petrus aufstehen, welcher die Anmaßung hätte, sich seinen Statthalter zu nennen, aber sein Reich, 
das Reich des Gedankens, wird sich fort und fort nicht ohne Anfechtung, aber ohne Widerstand 
ausbreiten.] 
 3 Christoph Jamme, $Editionspolitik. Zur %Freundesvereinsausgabe% der Werke G.W.F. Hegels,# 
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 1 (1984): 83!99, 85f. For the followings, ibid. 
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preparing the volumes for print did their work as an honorary duty.)3 The family or the 
widow appointed the students for the preparation and edition of the individual volumes, 
and lent them the manuscripts from the family archives. At the same time, the widow 
carefully selected these manuscripts; especially in the case of miscellaneous  writings, it 
was necessary ! she wrote to her sister-in-law in those days !  for her to help choose 
which of these writings should reach the world in Hegel%s spirit, and which not. To 
quickly satisfy the existing interest was said to be a primary task; the first work to appear 
was ! not incidentally !the philosophy of religion, already the following year, in 1832, 
in two volumes, nearly one thousand pages; Marheineke, who edited the volume, was 
Rector of Berlin University at that time, he may scarcely have had appropriate leisure for 
a very thorough work.  
 That the FVA itself was edited on the basis of a well-defined Hegel-image is 
apparent already from the fact that the lectures making up the greatest part of the edition 
were edited as composing a closed system ! or rather parts of a system. The manuscripts 
of the young Hegel were almost entirely left out, the only writings included in the 
edition were those which counted as parts of the way leading to the system. In contrast 
to these, the Berlin lectures, and especially the encyclopaedic system appeared in a 
strongly extended form, pumped up with various completions and amendments. The 
timelessness of the closed ! and final ! system dominated the image, but this system 
itself was not elaborated and published by Hegel ! it was in fact the work or $document# 
of the Hegel-school. In any case, it was this edition which laid the basis of Hegel%s fame 
and the centuries-long influence of his philosophy.  
 In addition to the variety of editorial intentions, the various Hegel-editions also 
mirror the historically changing self-understanding of philosophy, Lothar Wigger 
writes.1 It may hardly be too risky or daring a statement that the self-understanding of 
Hegel%s philosophy must have been a standard in Hegel%s time and especially in the 
circle of his disciples. At any rate, there is an interesting example ! to the best of my 
knowledge, previously unexploited ! which shows that the disciples might have 
followed themselves the spirit of Hegelian philosophy when editing the FVA. In the 
chapter on Schelling of Hegel%s history of philosophy there are some significant 
judgments!opinions which are not the least unknown, but much quoted and commented 
on in different contexts. $Schelling made his philosophical development in front of the 
public. The row of his philosophical writings is also the history of his own philosophical 
development. [&] [This row] does not contain a sequence of the elaborated partial fields 
of philosophy in their succession, but a sequence of its own degrees of development. If 
one asked for an ultimate writing which would contain the most definitive elaboration of 
his philosophy, there would be none to point to. [&] In his later works he always started 
from the beginning (he never created a fully elaborated whole) [&] Therefore it is not 
advisable to go into details about that which is called Schellingian philosophy [&] 
Because this philosophy is not yet an organically articulated scientific whole [&] This 
philosophy is still developing, it has not yet offered any ripe fruit [&].#2 
                                                 
1 Lothar Wigger, $75 Jahre kritische Hegel-Ausgaben: Zu Geschichte und Stand der Hegel-
Edition,# Pädagogische Rundschau 1 (1987): 101. 
2 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III. In Hegel, Werke in 
zwanzig Bänden, Theorie Werkausgabe. Auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832!1845 neu 
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The various interpretations usually comment on this fragment from the point of 
view of the Hegel!Schelling relationship, formulate questions as to whether Hegel%s 
statement is true and valid for Schelling or not ! and if it is, then is there any argument 
against this accusation. These issues ! whether Hegel%s description is accurate, whether 
Schelling can or cannot be defended1 ! are completely irrelevant for us now. No less 
irrelevant is the fact that these lines were formulated about Schelling. What is essential 
from our point of view is that Hegel presents here his own views about what a philosophy 
should be like. According to this requirement, a philosophy must be conclusive, definitive 
in its character should contain a closed system !, conversely formulated: a developing, 
changing philosophy is not a philosophy at all. Hegel%s own philosophical preferences are 
formulated here, and these prevent him from being susceptible to the values of a 
philosophy in change, in becoming. Such a philosophy ! one that always starts from the 
very beginning ! is none other than imperfect philosophy. One should only come out in 
public when this previous process of development and change has been finished, and the 
final system has been created. In the works to be published from now on ! works which in 
fact should only be published at this point and not earlier ! this final philosophy unfolds, 
spreads out, as it were, the individual elements of its organic totality are successively or 
simultaneously elaborated; however, the succession of elaborations, the degree of 
elaborateness and the increasing size of the sections to be explained no longer means an 
internal change of the structure itself.  
 Now, at a closer look, the FVA edited by Hegel%s disciples is articulated 
precisely along the lines of this concept. Hegel%s lecture sketches and outlines, the 
student notes, and various kinds of other notes, seen from here, are composed into 
uniform works not merely because of external or subjective reasons ! for instance, 
cultural or political !, but because the editors are influenced by the spirit of a philosophy 
                                                                                                                              
edierte Ausgabe, eds. E. Moldenhauer und K. M. Michel, vol. 20 (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 
1970), 421!423. Schelling hat seine philosophische Ausbildung vor dem Publikum gemacht. Die 
Reihe seiner philosophischen Schriften ist zugleich Geschichte seiner philosophischen Bildung 
[...] sie enthält nicht eine Folge der ausgearbeiteten Teile der Philosophie nacheinander, sondern 
eine Folge seiner Bildungsstufen. Wenn nach einer letzten Schrift gefragt wird, worin seine 
Philosophie am bestimmtesten durchgeführt darstellte, so kann man keine solche nennen. [...] In 
späteren Darstellungen fing er in jeder Schrift nur immer wieder von vorne an (stellte nie ein 
vollendet durchgeführtes Ganzes auf), weil man sieht, daß das Vorhergehende ihm nicht Genüge 
getan; und so hat er sich in verschiedenen Formen und Terminologien herumgeworfen. [...] Es ist 
daher auch nicht tunlich, da in ein Detail eingegangen werde ßber das, was Schellingsche 
Philosophie genannt wird, wenn es auch die Zeit erlaubte. Denn sie ist noch nicht ein in seine 
Glieder organisiertes Ganzes, sondern besteht mehr in einigen allgemeinen Momenten, die allein 
das sich gleich Bleibende sind. Diese Philosophie ist noch in der Arbeit ihrer Evolution begriffen, 
noch nicht zur reifen Frucht gezeitigt.#  
1 Hegel%s characterization of Schelling is of course true in a trivial sense; so much so that one of 
the most important works of 20th-century Schelling scholarship,, Xavier Tilliette%s two-volume, 
1200 pages long monograph formulates the very same idea on Schelling%s thought already in its 
title. See: Xavier Tilliette, Schelling. Une philosophie en devenir (Paris: Vrin, 1970). However, 
both for Tilliette and other researchers ! such as, e.g., Heidegger (see: Schellings Abhandlung 
über das wesen der meschlichen Freiheit, ed. H. Feick [Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1971], p. 7.) ! 
this statement establishes a fact and has no disapproving character.  
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which claims that it is only the final, the ultimate, the closed whole that is valuable.1 The 
disciples ! if standing indeed on the ground of the above cited Hegelian idea ! must 
surely have been convinced that Hegel did possess this system, only his premature death 
prevented him from lending it ultimate and detailed elaboration. Therefore they must 
have felt it to be their duty, task and responsibility ! indeed, a mission in the most 
pregnant sense of the word ! to finish, according to the best of their knowledge and 
conscience, what the master was not able to complete himself. On Hegelian grounds, 
                                                 
1 It should also be added: the creation of a (closed, final) system in Hegel%s sense is a fundamental 
ambition and distinguishing mark of German idealism starting with Kant, formulated on the 
ground of the initiatives of modern philosophy. Heidegger in his 1936 Schelling-lectures 
developed this idea with great force, embedded into a broad context of the history of philosophy. 
As he explains, the specific requirement of the construction of a philosophical system was only 
formulated in modernity. Before Descartes, the philosophers never claimed the need to elaborate 
a system in the modern sense; instead, they only offered the organization and articulation most 
suitable for appropriation and study in schools of an inherited and traditional mass of knowledge. 
The medieval summa itself was not a $system# in this sense either ! only our modern perception 
makes them be viewed as such ! but much rather as $handbooks# (e.g. Thomas Aquinas%s famous 
Summa theologiae, which is clearly offered as a $textbook# in the prologue). An organic 
philosophical system as a need to construct the conceptual system of knowledge only came into 
being in modernity. The particular image of modern philosophy is defined by the fact that, freeing 
itself from the authority of traditional knowledge ! or with the demand of its critical revision ! it 
tries to form a new, autonomous realm within knowledge: it is on this ground that the requirement 
of a $system# can be born. Kant particularly emphasized the architectonic nature of reason, 
distinguished from intellect, oriented primarily to unity, to the system, articulated according to 
various ideas. In his words, $Die Einheit aller möglichen empirischen Verstandeshandlungen 
systematisch zu machen, ist ein Geschäfte der Vernunft,# Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen 
Vernunft, eds. Georg Mohr and Marcus Willaschek (Berlin: Akademie 1998), A664, B692; cf. 
Martin Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung über das wesen der menschlichen Freiheit, 42ff. The 
fundamental requirement of reason for Kant is thus the system itself, but the Kantian philosophy 
failed to lead to a system, the $idea# forming the basis of criticism was left in shade: it is a 
dilemma which offers a nuanced explanation of how, in what specific sense has the requirement 
of a system in idealism become a basic problem of the development or ! what is the same for 
Kant ! professionalization of philosophy. $Das System allein verbürgt ja die innere Einheit des 
Wissens, seine Wissenschaftlichkeit und Wahrheit,# writes Heidegger in this interpretation. 
$Deshalb muß in Absicht auf die Wahrheit und das Wissen zuerst und vor allem immer wieder 
das System selbst in Frage gestellt, in seinem Wesen begründet und in seinem Begriff ausgebildet 
werden. So ist es zu verstehen, daß für den deutschen Idealismus das System der Leitruf wird und 
daß er nichts anderes bedeutet als wahrhafte Selbstbegründung des Ganzen des wesentlichen 
Wissens, der Wissenschaft schlechthin, der Philosophie.# (Heidegger, Schellings Abhandlung, 
50). Of the extended literature on the subject, I only mention the study of Robert C. Solomon, 
$Hegel%s Phenomenology of Spirit,# in The Age of German Idealism, eds. Robert C. Solomon and 
Kathleen M. Higgins, Routledge History of Philosophy, vol. 6 (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 181!215: $The idea of a <system% of philosophy comes from Kant, who aspired 
to provide a unified and all-encompassing <science% of philosophy.# (182). I have treated this 
issue in somewhat more detail in one of my earlier writings; see István Fehér M., $Rendszer, 
szabadság, intellektuális szemlélet. Kant és a német idealizmus néhány alapproblémája# (System, 
freedom, intellectual concept. Kant and some fundamental problems of German idealism) 
Magyar Filozófiai Szemle 3 (1982): 401!414. 
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they may rightly have been convinced that one must not come out in front of the audience 
with works still changing, with nothing more than a plurality of text variants ! the 
manuscripts and lecture notes had thus to be composed into an organic whole. Seen from 
here, the concept underlying the edition may legitimately be claimed to have largely been 
penetrated by the spirit of the philosophy to be edited: the basic principles of the edition 
(the philological establishment and elaboration of the texts) and the spirit of the philosophy 
to be edited (its preliminary understanding!interpretation, its pre-understanding, that is, 
hermeneutics) are connected by far-reaching Wahlverwandschaft, a sort of common spirit. 
From our point of view this means that the philological work ! the selection of the 
manuscripts and their working into a body of texts to be printed ! was preceded and 
guided by a (perhaps not conscious) philosophical and hermeneutical awareness. In other 
words, if it is true that the image of Hegel (gradually developed after the philosopher%s 
death) was shaped, to a considerable extent, by the first edition of his printed works, it is 
not less true that the specific way of editing the printed works was in its turn largely 
motivated by the image of Hegel!i.e., the disciples% image of Hegel, their preliminary 
understanding of Hegelian philosophy no less than of philosophy itself in general.  
 Meanwhile, it is worth noting: the new, modern Hegel-edition ! the declaredly 
evolutional conception (entwicklungsgeschichtlich) of this edition ! does not lack the 
spirit of the age, or in other words, the trace of the philosophical spirit or worldview of 
this age either. Since we live in a fragmentary, pluralistic age, which perceives itself in 
no way as some kind of an ultimate age like Hegel and his contemporaries may have 
perceived themselves ! and not even as a new age, a new epoch as a time of birth and a 
transition to a new period ! and since in such ages there is no kind of generally accepted, 
final philosophy, and even a requirement of the sort tends to sound quite improbable, 
inauthentic, therefore the question regarding a philosopher%s ultimate system ! or the 
edition of such an ultimate system ! cannot even be meaningfully formulated. The job of 
an edition in such an age can only be to prepare for print and edit in a chronological 
order, with adequate critical apparatus, the printed or manuscript works, sketches, 
fragments of an author. The question concerning which of these texts contains the 
ultimate system of thought of an author, or whether the idea of a final system of thought 
is plausible or not ! a system that resists any further change and evolution ! a modern 
edition has just to give up answering such questions. All it can do is to present or publish 
the development of a philosopher%s thinking in its various stages without conceiving of 
this development or rather change in a teleological way, as some kind of a movement 
towards perfection or completion.  
 
I. 4. Going back to the problems around the FVA edition: the above interpretation about 
the $complementarity# or $concordance# of the ideas permeating the edition and the 
philosopher being edited can be made problematic at one point. Its discussion leads us to 
one of the most serious dilemmas of the new, modern Hegel-edition, so it will not be 
useless to briefly speak about it.  
 The objection that can be formulated is that the interpretation presented above 
takes at its basis Hegel%s judgment on Schelling, as Hegel formulated it in his lectures on 
the history of philosophy. It is, however, one may argue, in the text edition of the FVA 
that Hegel%s lectures on the history of philosophy are presently available, their critical 
edition is still yet to come. Since doubts were raised in the past about the authenticity of 
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several parts of the FVA, it may well be the case that the quotation lying at the basis of 
the above interpretation will also be among these. In this case the above interpretation ! 
the claim concerning the common spirit between the basic principles of the edition (the 
philological establishment of the texts) and the spirit of the philosophy to be edited ! 
will cease to hold. And it will not because the supposed common spirit can be shown not 
to exist, but because the very possibility of the comparison will be eliminated. The 
principles of the edition will not be comparable to the spirit of this philosophy because 
the spirit of this philosophy itself can only be reconstructed from the texts made 
available by the basic principles of edition. Horribile dictu, it can even be imagined ! 
pushing the objection to its extreme ! that, in order to justify their editorial principles 
with Hegel%s philosophy, the disciples attributed to Hegel words and phrases that he 
never uttered. This objection means that the textual basis of the comparison is rendered 
questionable, an issue I analyzed elsewhere in the context of another Hegelian locus.1  
 This objection, as long as it is formulated in a general, theoretical way, cannot 
be countered: it can be formulated in connection with any Hegelian text which was not 
submitted for print by Hegel himself, or the authenticity of which cannot be undoubtedly 
proved from some other source. The only problem is that this objection is too relevant to 
hold, as it were, it reaches ! so-to-say ! beyond its target, and, as I shall return to it soon, 
one must pay a high price for it. At any rate, in the concrete situation here two kinds of 
considerations are possible.  
 The first is that it is hardly possible to conclusively disprove the originality of a 
text under suspicion as to its authorial authenticity.2 Suspicion is one thing and disproval 
is another, just as difference should be made between a free-floating (unmotivated) 
suspicion and a seriously founded one. As long as the suspicion is not founded by a 
thorough justification, we have no reason to doubt the authenticity of a text. This 
consideration seems to be valid not only for our concrete case, but it can be generalized 
within certain limits.  
 The other consideration, referring only to the concrete case and thus much 
stronger, claims that the thesis at the basis of the mentioned common spirit ! philosophy 
is only real as a closed system, it is only in this form that it is philosophy at all ! appears 
                                                 
1 See the philological appendixt of my study entitled $»Az eszme érzéki ragyogása«: Esztétika, 
metafizika, hermeneutika (Gadamer és Hegel)# (»Das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee«: Aesthetics, 
Metaphysics, Hermeneutics [Gadamer and Hegel]), in Hermeneutika, esztétika, irodalomelmélet 
(Hermeneutics, Aesthetics, Literary Theory), eds. István Fehér M. and ErnĘ Kulcsár Szabó 
(Budapest: Osiris, 2004), 264!332. Here: 294!326. I should add to this that rendering a textual 
fragment questionable as an original text (coming directly from its author) does not necessarily 
mean its rendering questionable as an interpretive text (although it is usually perceived to be 
questionable as such, too). An intelligent, clarifying interpretive text can be worth just as much ! 
or even more ! as an undoubtedly original, authorial text. One may have no expectations or 
requirements from an original, authorial text ! that is, if its authenticity is proved, it must be 
accepted as it is, as it has come down to us; however, we may be entitled to raise requirements 
about an interpretive text, for instance, trivially speaking, the requirement to meaningfully clarify 
some original text.  
2 The argument that a textual locus cannot be regarded authentic unless it can be found in 
preserved manuscripts or other sources is not conclusive because most of the sources available 
when editing the FVA are no longer extant today. 
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in, and what is more, completely pervades, also the texts prepared and submitted for 
print by Hegel himself, texts therefore standing beyond doubt as to their authenticity. 
The following four characteristic quotes, outlining in a certain sense the entire 
programme of Hegelian philosophy, taken from the Preface of the Phenomenology 
adequately illustrate this claim:  
 
1. $The true shape in which the truth exists can only be its scientific system.# To help to 
bring philosophy nearer to the form of science ! that goal where it can lay aside the 
name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge ! that is what I have set before 
me.# (§ 5.) 
2. $The truth is the whole. The whole, however, is merely the essential nature reaching 
its completeness through the process of its own development. Of the Absolute it must be 
said that it is essentially a result, that only at the end is it what it is in very truth; and just 
in that consists its nature, which is to be actual, subject, or self-becoming, self-
development.# (§ 20) 
3. $The living substance, further, is that being which is truly subject [...] As subject it is 
[&] a process of splitting up what is simple and undifferentiated, a process of 
duplicating and setting factors in opposition [&] True reality is merely this process of 
reinstating self-identity [&] It is the process of its own becoming, the circle which 
presupposes its end as its purpose, and has its end for its beginning; it becomes concrete 
and actual only by being carried out, and by the end it involves.# (§ 18) 
4. $Among the many consequences that follow from what has been said, it is of 
importance to emphasise this, that knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully 
in the form of science, in the form of system# (§ 24)1 
 
Philosophy, according to the first quote, is only real as a system; the second quote 
describes this system as a whole, as a result arrived to its end, while the third describes it 
as a circle, which has a presupposed purpose and beginning, and during its becoming 
reaches its end, that is, it closes in as a circle and forms a closed whole. This is, 
according to the fourth quote, the scientific form of philosophy. Making philosophy a 
science and constructing it as a system closed (in itself) is thus one and the same thing. 
For this reason, a philosophy which has not constructed itself as a system cannot lay 
claim to the status of science and ! as we have seen ! this is precisely what Hegel 
disapproved of Schelling. These are central theses of the self-understanding of Hegel%s 
philosophy, which leave no doubt about how Hegel looked at philosophy and his own 
philosophy as well. Hegel had this text printed himself, so we have no reason to doubt 
its authenticity.2  
                                                 
1 Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie (London: Harper = Row, 1967). Online 
edition: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm (Accessed: 
25.01.2012) (Emphasis in quotes 1. and 3.: I. F. M) 
2 Moreover, a particular ! negative ! philological situation can further enforce the authenticity of 
the quoted texts. In 1831, a few weeks before his death, Hegel started to rewrite the Preface in 
preparation for a second edition that he had been planning for some time. He reached with the 
revision approximately half-way through the Preface, more precisely to the paragraph beginning 
with Analysis of an idea (§ 32), but all the fragments I quoted precede this paragraph in the text. 
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I. 5. The fundamental dilemma following from the articulation of this objection, and 
concerning the new historical-critical edition and capable in a sense to bring it to crisis, 
can be reconstructed as follows. Our presentation of the history of the Hegel-editions 
started from the simple and almost trivial statement that the arguments on the necessity 
of new editions all grew out of the critical reflections on edition history. This ! as we 
have seen ! is completely and, indeed, primarily valid for the Hegel-editions. Since the 
old editions do not meet modern scholarly requirements and are full of deficiencies, 
therefore there is a need for new, reliable editions. This conclusion seems 
unobjectionable. However, is this argument exhaustive? Is it indeed the reason ! the 
only reason ! for the necessity of the new edition? 
 If we turn, in a somewhat pedantic way, to the traditional logic of syllogisms, 
we see that in order to draw a conclusion we need at least two premises. One single 
premise is never enough to correctly draw a conclusion from. So there must be an 
implicit, second premise in the background, which does not come to the forefront 
because it seems so trivial, so self-evident. It may of course be so ! let us not doubt it !, 
but it still is, it still exists nonetheless, and thus it deserves  being made heard and 
explicit. So: the new Hegel-edition is necessary because: 1. the old one has many 
shortcomings, and 2. (to put it in one of several possible ways) Hegel is admittedly a 
great philosopher, whose work deserves being made available in a new, scientifically 
reliable source, or ! to put it differently ! it is the duty of the present age to make his 
work available in a new, scientifically reliable source.  
 Let us stay with formal logic a bit longer. It is a requirement that the two 
premises of the conclusion must come from different sources of knowledge, that is, they 
cannot be related to each other in any way. If this is not the case, if they are somehow 
related, then we no longer have to do with two premises, but only one. Let us take the 
classic example: 1. All man is mortal, 2. Socrates is a man, so 3. Socrates is mortal. The 
first two premises cannot be deduced from each other. We know from different sources 
of knowledge that all men are mortal, and that Socrates is a man. From the enunciation 
$all man is mortal# cannot be deduced that $Socrates is a man#. (If we think that 
Socrates belongs to $all men#, since he is a man too, then we beg the question, i.e., 
presume exactly what should be proved; Socrates belongs to $all men# if I already know 
! and this of course means: from some other source ! that he is also a man, but this is 
precisely the question here).  
 Let us return to the Hegel-editions. Where, from what source do we know that 
Hegel is a great philosopher? Is it indeed the case here that the second premise is 
independent from the first? In the light of what was argued above, it is quite obvious: the 
                                                                                                                              
The revision did not affect any of the quoted fragments, Hegel left all of them unchanged for the 
second edition planned. (English translation of the paragraph Analysis of an idea in Hegel, 
Phenomenology of Mind, § 32. Original: Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, eds. Wolfgang 
Bonsiepen and Reinhard Heede, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 9 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1980), 27. New 
edition: Phänomenologie des Geistes, eds. H.-F. Wessels and H. Clairmont, introd. W. 
Bonsiepen, PhB 414 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1988), 25. See also W. Bonsiepen%s notes on the issue 
(new edition, 551), who refers to the report of the editor of the Phenomenology published in the 
FVA (Hegel!s Werke. Vollstandige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten, 
vol. 2, ed. J. Schulze (Berlin: Duncker, 1832), V. 
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FVA, which the first premise declares to be deficient, is not only not independent of the 
second premise%s source of knowledge, but is mostly identical with it. The reception 
history of Hegelian philosophy, which founded Hegel%s fame as a philosopher and 
presented Hegel as a great philosopher, was determined to the full by the FVA. 
Therefore if the FVA is rendered questionable, then implicitly the philosophical 
greatness of Hegel ! a greatness handed down by the reception history starting from the 
FVA edition ! is also rendered questionable. However, if this latter (Hegels gretness as a 
philosopher) is put under suspicion, it also renders then questionable the necessity of a 
new edition, needing decades of work and a considerable material and intellectual input. 
That the new edition will make available and mediate a more accurate image of Hegel ! 
may well be possible; but whether this Hegel should be worth being presented in a new 
edition, is an issue that cannot be anticipated. 
 From all those said before it results that one should be careful about criticizing 
the FVA. Now, this point of view appears indeed ! although instinctively rather than 
consciously ! in the writings of the academic edition%s editors. While illustrating the 
deficiencies of the FVA, they remember over and over again the indisputable merits of 
this edition. Firstly, about its having grounded Hegel%s fame and transmitted it to 
posterity. Friedhelm Nicolin, the initiator and mentor of the GW, emphasized it from the 
very beginning: $Hegel%s thinking had exercised a worldwide influence due to the FVA. 
Followers and antagonists in the 19th and 20th century read Hegel in this edition. The 
translations to foreign languages of his individual works were based on these text 
editions. Last but not least, the indirect effect of Hegel%s image in the history of 
philosophy was also determined by this edition. [&] Finally, as regards the original 
documents which were still available for Hegel%s disciples, but have since been lost, this 
edition makes up the permanent part of the sources of Hegel%s work.#1 It should be 
added that here at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s Nicolin tried to argue for the necessity 
of the new edition not merely by reference to philological reasons: first of all, he referred 
to a particular modern necessity, a renewing interest worldwide in Hegel%s philosophy.2 
Then, following Nicolin, the idea of the actualization of Hegelian thought for present 
thinking did continue appearing in the writings of other co-operators and editors of the 
Hegel Archives.3  
 As for the merits of the FVA, Walter Jaeschke still continues to emphasize in 
our times ! after the turn of the millennium, almost fifty years following Nicolin%s 
quoted words and connected to them ! that $The <Friends of the Deceased% created the 
Corpus Hegelianum and the image of Hegelian philosophy which [&] defined its direct 
influence and which has lasted until these days.#4 From the period between these two 
seminal opinions, I shall quote Christoph Jamme, who wrote in the first half of the 
                                                 
1 Friedhelm Nicolin, $Die neue Hegel-Gesamtausgabe. Voraussetzungen und Ziele,# Hegel- 
Studien 1 (1961): 295!313, 296. 
2 Ibid., 308. 
3 Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, $Hegel Archiv und Hegel Ausgabe,# Zeitschrift für philoso-
phische Forschung 4 (1976): 609!618, 617: $A second, just as essential precondition of the work 
of the Hegel Archive is the philosophical actualization of Hegel. A successful attempt must be 
made to reveal the relevance of facing Hegel for the horizon of present-day philosophy.#  
4 Walter Jaeschke, Hegel-Handbuch: Leben  Werk  Schule (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2003), 503. 
Philobiblon  Vol. XVII (2012)  No. 1 
 ✞   ✝
1980s: $Despite all of its editorial questionability, the FVA is outstandingly important.# 
Since ! by the more recent 20th century editions based on the FVA, such as Glockner%s 
so-called anniversary edition or the Theorie Werkausgabe ! $it has fundamentally 
influenced the reception history of Hegelian philosophy up to the middle of the 20th 
century and beyond; it has formed the basis of Hegel-interpretations from Marx and 
Kierkegaard to Adorno.#1 The significance of reception history can of course hardly be 
overestimated from a hermeneutical perspective: no matter what the edition policy of the 
FVA was like, and no matter how we think about it now in the light of today%s 
philological standards, it is a fact that this edition created the dominant Hegel-image. 
The young Marx ! whose thinking was determined all his life by the struggle with Hegel 
as mediated by the FVA ! wrote in his doctoral thesis, debating the question of the 
ontological proof of the existence of God that the essential thing is not whether or not 
there were gods, but that people believed in them in the course of history, and $in this 
sense all gods, both pagan and Christian, possessed a real existence. [&] Kant%s 
criticism [of the ontological proof of God ! I.F.M] means nothing here. If someone 
imagines to have a hundred Thalers [&], if he believes in it, then the hundred imagined 
Thalers have the same value for him as a hundred real ones. E.g. he will run into debt 
over his imagination, the imagination will have effect, just like the whole humanity ran 
into debt on their gods% account.#2 Similarly, it can be said: irrespective of how the 
$real# Hegel, Hegel $in himself# may be construed to have been ! provided this question 
is meaningful at all,3 and provided there is any empirical evidence extant to reconstruct 
it,4 to finalize this (still not entirely clearly meaningful) enterprise !, his reception history 
                                                 
1 Christoph Jamme, $Editionspolitik. Zur %Freundesvereinsausgabe% der Werke G.W.F. Hegels,# 
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 1 (1984): 83!99, 84. 
2 Karl Marx, Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie nebst einem 
Anhange. In: Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe. Ergänzungsband, T. 1. Berlin: Dietz 1975, pp. 257!
373, here p. 371: $in diesem Sinn [&] alle Götter, sowohl die heidnischen als christlichen, eine 
reelle Existenz besessen haben. [&] Hier heißt auch Kants Kritik [of the ontological proof for the 
existence of God] nichts. Wenn jemand sich vorstellt, hundert Taler zu besitzen, [&] wenn er an 
sie glaubt, so haben ihm die hundert eingebildeten Taler denselben Wert wie hundert wirkliche. 
Er wird z. B. Schulden auf seine Einbildung machen, sie wird wirken, wie die ganze Menschheit 
Schulden auf ihre Götter gemacht hat.# (In English: Karl Marx, The Difference between the 
Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, Marx-Engels Collected Works vol. 1. 
[Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975]). 
3 $Ein Kant an sich [...] ist ein Grundmißverständnis# (A Kant in himself [...] is a fundamental 
misunderstanding#). Heidegger GA 3, 301. 
4 No kind of empiric knowledge can be used to reconstruct something like a $real x# ! even if the 
sources are abundant, or even if (or rather especially if) they are endless ! since this $real x# 
always presupposes the primacy of the a priori unity of a concept or an idea. $The desire either to 
prove or to refute ideas on the basis of facts is nonsense ! according to the quotation Kant used: 
ex pumice aquam.#! wrote Husserl. Edmund Husserl, $Philosophy as Rigorous Science,# in 
Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, translated by Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper = 
Row, 1965), pp. 71!147. The quotation in Kant%s The Critique of Practical Reason, trans. and ed. 
Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); on ideas see also: Critique of 
Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998). See also: Jean-Paul Sartre, The Emotions: Outline of a Theory, trans. Bernard 
Frechtman (New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1993), pp. 4!5. $[T]he idea of man [&] will be 
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could not still be ignored or eliminated even in that case. Should we still expect a new, 
significant, more authentic image of Hegel on the basis of the GW, the almost two 
centuries-long effective history of the reception of Hegelian philosophy cannot be 
undone.  
 
I. 6. Thus the FVA serves the GW in a double, ambivalent way: both negatively and 
positively. Indeed, the GW is very much dependent on this ambivalence in order to 
justify itself. It must feed on the FVA ! both negatively and positively ! as a parasite. 
The thorough criticism of the editorial principles and practice, as well as editorial policy 
of the FVA is just as much a decisive part of the necessity and self-justification of the 
GW as the assumption of Hegel%s greatness and importance as a philosopher constructed 
and handed down due to the same FVA. However, this ambivalence brings about 
several incompatibilities and results in a number of $non sequitur#. In any case, taking 
back or moderating the criticism of the FVA, or counter-balancing it by accentuating its 
merits creates a dubious obscurity. It seems advisable to veil or conceal the common 
root of this double ! positive and negative ! reference.      
 I have previously cited Nicolin, who claimed it was a merit of the FVA, 
amongst other things, that $Hegel%s thinking has gained its worldwide influence due to 
the FVA.# But ! let us not postpone the question any further ! did Hegel deserve indeed 
this $worldwide influence#? For precisely by taking seriously the criticism concerning 
the FVA the traditional image of Hegel ! or: the traditional image of Hegel%s greatness 
as a philosopher ! should be shattered, as a result of, and in parallel with, this criticism. 
As a matter of fact, if one ventures to consistently think over this issue, one should 
become absolutely sceptical about the nature and calibre of Hegelian thinking. One 
cannot make the pretension ! although, of course, one does, and by doing so makes the 
ambivalent, tacit impression ! as if Hegel%s importance as a philosopher were a widely 
                                                                                                                              
only a conjecture aiming to establish connections between disparate materials#; if $some 
psychologists were to use a certain conception of man before this ultimate synthesis were 
possible, it would be [&] like an idea in the Kantian sense, and their first duty would be never to 
lose sight of the fact that it was a regulating concept. [&] To expect the fact is, by definition, to 
expect the isolated, to prefer, because of positivism, the accidental to the essential, the contingent 
to the necessary, disorder to order; it is, on principle, to case what is essential into the future: <That 
will do for later, when we shall have assembled enough facts.% [&] it is just as impossible to get 
to essence by accumulating accidents as to reach 1 by adding figures to the right of 0.99.# Jean-
Paul Sartre: Esquisse d!une théorie des émotions. Paris: Hermann = Cie 1939, p. 5: $C%est dire 
que l%idée d%homme, si jamais elle prend un sens positif, ne sera qu%une conjecture visant à établir 
des connexions entre des matériaux disparates et qui ne tirera sa vraisemblance que de sa réussite. 
[&] Si pourtant certains psychologues usaient d%une certaine conception de l%homme avant que 
cette synthèse ultime ne fût possible, ce ne pourrait être qu%à titre rigoureusement personnel et 
comme fil conducteur ou mieux comme idée au sens kantien et leur premier devoir serait de ne 
jamais perdre de vue qu% il s%agit d%un concept régulateur. [&] Attendre le fait, c%est, par 
définition, attendre l%isolé, c%est préférer, par positivisme, l%accident à l%essentiel, le contingent au 
nécessaire, le désordre à l%ordre; c%est rejeter, par principe, l%essentiel dans l%avenir: »c%est pour 
plus tard, quand nous aurons réuni assez de faits.« [&] Les psychologues ne se rendent pas 
compte, en effet, qu%il est tout aussi impossible d%attendaire l%essence en entassant les accidents 
que d%aboutir à l%unité en ajoutant indéfiniment des chiffres à la droite de 0,99.$ 
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known, acquitted, concluded fact, whereby the disciples editing the FVA deserved to be 
praised and patted on the back for recognizing it,!in other words, as if it were a fact 
which we already know and take for granted as something beyond dispute and beyond 
doubt. The criticism of the FVA ! if taken seriously ! must throw into crisis or pull 
down with it the Hegel that it $constructed# or $built up# (to return to this political-like 
expression). The ambivalent reference to the FVA or the FVA%s use or exploitation ! 
both in a negative, and a positive sense ! for the advantage and justification of the GW 
is a phenomenon which precedes and accompanies the initiative and development of the 
GW. It is articulated differently depending on the audience it addresses or the interests 
of its particular context, while the reference is usually very careful not to $bring 
together# its thoughts; therefore it $conducts a household of its own,# $weighs and 
measures by a twofold standard,# to use Hegelian expressions.1 
 The argument that the FVA does not meet contemporary scholarly standards is 
a direct basis for the necessity of the new edition. The second, tacit premise, which 
should accompany the first and come in its completion, and must sometimes be 
expressed nonetheless, says that: a $Kulturvolk# or $Kulturnation# (such as the 
Germans) ! or in a more emphatic formulation: a $Kulturvolk# or $Kulturnation# of the 
                                                 
1  Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie (London: Harper = Row, 1967), § 205. 
Online edition: http://www.marxists.org/reference /archive/hegel/works/ph/phprefac.htm 
(Accessed: 01.02.2012) $This [sceptical] form of consciousness is, therefore, the aimless 
fickleness and instability of going to and fro, hither and thither, from one extreme of self-same 
self-consciousness, to the other contingent, confused and confusing consciousness. It does not 
itself bring these two thoughts of itself together. It finds its freedom, at one time, in the form of 
elevation above all the whirling complexity and all the contingency of mere existence, and again, 
at another time, likewise confesses to falling back upon what is unessential, and to being taken up 
with that.# And also: ibid., § 572. $The believing mood weighs and measures by a twofold 
standard, it has two sorts of eyes and ears, uses two voices to express its meaning, it duplicates all 
ideas, without comparing and relating the sense and meaning in the two forms used. Or we may 
say belief lives its life amidst two sorts of perceptions, the one the perceptions of thought which is 
asleep, purely uncritical and uncomprehending, the other those of waking consciousness living 
solely and simply in the world of sense; and in each of them it manages to conduct a household of 
its own.# (Italics mine ! I.M.F.]. See Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phänomenologie des 
Geistes. In: Hegel: Werke in zwanzig Bänden. Theorie Werkausgabe. Auf der Grundlage der 
Werke v. 1832-1845 neu edierte Ausgabe. Redaktion Eva Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel. 
Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp 1970, Bd. 3, p. 162: $Dies [skeptische] Bewußtsein ist also diese 
bewußtlose Faselei, von dem einen Extreme des sichselbstgleichen Selbstbewußtseins zum 
andern des zufälligen, verworrenen und verwirrenden Bewußtseins hinüber- und herüberzugehen. 
Es selbst bringt diese beiden Gedanken seiner selbst nicht zusammen [Italics mine ! I.M.F.]; es 
erkennt seine Freiheit einmal als Erhebung über alle Verwirrung und alle Zufälligkeit des Daseins 
und bekennt sich ebenso das andere Mal wieder als ein Zurückfallen in die Unwesentlichkeit und 
als ein Herumtreiben in ihr.$ Cf. also p. 423: $Das glaubende Bewußtsein führt doppeltes Maß 
und Gewicht [Italics mine ! I.M.F.], es hat zweierlei Augen, zweierlei Ohren, zweierlei Zunge 
und Sprache, es hat alle Vorstellungen verdoppelt, ohne diese Doppelsinnigkeit zu vergleichen 
[Italics mine ! I.M.F.]. Oder der Glaube lebt in zweierlei Wahrnehmungen, der einen, der 
Wahrnehmung des schlafenden, rein in begrifflosen Gedanken, der anderen des wachen, rein in 
der sinnlichen Wirklichkeit lebenden Bewußtseins, und in jeder führt er eine eigene Haushaltung 
[Italics mine ! I.M.F.].$ 
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sort of the Germans ! have the elementary obligation both towards themselves and 
towards the educated, scholarly world to make available the works of the outstanding 
thinkers of their past in scientifically reliable editions, meeting contemporary exigencies. 
The essential part of this double reference is that $it does not itself bring these two 
thoughts of itself together#: the second premise ! as it should in a syllogism ! appears as 
a distinct source of knowledge although in fact it is not. This second premise is needed 
nonetheless, it cannot be done without: if the edition project wants to avoid turning 
against itself and undermine the scientific and institutional foundations of its own 
enterprise, then it can be by no means of interest to the GW to overthrow or revise the 
image of Hegel%s greatness as a philosopher. On the contrary: it must make use of it as a 
justification for its own enterprise and its importance, for its purported national-cultural 
mission. The reference therefore ! here, in this context ! remains silent about the 
connection of the two premises: namely, the fact that Hegel%s philosophical greatness is 
a product of the scientifically condemned FVA. Were it not silent about it, the second 
premise would be overthrown, and the justification of the necessity of a new edition 
would seriously lose its weight.  
 However, in a different context this fact does not have to be dismissed in 
silence. Once the self-justification of the GW has been successful, it can well be 
formulated: it happens with the purpose both of generously recognizing the merits of the 
FVA, and the accentuation of the importance of its task ! further enhanced by the fame 
of the praised predecessors ! as well as the raising of scholarly requirements. Since it is 
the merit of the FVA to have perpetuated Hegel%s philosophical greatness in its own ! 
debatable ! way, then a contemporary, scientifically more reliable edition could even 
more raise the hope and expectation to reformulate and present this greatness in an 
undistorted, modern, scientific form. In this context the theoretical emphasis of the fact 
elsewhere kept silent of how significantly a textual and life-work edition can transform 
consciousness and shape the reception history is expressly an advantage and not at all a 
drawback. It formulates the expectation that the new edition will be a great 
accomplishment similar to the old one. By the two premises according to which: 1. the 
FVA performed a culturally significant act, and 2. the FVA used scientifically 
questionable methods, results the promise that: if 2. is corrected, that is, a scientifically 
reliable edition is made, it would bring along with it also premise 1, that is, it would be a 
culturally equally significant act. 
 
I.7.  However, the GW is the prisoner of FVA also in another sense: in a sense which 
could also exemplify the $conducting of a household of one%s own,# therefore it is not 
uninteresting to enter into some detail. The basic objection against the FVA is that it 
focused on the Berlin Hegel, that is, the Berlin lectures, the texts of which did not come 
directly from Hegel and which were compiled together to form unitary works. These 
volumes, which were not prepared and submitted for print by Hegel, take up more than 
half of the edition; in their case, much more textual criticism is needed than for those 
works which Hegel himself had published. The GW wanted to compete with the FVA 
primarily about the second series of the edition, the preparation of the lectures, since it 
was this part of the FVA which was most criticised and condemned, also firstly by the 
GW, therefore it seemed desirable and necessary to offer an alternative in this field. 
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 To compete with the FVA means however, that the GW in this respect is 
subject to the previous edition. Had the FVA not attributed such an outstanding role to 
the lectures, perhaps the GW would not have placed them in the forefront either. 
However, the GW also tried to justify the importance of editing the lectures, this time 
not on the basis of compilations, with a circumstance partly connected to the previous 
one, and partly independent of it. It argued that Hegel%s great influence, because of the 
relative scarcity of published works, was primarily grounded by the orally delivered 
lectures, his fame is due to those, therefore it is highly justified to pay extra editorial 
attention to them and, following a thorough critical textual analysis, make them 
available to the audience in a form which satisfies contemporary scholarly standards.  
 This argument appears as essential because it (is practically the only one which) 
tries to validate Hegel%s fame and influence not on the basis of the FVA edition, but in a 
way evading it, independently from it. The new edition is claimed to have to pay special 
attention to the lectures because Hegel gained his fame primarily by these and not by his 
printed works. This creates the impression that, besides and beyond the imperfection of 
the FVA, we have gained one further argument to justify the outstanding editorial 
interest in the lectures. The edition of the lectures therefore is especially significant 
because, 1. the way the FVA edited them is highly imperfect, unacceptable for modern 
standards, and 2. Hegel%s fame as a philosopher was primarily established by his oral 
lectures. Or, to put it more impressively: the edition of the lectures is especially 
significant because 1. Hegel%s fame as a philosopher was primarily established by his 
oral lectures, and 2. these were highly imperfectly edited by the FVA.  
 However, a closer analysis of the argument reveals once more its ambivalences. 
It can be questioned indeed whether these two arguments are truly independent of each 
other ! and enforce each other ! or rather there is one single argument in fact, that is, the 
existence of two arguments is only an appearance. Indeed, in the previous formulation 
the expression $by them# [the lectures] can be understood in two ways: first, as directly 
by them (so, directly by the oral delivery, and not by (or not only by) the FVA), then as 
indirectly by them, insofar as the FVA, focusing on the lectures, made them available in 
print, and this was the basis of their later broad influence. Of course, this statement 
cannot be refuted. Whether directly, through their oral delivery, or by their later edition, 
it is a fact: the lectures did have indeed a major influence. The ambivalence of this latter 
formulation also creates a dubious ! though from an editorial viewpoint beneficial ! 
obscurity; at any rate, it is obvious that at a closer look this argument (namely, the 
reference to the great influence of the lectures) for establishing Hegel%s fame apart from 
the FVA can hardly be tenable. Any attempt to account for Hegel%s fame and reception 
history by overlooking the FVA is necessarily doomed to end up in failure.  
 But let us see some characteristic formulations. The starting point is in almost 
all cases a kind of specific negativity, which then is turned into positivity. The negativity 
lies in the fact that Hegel ! unlike his idealist predecessors and Kant ! published very 
little in his lifetime. His fame, unlike his predecessors%, had not been established by the 
little number of his printed works (most of which had already been hardly accessible by 
that time). But since Hegel was a great philosopher (as we of course already know), 
therefore ! if we wish to know his thinking !, we must concentrate on the reconstruction 
of his university lectures, which are much more significant in the process of the 
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publication of his works than in the case of his forebears.1 And since Hegel%s lecture 
manuscripts have been handed down in very fragmentary forms, one must heavily draw 
on the student notes still available, the publication of which exceeds in significance the 
importance of lecture editions of other philosophers. If for no other reason, then because 
the FVA also published first of all the lecture notes. $Simply by presenting Hegel%s 
work in a closed form, by introducing the lecture volumes as complements, what is 
more, higher-level complements of Hegel%s unpublished works, and only thus could this 
edition exert a decisive influence lasting to this day# ! writes Walter Jaeschke.2 
$First of all, Hegel%s influence was established by his lectures; there he gathered 
his students around him and founded his school,# wrote Otto Pöggeler at the beginning 
of the 1990s. $Distinctly from Kant and Fichte, the decisive part of Hegel%s works was 
formed indeed by his lectures.#3 The claim that Kant was primarily influential by his 
printed works, while this was not the case for Hegel, was already formulated by 
Christoph Jamme in the 1980s,4 and Lothar Wigger also stressed: $As opposed to Kant, 
Hegel was primarily influential due to his lectures, in which he concretely elaborated 
important parts of his system.#5 Then after the turn of the millennium Walter Jaeschke 
                                                 
1 This reference is almost completely valid, although both Fichte and Schelling have a 
considerable amount of unpublished writings, and especially in Fichte%s case the various drafts of 
$science knowledge# (Wissenschaftslehre) which formed the core of his thinking were largely 
remained unpublished in the philosopher%s lifetime, and were only made available by the new, 
forty-volume historical-critical edition initiated some years before the Hegel-edition, in the 
beginning of the 1960s, and now at its termination (while the first series of the complete edition, 
containing the works published in the philosopher%s lifetime, consisted of ten volumes, the second 
series containing the works from his legacy consisted of fourteen volumes). In any case, it is valid 
for both of them that they published enough writings during their lifetime to establish their fame 
(in Fichte%s case the unpublished manuscripts of the Wissenschaftslehre were adequately 
compensated by the popular writings meant for the audience at large, such as the Speeches to the 
German Nation). For Kant the influence of his three critiques evidently eclipsed the aura of his 
university lectures; furthermore, Kant consciously considered his works as an organon $by which 
he intended to influence the audience.# Eckart Förster, $Die Vorreden,# in Immanuel Kant: Kritik 
der reinen Vernunft. Klassiker Auslegen, vol. 17, eds. G. Mohr, M. Willaschek (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 1998), 37!55, 37. 
2 Walter Jaeschke, $Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen,# 
Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 3 (1980): 51!63, 57: $Allein indem sie Hegels Werk in 
dieser geschlossenen Form darbot, indem die Vorlesungsbände sich als Surrogat und sogar als 
überlegenes Surrogat von Hegel nicht publizierter Werke präsentierten, konnte diese Ausgabe 
ihre bis heute bestimmende Wirkung entfalten.# 
3 Otto Pöggeler, $Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen,# Hegel-Studien 26 (1991): 121!175, 
128: $[Es waren] vor allem die Vorlesungen, auf denen Hegels Wirkung beruhte: dort gewann er 
zumeist seine Schüler und bildete seine Schule. In diesen Vorlesungen lag ! anders als bei Kant 
oder bei Fichte ! in der Tat ein entscheidender Teil des Hegelschen Werkes#. 
4 Christoph Jamme, $Editionspolitik. Zur %Freundesvereinsausgabe% der Werke G.W.F. Hegels,# 
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 1 (1984): 83!99, 89; see also ibid., 95. 
5 Lothar Wigger, $75 Jahre kritische Hegel-Ausgaben: Zu Geschichte und Stand der Hegel-
Edition,# Pädagogische Rundschau 1 (1987): 101!116, 102: $Gewirkt hat Hegel ! im 
Unterschied z. B. zu Kant ! vor allem durch seine Vorlesungen, in denen er die konkrete 
Umsetzung und Ausführung wichtiger Teile seines Systems vornahm.# 
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continued to emphasize: $Unlike the works of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, Hegel%s 
philosophy received little public attention and discussion in his lifetime.#1 In one of his 
writings two decades earlier Jaeschke expressed this same thesis in more detail as well. 
$Distinctly from the cases of Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, or Schelling, the major influence of 
Hegel%s works starting from the edition of his lectures. [&] From the perspective of the 
reception history of his philosophy, Hegel%s activity as a lecturer at Berlin University 
proved to be decisive, and it proved to be so both from the point of view of its broad 
influence, and the foundation of the Hegelian school, which was of course only 
established by his educational activity in Berlin.#2 
 Our investigation could naturally ask the question whether this bothand 
denotes two distinct things indeed. The question is answered in a sense by Jaeschke 
himself in his previously cited work from 2003, which is worth being cited at some 
length: $Hegel%s philosophy received little public attention and discussion in his lifetime. 
His actual reception history [&] started only posthumously. [&] Contrary to widespread 
legends which saw him as the emperor of philosophy of his age, Hegel%s influence in his 
lifetime was limited to the classroom, his aura only reached Halle, and remained only 
partial even in Berlin.#3 
 This qualification seems to heavily contradict any statement that stresses the 
significant influence of the lectures ! formulated by others as well as Jaeschke himself 
in his earlier writings cited before ! and seems to be difficult to reconcile with the first 
part of the bothand construction of the above mentioned sentence. In this respect in fact 
it does answer ! albeit in a negative sense ! the question whether the bothand denotes 
indeed two things. The contradiction can be explained (or dissolved) by the difference in 
knowledge interests or ! as I have mentioned above ! the difference in contexts, which 
in this particular case means the targeted audience. The last cited fragment comes from a 
handbook, while the former from a scholarly journal. Now, evidently a handbook is 
written not so much for the experts of a discipline, but for the audience at large. The 
need for a new edition must be justified towards the experts of the discipline (and not 
less towards cultural policy and science financing); however, such a justification loses 
its relevance or at least remains in the background in presentations written for the wide 
                                                 
1 Walter Jaeschke, Hegel-Handbuch: Leben  Werk  Schule (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2003), 503: 
$anders als das Werk Kants, Fichtes und Schellings [&] Hegels Philosophie zu seinen Lebzeiten 
nur geringe öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit und Auseinandersetzung erfahren [hat]# 
2 Walter Jaeschke, $Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen,# 
Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 3 (1980): 51!63, 57: $Denn anders als etwa bei Leibniz, 
Kant, Fichte und Schelling ging die Hauptwirkung des Hegelschen Werkes von der Edition der 
Vorlesungen aus. [&] Hegels Vorlesungstätigkeit an der Berliner Universität [ist] für die 
Wirkungsgeschichte seiner Philosophie entscheidend geworden [&]: sowohl für ihre 
Breitenwirkung als auch für die Gründung der Hegelschen Schule, die sich ja erst auf Grund der 
Berliner Lehrtätigkeit gebildet hat [&]# (Italics I.M.F.) 
3 Walter Jaeschke: Hegel-Handbuch, 503: $Hegels Philosophie [hat] zu seinen Lebzeiten nur 
geringe öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit und Auseinandersetzung erfahren. Ihre eigentliche 
Wirkungsgeschichte setzt erst postum ein [&]. [&] Entgegen den verbreiteten Legenden, die 
Hegel zum philosophischen Imperator seines Zeitalters stilisieren, hat sich seine Wirkung zu 
seinen Lebzeiten auf seinen Hörsaal beschränkt, mit Ausstrahlung lediglich auf Halle ! und selbst 
in Berlin ist sie nur partiell gewesen#. 
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audience. Nevertheless, the interest of the wide audience can very well be raised by 
curiosities such as the discovery that the world-famous philosopher was practically 
unknown in his own age. Moreover, this latter representation is probably closer to 
reality, while the former is prone to project this wide influence back to Hegel%s time, to 
his Berlin period. (It should deserve a little digression to call attention to this particular 
anomaly of the profession, this kind of $transcendental appearance or illusion# in a 
Kantian sense, which Kant describes in opposition to empirical or logical appearance as 
follows: $This illusion it is impossible to avoid, just as we cannot avoid perceiving that 
the sea appears to be higher at a distance than it is near the shore#1 ! namely, to the fact 
that the present is prone to date the influence of a work it considers outstanding to as 
early as possible, preferably to the very age when it was written.) 
 Therefore the references to Hegel%s $widely influential# lectures are ambivalent, 
and capable of creating appropriate obscurity; the meaning may be either the effect of 
the orally delivered lectures, or that of the printed version published by the slightly more 
than half a dozen disciples in the FVA edition, and this shift in meaning can alternate, in 
accordance with the all-time necessities and contexts. The two meanings are indefinitely 
! and, let us add, beneficially ! intertwined. Christoph Jamme in his already cited work 
spoke about the $inglorious fame# ($unrühmliche Berümtheit#) that Hegel%s works had 
to deal with firstly due to the methods used in editing the lectures. This is a fortunate 
expression ! but not only in the meaning intended by the author, but also in that further 
sense that the researchers editing the GW in their statements about the FVA can 
alternately stress the positive connotations of the noun or the negative connotations of 
the adjective, in accordance with the context and the all-time needs of the GW.2 
However, that much should be added by all means: without this $inglorious fame# 
Hegel could hardly have become who he was later to be, and the GW could also hardly 
have come into being.  
 
I.8. It has been repeatedly mentioned above that the edition of the lectures is the most 
controversial point of the FVA, and that the GW considers its fundamental task to offer 
an alternative to the FVA precisely in this matter. However, the elaboration of adequate 
editorial principles has been a problem from the very beginning. There was agreement 
only about the fact that it cannot be pursued as the FVA did. In the mid-1970s 
Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert complained abpout there being no philological standards 
for the edition of the lectures.3 A few years later, Walter Jaeschke ! editor of the FVA, 
today the director of the Archives ! already summarized as follows: $we have been 
dealing with it for years to proceed with the planning and preparation of the second 
                                                 
1 See Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, B353f. [Transcendental logic. Second Divison. I. Of 
Transcendental Illusory Appearance] 
http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/4280/pg4280.html 
($... so wenig als wir es vermeiden können, daß uns das Meer in der Mitte nicht höher scheine, 
wie an dem Ufer#). 
2 Christoph Jamme, $Editionspolitik. Zur %Freundesvereinsausgabe% der Werke G.W.F. Hegels,# 
Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 1 (1984): 83!99, 83. 
3 Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, $Hegel Archiv und Hegel Ausgabe,# Zeitschrift für 
philosophische Forschung 4 (1976): 609!618, 610. 
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series, the edition of the lecture notes as well, in parallel with the first series of the 
complete edition.#1 The elaboration of the concept is evidently a time-consuming 
activity, and it should by no means be hastened, we could say, since twenty-eight years 
have passed since the publication of the above lines. The edition started in the 1960s and 
was planned for forty volumes; it should have been finished by the turn of the 
millennium, in forty year%s time2 ! whereas the editorial brochure planned the 
publication of the opening volume of the second series only for 2008, evidently on the 
basis of a well-designed concept, but definitely ! as mentioned above ! following a 
decade of test-edition series.  
 The editorial announcement of this initial volume of the second series makes 
use to the full of the above displayed ambivalence. Hegel%s fame, the editorial reads, was 
established by his Berlin lectures, and his great influence on his contemporaries was due 
less to his earlier published writings than to his lectures held at Berlin University.3 
Nonetheless, the text goes on, the FVA%s procedure to compile a sovereign main text out 
of various source texts is not an acceptable way to go for the GW. Instead, the second 
series of the GW will contain $the authentic wording of all extant lecture notes# ($der 
authentische Wortlaut aller erhaltenen Nachschriften#).4 
                                                 
1 Walter Jaeschke, $Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen,# Allgemei-
ne Zeitschrift für Philosophie 3 (1980): 51!63, 51 ($Wir sind ... seit mehreren Jahren damit 
beschäftigt, parallel zur Arbeit an der ersten Abteilung auch die Planung und Vorarbeiten für die 
zweite Abteilung, also für die Edition der Nachschriften, voranzutreiben [&]#). Friedhelm 
Nicolin noted already in the second half of the 1950s that $the publication of the lectures has 
begun# (Friedhelm Nicolin, $Probleme und Stand der Hegel-Edition,# Zeitschrift für 
philosophische Forschung 1 (1957): 117!129, 128.) He also mentioned that there was great 
anticipation for the long heralded early writings of Hegel (although the first of the planned two 
volumes of these latter writings only appeared in 1989 [GW 1], while the second [GW 2], which 
should comprise the Frankfurt writings, possibly the most acclaimed of this period, is still 
unpublished).  
2 See the summary of Otto Pöggeler, $Die historisch-kritische Edition in der Wissenschaftsorgani-
sation,# Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte, eds. Walter 
Jaeschke, Wilhelm G. Jacobs und Hermann Krings (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), 27!
37, 33. $According to the plan designed in the 1960s, Hegel%s works are to appear over a period 
of forty years in forty volumes.# One of the primary motivating factors of the new edition was 
that ! as I have previously mentioned ! even the ever so honourable efforts of individual 
researchers will not be enough to complete a new Hegel edition within one generation%s time. 
However, the present state of the Hegel-edition sets forth the perspective that the editorial work of 
a whole generation of researchers and philologists of Hegel will not suffice to do so either.  
3 http://www.meiner.de/product_info.php?products_id>2962: $Hegels Ruhm gründet sich auf 
seine Berliner Vorlesungen, die in der zweiten Abteilung der %Gesammelten Werke% nun erstmals 
in textkritischer Edition vorgelegt werden. [...] Hegels große Wirkung auf seine Zeitgenossen 
beruhte nicht so sehr auf der Rezeption seiner zuvor publizierten Schriften, sondern vor allem auf 
seinen Vorlesungen an der Berliner Universität, an die er 1818 berufen wurde und an der bis zu 
seinem Tod im Jahr 1831 den Ton angab.# 
4 $Für die Edition der Vorlesungen in der historisch-kritischen Ausgabe der %Gesammelten Wer-
ke% kann das Prinzip der %freihändigen% Kompilation eines Haupttextes aus diversen Quellentex-
ten, das [...] von den Herausgebern der %Freundesausgabe% befolgt wurde, allerdings keine Gel-
tung mehr haben. Geboten wird daher in der zweiten Abteilung der %GW%, die die Bände 23 bis 
Philobiblon  Vol. XVII (2012)  No. 1 
 ✞ ✁ ✆
 Although it is advisable to evaluate the opening volume only after its 
appearance and the ensuing scholarly echo, and a thorough value-judgment can 
obviously be made only perspectively, after several volumes have been published, a 
remark can be made nonetheless: the expression within the quotation marks is very 
difficult to understand. Since the $test edition# of the lectures and the subsequent debates 
clearly show that, while the FVA%s way is not a pursuable one, the opposite extreme, the 
publication of all student notes extant, is nothing more effective or executable either.1 
Firstly because of the material-intellectual-physical overwork, since ! as it has been 
mentioned before ! the Hegel Archives possesses approximately ninety lecture notes, 
and this would entail the publication of almost as many or only a little fewer volumes, 
while there is hardly enough capacity for such an endeavour. Secondly, this method is 
also counter-productive, since by this edition it would, so-to-say, $dead edit# its author 
($tot edieren#; I shall return to it further on). On the other hand, not all lecture notes 
extant deserve to be published, that is, not all of them are in a condition to be worth 
publication. The previously repeatedly considered proposition to edit the notes 
according to academic years, including the lecture notes of a particular series into one 
volume ($Jahrgangstexte#) would be too mechanical and inexpedient. Hegel%s teaching 
activity in Berlin extended to twenty-six semesters, with an average of two lectures per 
semester, therefore ! as far as the sources are improved ! we would still be speaking 
about the edition of sixty or seventy volumes, which is not only too much, but also not 
justified, since the notes of various years are unevenly documented; some better, others 
less, yet others very poorly. Moreover, Hegel%s lectures in some years were quite 
similar. The solution apparently chosen by the second series (deducing from the planned 
amount of ten volumes) was already formulated by Walter Jaeschke. According to him, 
the lecture notes referring to one discipline or subject (e.g. metaphysics, philosophy of 
religion, aesthetics, history of philosophy), coming from subsequent years ! and 
different students ! should not be published individually, but compiled into one single ! 
or, if justified (if there are significant conceptual differences between the years), two or 
three ! volume(s) in such a way that the best lecture note is chosen as the $lead text# 
($Leittext#), while the other notes ! from the same year but different author, or adjacent 
years but on similar subject ! will serve as control or complementary texts 
($Kontrolltext#, $Ergänzungstext#), and will appear in footnotes or attachments, or in 
the textual critical apparatus. The edition of the lectures is organized thus around $year%s 
texts# ($Jahrgangstexte#), where one volume integrates several years% texts. This edition 
technique will make possible the publication of the thirteen preserved notes in logic in 
three or four volumes.  
 The sketched proposition is felicitous, but its success depends on the fortunate 
encounter of too many contingent circumstances. It is a question, first of all, whether the 
preserved lecture notes will fall in line with the concept. What happens if several 
lectures notes can rightfully claim to be $lead texts#, or the opposite: none seems worthy 
                                                                                                                              
31 umfassen wird, der authentische Wortlaut aller erhaltenen Nachschriften zu den von Hegel 
gehaltenen Vorlesungen, um der Forschung ein sicheres Fundament zu geben.# (Emphasis by 
I.F.M.) 
1 For the followings, see: Walter Jaeschke, $Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels 
Vorlesungen,# Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 3 (1980): 51!63, 53!59. 
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of it? Then: the criteria for establishing the $lead text# are not clear or clearly 
identifiable. Otto Pöggeler was apparently right to claim that various notetakers 
($Nachschreiber#) could work together, exchange their notes, or copy from each other.1 
Thus, if for example three of a lecture%s five extant notes are highly consistent with each 
other, it is still no evidence for their authenticity. Be it as it may, the publisher%s 
assurance that the second series of the GW will yield the $authentic wording of all extant 
lecture notes# is quite obscure and unfounded; one can hardly explain what an 
$authentic wording# would mean here, and especially, how this latter would refer to 
$all# lecture notes.  
 At any rate, the integrated (combined) edition of the lectures by years, although 
maintaining the critical attitude towards compilation, seems to make steps in the 
direction of the FVA%s concept of Hegel%s $system#. In addition to this, the ambition of 
competing with the FVA also seems to remain in the background, and this way the role 
of the lectures in the integrated edition (dramatically stressed before) diminishes or loses 
its importance as well. While the lectures were contained in more than half of the FVA%s 
volumes, the second series of the GW, in contrast to the twenty-two volumes of the first 
series, will publish the lectures in only ten volumes.  
 Despite the grouping into thematic units, the edition based on combined years% 
texts is still highly reclining on the principle of evolution history, stresses Jaeschke.2 
Ever since Dilthey, the perspective of evolution history is a recurrent keyword of Hegel-
editions. I have been arguing earlier (section I.3.) that the new, modern Hegel-edition, 
the GW does not lack the traces of the philosophical spirit and worldview of the age 
either, only that it expresses it differently than the FVA, and that it is precisely the 
evolutionary perspective which is the leading motif of expressing the spirit of the age. 
Since the main subject of this paper is the relationship of philology and philosophy or 
philology and hermeneutics ! the thesis that the establishment of the text and the edition 
of the text, or the critical and lifework-editions in general, do not happen in a space void 
of interpretation or above history ! it will not be superfluous to return to this question in 
the concluding part of this summary of the history of Hegel%s edition (which has 
hopefully illustrated this relationship in several different ways).  
 
I.9. The critical reflections about the $complete# and the $real# Hegel have constituted 
the overture of the GW ! as discussed in part I.1. ! in the sense that the FVA contained 
neither the one, nor the other.3 Which Hegel is the $real# Hegel ! that is, the tacit 
assumption that the $real# Hegel will be contained in the lifework edition drawn up on 
the basis of the evolutionary Hegel-image, and not in the disciples% edition ! is not at all 
a trivial, self-evident question: and to its greatest part is dependent on philosophical 
considerations on truth. At any rate, the real/true Hegel for the disciples may well have 
been the systematic Hegel, the Hegel of the FVA. They could argue this on the basis of 
the philosophical concepts and authority of their master. For ! we have heard it ! $the 
                                                 
1 Otto Pöggeler, $Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen,# Hegel-Studien 26 (1991): 121!175, 158.  
2 Walter Jaeschke, $Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen,# 
Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie 5 (1980): 58. 
3 See Friedhelm Nicolin, $Probleme und Stand der Hegel-Edition,# 118. Part of the researchers 
took then over this characterization. See e.g. Wigger, $75 Jahre kritische Hegel-Ausgaben,# 103. 
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truth is the whole.# $The true shape in which the truth exists can only be its scientific 
system.# Obviously, it is possible to come out with other kinds of philosophical concepts 
on truth, but these will be just as debatable as all philosophical concepts in general. It is 
a naivety to believe that the rhetoric on the $real# Hegel could find itself a stable ground 
outside philosophy, and thus could feel exempted (as some kind of ultimate truth) from 
philosophical discussion. It can be claimed of course that (the meaning of) truth is 
different for us today than it was for Hegel or his disciples. Today we understand 
something else as the $real# Hegel. But this only means that we live in a different age. 
Still, we do not live in an absolute age either.  
 The situation is the same with reference to the $complete# Hegel. Similarly to 
the $real#, Hegel also had his own clear opinion about the $complete#, as apparent from 
the quoted passages of the Phenomenology and his remarks on Schelling. The 
legitimacy of the modern complaint that the FVA does not contain the $complete# Hegel 
because it only very selectively draws on the early manuscripts ! it consciously puts 
aside and eliminates the writings which are documents of Hegel%s evolution, while it 
publishes the Berlin lectures in a highly overestimating manner !, so because its 
editorial method is highly selective, depends on what we mean by $complete#. The 
disciples could rightfully believe that they published indeed the $complete# Hegel 
($complete# in the sense shown by the quotes), and to this purpose they resorted, 
wherever necessary, to the method that they are blamed about today: the compilation of 
manuscripts and lecture notes. Hegel reprehended Schelling for putting forth his 
developing, shaping thoughts for the wide public instead of waiting until his thoughts 
had gained their final shape, crystallized, and formed a system. The disciples could have 
answered: they did not wish to burden or confuse the reader with unnecessary and 
irrelevant things ! as Hegel seems to have thought Schelling did. For them, the missed 
things: the manuscripts representing the various, consecutive stages of the evolution 
history of Hegelian thought were definitely not part of the $complete# works (based on 
the understanding of $complete# mediated to them by the Hegelian system).  
 Every selection has its criteria ! however, this statement is not less valid for the 
(apparent) lack of any selection. The disciples could have argued against the modern, 
evolution-historical Hegel-edition by saying that it wants to employ no kind of selection, 
only taking into consideration the one single, external (\) criterion of what Hegel himself 
(incidentally) submitted for publication and what he had no time to publish, or what 
manuscripts and notes were preserved ! by this, a lifework-edition only betrays (and/or 
conceals) its own perplexity. Its perplexity regarding the question: what does Hegel%s 
philosophy consist of? And through this, also the fact is revealed that Hegel%s 
philosophy does not concern the editors any longer, it does not affect them, it has no live 
relationship with them any more. (And indeed: the editors of the GW are Hegel-
researchers, but they are hardly Hegelians). The $complete# they wished to edit may be 
said to be nothing else than the accidental empirical set of completely heterogeneous and 
disparate things,1 and the obtained result hardly assists the reader in familiarizing 
                                                 
1 See Friedhelm Nicolin, $Die neue Hegel-Gesamtausgabe,# 310. As to its content, $the 
fundamental principle of completeness is valid# for the new complete edition. $The edition must 
contain everything that Hegel ever published in print, or everything that was preserved in his 
legacy in manuscripts or posthumous editions.# The objective is to $make visible, as much as 
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him/herself with Hegel, but rather overwhelms and confuses him or her. The editorial 
uncertainty causes the reader%s disorientation. While an edition (seen from the 
perspective of the disciples) would have the task to undertake a fundamental role in the 
dispersion of the system ! whether or not as an unconquerable fortress !, or at least, as a 
minimal condition, in raising the interest and sympathy towards it.  
 At the same time, this reasoning, as it had been mentioned before, is very much 
present in the attempt to avert the risk of $tot edieren#. $There can easily be found basic 
editorial principles for the edition of the students% notes which so-to-say overwhelm the 
author by his edition [einen Autor tot zu edieren],# highlighted Jaeschke. $A supposed 
philological accuracy and thoughtlessness ! at least with reference to this problem ! are 
not very far from each other.#1 This latter thesis ! as the theoretical formulation of the 
relationship and inner connections of philology and hermeneutics ! can be accepted 
indeed to the fullest with a pure heart. However, it is worth noting meanwhile: there can be 
various kinds of reactions to the supposed or real danger outlined; the complete edition of 
Heidegger, started in 1975 with its over one hundred planned volumes ! precisely one 
hundred and two ! and seventy-seven actually published volumes until October 2008, 
seems to have remained indifferent to it, or wanted to defiantly challenge it. 
 The need for the evolution-historical image and edition of Hegel, propagated by 
the spirit of the age and undertaken by the GW together with all other editions following 
                                                                                                                              
possible, the thinker%s path that Hegel had walked.# As Nicolin relates it elsewhere, after 
reviewing more than one thousand auction catalogues, the number of documents (letters and 
manuscripts) in Hegel%s handwriting has raised to approximately one hundred items; at the same 
time, not much is known about their state of preservation (see Friedhelm Nicolin, $Philologische 
Aufgaben der Hegel-Forschung,# Heidelberger Hegel-Tage, Hegel-Studien, Supplement 1, eds. 
Friedhelm Nicolin and Otto Pöggeler, (1962): 327!337, 331.) 
1 Walter Jaeschke, $Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen,# Allgemei-
ne Zeitschrift für Philosophie 3 (1980): 56 ($...sich unschwer Prinzipien finden [lassen], um einen 
Autor tot zu edieren. Vermeintliche editorische Akribie und Gedankenlosigkeit sind ! zumindest 
im Blick auf dieses Problem ! eng benachbart#). See also Otto Pöggeler, $Nachschriften von 
Hegels Vorlesungen,# Hegel-Studien 26 (1991): 123. $It has been repeatedly claimed that an 
author can be edited to death [Es ist vielfach darauf hingewiesen worden, daß man einen Autor 
auch totedieren kann]. With the above mentioned quantity [several dozens of lecture volumes] the 
loading of the statics and finances of institutions and libraries would become unmanageable. And 
which doctoral student would then not be right to turn around and run away if he were taken to 
the inestimable number of volumes with the warning: <Well, you should read these first.%# ($Es ist 
vielfach darauf hingewiesen worden, daß man einen Autor auch totedieren kann. Mit der 
genannten Quantität an Büchern würde die Belastung der Statik und die Finanzen der Institute 
und Bibliotheken untragbar. Und welcher Doktorand würde nicht mit guten Gründen fortlaufen, 
wenn man ihn vor die unübersichtliche Zahl der Bände führte mit der Mahnung: »Lesen Sie das 
erst einmal.«#.) See also Otto Pöggeler, $Die historisch-kritische Edition in der 
Wissenschaftsorganisation,# Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition 
philosophischer Texte, eds. Walter Jaeschke, Wilhelm G. Jacobs and Hermann Krings (Hamburg: 
Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), 27!37. Here, 33.: $Is it not possible to edit an author to his death? To 
close it up by the edition within his coffin in such a way that no doctoral student can access it any 
longer?# ($Kann man einen Autor aber nicht auch tot edieren, ihn durch eine Edition so 
einsargen, daß kein Doktorand sich mehr an ihn heranwagt?#) 
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the FVA, reaches back to Dilthey.1 It is from him that the nearly programmatic famous 
words derive: $The time of struggling with Hegel has come to an end, the time of his 
historical knowledge has arrived. Only this historical perspective will be able to separate 
the transient and the permanent in Hegel.#2 These lines were written in conclusion of the 
review which Dilthey wrote on the appearance of the two-volume edition, published in 
1887 by Karl Hegel, of Hegel%s correspondence as a late supplement of the FVA.3 This 
publication and its review by Dilthey marks a kind of time limit: the change of a 
philosophical worldview and spirit of the age which determines and separates two 
editions. Seen from here, the edition of Hegel%s correspondence is itself a kind of shift: a 
bridge from the systematic Hegel of the FVA to the historical Hegel. Highly welcoming 
this latter kind of edition, Dilthey intended to radicalize it; his conclusion projects forth 
the necessity of accomplishing this task. $We have received these two volumes with 
great gratitude,# he wrote immediately before the quoted words: $But these make us 
realize even more the necessity to create, on the basis of the completely new apparatus, 
the evolution history of Hegel [Entwicklungsgeschichte] by the publication of the more 
complete abstracts of the manuscripts of his early years, and that this way the nice work 
once started by Haym ! before the opening of the legacy of the romantics and Schelling, 
and in addition precisely in the time of the struggles with speculative systems ! would 
adequately come to its end.# ("Mit lebhaftem Danke haben wir diese beiden Bände 
aufgenommen. Aber sie können nur unser Bedürfniss um so lebhafter erregen, dass auf 
                                                 
1 This is also valid for the new, academic edition of the lifeworks of Fichte and Schelling. 
$Dilthey%s concept on the academic edition of Kant%s Collected writings is the pattern for the 
basic editorial principles of the historical-critical edition of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel half a 
century later. The complete processing of the author%s intellectual legacy, the edition within the 
framework of four series (works, letters, manuscripts, lectures), the chronological organization of 
the material which makes possible to reconstruct the author%s evolution history, the preservation 
of historical language use, the documentation of the creation of individual texts, the list of all 
textual variants, reference to cited places, and objective explanations ! these are the most 
important characteristics taken over from the Kant-edition# (Wolfhart Henckmann, $Fichte ! 
Schelling ! Hegel,# Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte, 
eds. Walter Jaeschke, Wilhelm G. Jacobs and Hermann Krings [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 
1987], 83!115; 83: $Diltheys Konzeption der Akademie-Ausgabe von Kants Gesammelten 
Schriften ist das Modell, nach dem noch ein halbes Jahrhundert später die Grundzüge der 
historisch-kritischen Ausgaben der Werke von Fichte, Schelling und Hegel entworfen worden 
sind. Vollständige Erfassung der geistigen Hinterlassenschaft des Autors, Einteilung in die vier 
Reihen der Werke, Briefe, des handschriftlichen Nachlasses und der Vorlesungen, chronologische 
Anordnung der Materialien, aus der die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Autors abgelesen werden 
kann, Wahrung der historischen Sprachform, Dokumentation der Entstehung der einzelnen Texte, 
Verzeichnis aller Textvarianten, Zitatnachweise und Sacherklärungen ! dies sind die wichtigsten 
Standards, die von der Kant-Ausgabe übernommen worden sind#) 
2 Wilhelm Dilthey, $Briefe von und an Hegel,# in Idem, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 15. Zur 
Geistesgeschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Portraits und biographische Skizzen. Quellenstudien und 
Literaturberichte zur Theologie und Philosophie im 19. Jahrhundert, ed. Ulrich Herrmann, 3rd 
edition (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck = Ruprecht, 1991), 310!316; 316.: $Die Zeit des Kampfes mit 
Hegel ist vorüber, die seiner historischen Erkenntnis ist gekommen. Diese historische 
Betrachtung wird erst das Vergängliche in ihm von dem Bleibenden sondern.#  
3 Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie I (1888): 289!299. 
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Grund des neuen vollständigen Apparates eine Entwicklungsgeschichte Hegel%s unter 
Mittheilung ganz ausreichender Auszüge aus den Manuscripten seiner früheren Jahre 
uns geschenkt werde und so das eins von Haym vor der völligen Eröffnung der 
Nachlasse der Romantiker und Schelling%s, dazu noch in der Zeit des Kampfes mit den 
speculativen Systemen so schon Begonnene entsprechend vollendet werde.#) 
 I shall return to Haym soon, but in order to illustrate the differences between the 
two kinds of age climates, it is worthwhile to return to and dwell on Hegel%s age for a 
while. The description of the age is offered first of all by the plastic summary of Richard 
Kroner%s work.1 The age of German idealism, dating it from the year of publication of 
the Critique of Pure Reason to the year of publication of Hegel%s Philosophy of Right, 
wrote Kroner at the beginning of his outstanding work, comprises in fact the four 
decades between 1781 and 1821. This age is penetrated by a spirit which $is comparable 
to the eschatological hopes of the forming Christianity; the day of the truth must dawn 
now or never again; it is at hand, it is our calling to accomplish it.#2 In order to illustrate 
the intellectual climage, Kroner cites Hegel%s letter written to Schelling in January 1795: 
$Let the kingdom of God come, and let us not sit idle.#3 This spirit is similarly 
represented already in the final lines of Kant%s main critical work: $only the way of 
criticism remains open,# Kant retrospectively summarizes his seminal work. $The 
readers, if they had enough good will and patience to accompany me on this road, can 
now judge whether it is possible, if they are willing to contribute, to widen this path into 
a highway, and turn into reality before the end of our century that what so many 
centuries could not accomplish, namely to answer those question, to the full satisfaction 
of the human mind, which have always raised ! although to no avail up to now ! their 
desire of knowledge.#4 Reading these lines, one may remark: it is evident in this 
approach that for the represantatives of German idealism ! and especially for Hegel ! 
these words of Kant sounded as summons. They were extremely willing to widen the 
path of criticism into a highway, and they tried to give final answers to the questions 
raising the humans% desire of knowledge. Kroner then illustrates this spirit and the 
corresponding tone on the basis of various writings of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, but 
we shall not follow his summarizing any further.  
                                                 
1 For the followings, see Richard Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel, 2 vols. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1921 and 
1924; 2nd edition: 1961), 1 ff.  
2 $...etwas von dem Hauche der eschatologischen Hoffnungen aus der Zeit des Christentums$ hat; 
$jetzt oder niemals muß der Tag der Wahrheit anbrechen, er ist nahe, wir sind berufen, ihn 
herbeizuführen$. We have seen before (in part I.3.) that the tone of the funeral orations delivered 
at Hegel%s death are very much similar to this. 
3 Brief Hegels an Schelling v. Ende Januar 1795. In: Briefe von und an Hegel, ed. Johannes 
Hoffmeister, vol. 1 (Hamburg: Meiner 1969), p. 18. $Das Reich Gottes komme, und unsere 
Hände seien nicht müßig im Schoße\$ 
4 Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B884: $Der kritische Weg ist allein noch offen. Wenn der 
Leser diesen in meiner Gesellschaft durchzuwandern Gefälligkeit und Geduld gehabt hat, so mag 
er jetzt urteilen, ob nicht, wenn es ihm beliebt, das Seinige dazu beizutragen, um diesen Fußsteig 
zur Heeresstraße [Italics mine ! I.M.F.] zu machen, dasjenige, was viele Jahrhunderte nicht 
leisten konnten [Italics mine ! I.M.F.], noch vor Ablauf des gegenwärtigen erreicht werden 
[Italics mine ! I.M.F.] möge: nämlich die menschliche Vernunft in dem, was ihre Wißbegierde 
jederzeit, bisher aber vergeblich, beschäftigt hat, zur völligen Befriedigung zu bringen. 
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 It should be noted at any rate that the period of fifteen years after Hegel%s death 
! the very period while the disciples were editing the FVA ! was still reigned by the 
intellectual climate signalled by Kroner, to such an extent that even Schelling%s Berlin 
lectures in the 1840s unfolded against its background. The way how Hegelians reacted 
to Schelling%s occupation of the Berlin cathedra was reminiscent of the tone of the 
funeral speeches delivered upon Hegel%s death. In his account of Schelling%s inaugural 
speech in Berlin in November 1841, the young ! and at that time still very Hegelian ! 
Engels wrote the following: $Our job will be [&] to protect the grave of the great master 
from vituperations. We shall not refrain from struggle. Nothing can be more desirable 
for us than to temporarily become ecclesia pressa [repressed church]. Here the souls 
part. That which is true, will resist to the ordeal of fire, that which is false, we shall 
gladly miss it from among ourselves. [&] the youth has never poured in such a great 
number under our flags, the thought that reigns over us has never unfolded with such 
richness, the courage, sensibility, talent has never been on our side as much as it is now. 
Therefore we shall boldly confront the new enemy [&].#1 In his brochure published one 
year later, Engels also wrote lines which mirrored the contemporary influence of the 
FVA and which are worth cited here because, according to my knowledge, they have 
not been put to use yet from the point of view of FVA%s philology and reception history, 
although possibly so from other points of view. $When Hegel died in 1831 and left his 
system as heritage to his students, their number was relatively small. [&] His writings 
taken in public [&] could only count on the small number and biased audience of 
scientists. [&] But it was when Hegel died, that his philosophy started its true life. The 
edition of his complete works, and especially his lectures had an immense influence. 
New gates were opened to that hidden, wonderful treasure that lay in the silent cave of 
the mount [&] At the same time the teaching gained a more human, more approachable 
form on the lips of Hegel%s disciples.#2 
                                                 
1 Friedrich Engels, $Schelling über Hegel,# Telegraph für Deutschland, no. 107, December 1841 
(signed Friedrich Oswald); also see in: Karl Marx ! Friedrich Engels, Werke, supplementary 
volume: Schriften, Manuskripte, Briefe bis 1844, second part (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1982), 163!
170; 169. ($Unsere Sache wird es sein, [&] des großen Meisters Grab vor Beschimpfungen zu 
schützen. Wir scheuen den Kampf nicht. Uns konnte nichts Wünschenswerteres geschehen, als 
für eine Zeitlang ecclesia pressa [unterdrückte Kirche] zu sein. Da scheiden sich die Gemüter. 
Was echt ist, bleibt im Feuer bewährt, was unecht ist, vermissen wir gern in unseren Reihen. Die 
Gegner müssen uns zugestehen, daß niemals die Jugend so zahlreich zu unsern Fahnen strömte, 
niemals der Gedanke, der uns beherrscht, sich so reich entfaltete, Mut, Gesinnung, Talent so sehr 
auf unserer Seite war als jetzt. So wollen wir denn getrost aufstehen gegen den neuen Feind 
[&].#) 
2 Friedrich Engels, $Schelling und die Offenbarung. Kritik des neuesten Reaktionsversuchs gegen 
die freie Philosophie,# in Karl Marx ! Friedrich Engels, Werke, Ergänzungsband: Schriften, 
Manuskripte, Briefe bis 1844, Zweiter Teil, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1982, 171!221; 175. ($Als 
Hegel im Jahre 1831 sterbend seinen Jüngern das Vermächtnis seines Systems hinterließ, war ihre 
Zahl noch verhältnismäßig gering. [&] Die Schriften, die er veröffentlicht hatte, [&] konnten 
[&] nur auf ein geringes, noch dazu präokkupiertes Publikum von Gelehrten rechnen. [&] Als 
aber Hegel gestorben war, begann seine Philosophie erst recht zu leben. Die Herausgabe seiner 
sämtlichen Werke, besonders der Vorlesungen, machte eine unermeßliche Wirkung. Neue Pforten 
taten sich auf zu dem verborgenen, wundervollen Schatze, der im verschwiegnen Bergesschoße 
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 These lines hardly need any commentary: not only do they stand evidence for 
the great influence of the FVA through the eyes of a contemporary, but they also show 
that the effort of this edition, as formulated by Walter Jaeschke in his quoted note, $to 
present the lecture volumes as a supplement, and directly as a higher-level supplement, 
to Hegel%s unpublished works#1 was not at all unsuccessful. In addition, it is not merely 
incidental that Engels%s writing contains the objection to Schelling quoted above ! 
objection born in an utterly Hegelian spirit ! that $in the history of recent philosophy 
[Schelling] played an important role, but despite any of his initiatives he never offered a 
finished system, and always postponed coming to grips with science.#2 
 Schelling%s lecture in Berlin was in Karl Jaspers%s formulation the last occasion 
for the university to play a decisive role for the public at large, and for philosophy to 
count as a world-shaping power and event.3 Schelling%s inauguration address was 
delivered in front of several hundreds of people ! the largest auditorium was not large 
enough, the students threatened to climb in through the windows if they could not get in 
through the doors (they needed entrance tickets for this)4 ! among whom there were 
$university notabilities and the coryphaei of science# and the representatives of $all 
social statuses, nations, and religions,# $old physicians and priests,# $white-bearded field 
officers# and $young volunteers.#5 The audience comprised contemporary or future 
intellectual or political personalities such as Alexander von Humboldt, Savigny, 
Kierkegaard, Bakunyin, Lasalle, Leopold von Ranke, Jacob Burkhardt, Droysen, 
Trendelenburg. Many notabilities sat among the listeners: high ranking state officials, 
functionaries, officers and high priests. The lecture, so it seemed, caused no 
disappointment, but lived up to the expectations. As Xavier Tilliette wrote as a 
summary: $Notabilities and unknown people, admirers and adversaries all declared with 
little dissent: they had witnessed a great event.#6 
 The increased attention and the eschatological anticipation surrounding 
philosophy in the age of idealism which preceded and accompanied Schelling%s lecture 
in Berlin can also be very well perceived in Engels%s description. The militant young 
Hegelian painted the following picture about the atmosphere preceding Schelling%s 
occupation of the Berlin cathedra: $If anyone who has the slightest knowledge about the 
                                                                                                                              
lag [&]. Zugleich nahm die Lehre im Munde der Schüler Hegels eine menschlichere, 
anschaulichere Gestalt an [&]#. ! Italics I.M.F.) 
1 Walter Jaeschke, $Probleme der Edition der Nachschriften von Hegels Vorlesungen,# 57. See 
note 2 on page 133 above. 
2 Friedrich Engels, $Schelling und die Offenbarung,# 166. See note 2 on page 120 above on the 
objection towards Schelling. 
3 See Karl Jaspers, $Vom lebendigen Geist der Universität,# in Idem, Rechenschaft und Ausblick. 
Reden und Aufsätze (München: Piper, 1958), 174!217; 197. See also Xavier Tiliette, Schelling. 
Biographie (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2004), 400 f. Arszenyij Gulüga: Schelling (Budapest: 
Gondolat, 1987), 292 f. 
4 Kuno Fischer, Schellings Leben, Werke und Lehre. Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, vol. 7, 
2nd edition (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1899), 244.; Xavier Tiliette, Schelling. Biographie, 402. 
5 Friedrich Engels, $Schelling über Hegel,# 162 f. For the followings see also: Gulüga, Schelling, 
292; Kuno Fischer, Schellings Leben, Werke und Lehre, 244; Xavier Tiliette: Schelling. 
Biographie, 402. 
6 Xavier Tiliette, Schelling. Biographie, 401. 
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power of the intellect over the world was asked now in Berlin which is the battlefield 
where the fight for the reign over Germany%s political and religious public opinion, that 
is, over Germany itself is going on, then he would answer: this battlefield is on the 
university, and precisely in lecture room 6, where Schelling holds his lectures on the 
philosophy of revelation.#1 Schelling of course, writes Jaspers, similarly to his 
contemporaries, lived with the awareness of the turn of the age, moreover, $together 
with all those intellects whom he had met in Jena, his thinking was penetrated not 
merely by the awareness of a new age, but outright of a turning point in world history.#2 
The awareness of the turning point, the eschatological expectation of the coming of a 
new age is very much present in Schelling as well ! this awareness will then survive in a 
modified form in Marx%s thinking as well.  
 This short panorama shows how the spirit of idealism permeated  not only the 
thinking of the idealists and Hegel, but ! more importantly in the current context ! also 
the disciples% self-interpretation of their task ! perceived as a mission ! to edit and 
publish Hegel%s works. Compared to this, the age characterized by the collapse of 
German idealism ! to borrow the title of Paul Ernst%s influential book published after the 
first World War3 ! which marked the second half of the 19th century, only found its way 
to Hegel ! if at all ! in a historical approach. This approach is best signalled by the title 
of the first significant work of the literature on Hegel, Rudolf Haym%s book published in 
1857: Hegel und seine Zeit.4 Hegel%s work is represented in the context of its own age 
and evolution ! that is: not our age, but the age of Haym. Hegel must be understood 
starting from his own age ! in the background of this harmless and benevolent, and 
seemingly natural requirement lies the recognition: if we start out from our own age, we 
find no ways to him. Dilthey also stressed in his cited review: $Haym newly processed 
the manuscripts of the legacy, and was the first to present the inner evolution history 
[Entwicklungsgeschichte] of his system.#5 And indeed: as Haym wrote in the 
introduction, his purpose was not dogmatic, his work $wishes to offer the objective 
                                                 
1 Friedrich Engels, $Schelling über Hegel,# 162 f.: $Wenn ihr jetzt hier in Berlin irgendeinen 
Menschen, der auch nur eine Ahnung von der Macht des Geistes über die Welt hat, nach dem 
Kampfplatze fraget, auf dem um die Herrschaft über die öffentliche Meinung Deutschlands in 
Politik und Religion, also über Deutschland selbst, gestritten wird, so wird er auch antworten, 
dieser Kampfplatz sei in der Universität, und zwar das Auditorium Nr. 6, wo Schelling seine 
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Offenbarung hält.# 
2 Karl Jaspers, Schelling. Größe und Verhängnis (Munich und Zürich: Pieper, 1986; unchanged 
reprint of the 1955 edition), 253: $[Schelling lebte] mit all den Geistern, die sich in Jena trafen, im 
Bewußtsein nicht nur der Heraufkunft einer neuen Zeit, sondern einer weltgeschichtlichen 
Wende. Sie denken und dichten in dem Sinne, diese Wende zu sein und sie zu prägen.# 
3 Paul Ernst, Der Zusammenbruch des deutschen Idealismus (München: Georg Müller, 1918; 2nd 
edition 1931). See also: Gadamer, Neuere Philosophie I: Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, in GW, Vol. 
3, (Tübingen: Mohr, 1987), 249; Heidegger, EM, 34 f, GA, 32: 57; SA, 7.  
4 Rudolph Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit. Vorlesungen über Entstehung und Entwickelung, Wesen 
und Werth der hegel'schen Philosophie (Berlin: Verlag von Rudolf Gaertner, 1857), 2.; 
(expanded edition: Leipzig: Wilhelm Heims, 1927). 
5 Wilhelm Dilthey, $Briefe von und an Hegel,# in Idem, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 15, 310: 
$Haym [&] hat von neuem die nachgelassenen Manuskripte Hegels durchgearbeitet und zuerst 
eine innere Entwicklungsgeschichte des Systems gegeben.# 
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history# of Hegelian philosophy rather than a presentation of its parts or a criticism or 
polemics in the usual meaning of the word; and although presentation and criticism are 
also part of his intentions, he still strives to prepare the ground for both $in a historical 
way#, $by discussing the origins and evolution# of this philosophy. $Nobody would dare 
state today ! unless he was completely anachronistic or blind ! that this system would 
still rule over life and science as it once used to.#1 However, a philosophical system can 
only be overthrown by another system, writes Haym (of course this idea shows very 
much the influence of the Hegelian concept of system), a mental edifice cannot be 
demolished by mental fragments. There is no shortage of course of pretenders for the 
vacant throne. On the other hand, $the truth is [&] that the realm of philosophy has 
remained today altogether without a leading philosophy, it is now in a state of 
disintegration and chaos.#2 
 The state of disintegration and chaos favours the unfolding and flourishing of 
historical interest, which is born in fact with the decline of system philosophy, gradually 
taking its place. As Haym clearly claims, the interests of the modern age no longer favour 
spirit: whether poetry or philosophy. $The fall of Hegelian philosophy is in connection 
with a general fatigue of philosophy.# Our age is no longer an age of philosophical 
systems, but much rather one of technical discoveries: $the emotional and mental world of 
the previous decade is separated from ours by a sharply traced division line.#3 
 As long as the spirit of the age has fallen out of the range of the reception 
history of Hegelian philosophy, it can only approach Hegel in a historical way. This is 
the confrontation of reception history and historicism. If something no longer stands in 
the reception history of something previous, than this something can only be accessed in 
a historical way ! this is the age of the flourishing of historicism. Because historicism, as 
Gadamer argues, tears the threads connecting the present to the past; and it tries to find 
its way historically in the second run to something that it has ceased all living relations 
                                                 
1 Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit, p. 3: $Niemand, es müßte denn ein ganz Zurückgebliebener oder 
ein ganz Blinder sein, wagt zu behaupten, daß dieses System noch heute Leben und Wissenschaft 
beherrsche, wie es sie beherrscht hat.# 
2 Rudolph Haym, Hegel und seine Zeit, 2. (expanded ed.: 2!4.) ($An Prätendenten, es ist wahr, 
auf den leer gewordenen Thron ist kein Mangel. [&] Die Wahrheit ist [&], daß sich das Reich 
der Philosophie im Zustande vollkommener Herrenlosigkeit, im Zustande der Auflösung und 
Zerrüttung befindet#.) 
3 Ibid., 5 f. ($Der Verfall der Hegel%schen Philosophie steht im Zusammenhang mit der 
Ermattung der Philosophie überhaupt. [...] Wie durch einen scharfgezognen Strich ist die 
Empfindungs- und Ansichtswelt des vorigen Jahrzehnts von unserer gegenwärtigen getrennt.$) 
$It can be said, and it was said indeed,# writes a contemporary writer, $that a humanist education 
[&] had become anachronistic by the second half of the 19th century [&], since that was the 
period of the technical revolution, of industrialization ! an unprecedented event which 
transformed Europe within a very short time more profoundly than anything that had been 
accomplished as the works of humans in the course of the preceding three millennia.# (Manfred 
Fuhrmann, Bildung. Europas kulturelle Identität [Stuttgart: Reclam, 2002], 32: $Man kann sagen 
und hat gesagt, dass die humanistische Bildung schon im 19. Jahrhundert [&] ein Anachronismus 
gewesen sei, fand doch damals die technische Revolution, die Industrialisierung statt, ein 
beispielloser Vorgang, der Europa in kürzester Zeit mehr veränderte als alles Menschenwerk in 
den drei Jahrtausenden, die vorausgegangen waren.$) 
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with in the first run. The connection to tradition ! the creative furthering of tradition ! 
will be replaced by the ambition of its objective (historical) knowledge. This latter 
means, even in its starting point and objective, the elimination of any connection. 
Historical consciousness, as Gadamer writes, dissolves the living relation of life, it 
creates a distance towards history,1 it places within brackets $the primary role of that life 
reference that tradition means for the present age,#2 $reflects itself out of the life 
reference connected to tradition.#3 By this, historical consciousness enforces tradition, 
but only $historically#, that is, in its own otherness, and not as something that has an 
effect over us and continues in us.  
 It is worth following Gadamer%s representation a little longer, since his 
description is fully appropriate to picture the change of the spirit of the age in which the 
relating to Hegel went through a basic transformation; ! it is so appropriate that one 
might think that it may have been particularly this change that he had in view when 
formulating his assessment of historicism. In addition, it is also not incidental that, when 
describing this change, the reference to Dilthey is repeatedly uttered in an authoritative 
way. $Just like the strangeness which the mechanical age felt against nature as natural 
world, was epistemologically expressed in the concept of self-consciousness and its? 
clear and well articulated [&] rules,# he writes, $the same way 19th-century intellectual 
sciences felt a similar strangeness towards the historical world. The intellectual creations 
of the past [&] no longer belong to the self-evident content of the present, but they are 
objects which must be researched, givennesses by which the past can be represented. 
Thus Dilthey is also guided by the concept of givenness when he forms the concept of 
experience.#4 In his obituary written on Wilhelm Scherer, Dilthey stresses that Scherer%s 
method was guided by the spirit of natural sciences. He tried to explain why Scherer 
submitted so much to the influence of English empiricism: <He was a modern man, and 
the world of our ancestors has no longer been a home for his spirit and heart, but a 
historical object.%#5 Dilthey%s last statement could be regarded more or less as a self-
characterization or self-interpretation as well. 
                                                 
1 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hermeneutik I. Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen 
Hermeneutik. Gesammelte Werke Bd. 1, Tübingen: Mohr 1999, p. 12f. 
2 Ibid., 201.: $Vorgängigkeit des geschichtlichen Lebensbezugs, den die Überlieferung für die 
Gegenwart darstellt#. 
3 Ibid., 366. 
4 Ibid., 70f.: $Hatte die Fremdheit, die das Zeitalter der Mechanik gegen die Natur als natürliche 
Welt empfinden mußte, ihren erkenntnistheoretischen Ausdruck in dem Begriff des 
Selbstbewußtseins und der [&] Gewißheitsregel der klaren und distinkten Perzeption, so empfanden 
die Geisteswissenschaften des 19. Jahrhunderts eine ähnliche Fremdheit gegenüber der 
geschichtlichen Welt. Die geistigen Schöpfungen der Vergangenheit ["] gehören nicht mehr zu 
dem selbstverständlichen Inhalt der Gegenwart, sondern sind der Erforschung aufgegebene 
Gegenstände, Gegebenheiten, aus denen sich eine Vergangenheit vergegenwärtigen läßt. So ist es 
der Begriff des Gegebenen, der auch Diltheys Prägung des Erlebnisbegriffes leitet.#4 [Italics I.M.F.] 
5 Ibid., 12. See Wilhelm Dilthey, Vom Aufgang des geschichtlichen Bewußtseins. Jugendaufsätze 
und Erinnerungen, in Idem, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Erich Weniger, vol. 11 (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck = Ruprecht, 1988), 244: $Er war ein moderner Mensch, und die Welt unserer 
Vorfahren war nicht mehr die Heimat seines Geistes und seines Herzens, sondern sein 
geschichtliches Objekt.# 
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 Now it is hardly a mistake to say: the statement that $The intellectual creations 
of the past ["] no longer belong to the self-evident content of the present# is perfectly 
valid for Hegel, or rather, it is primarily valid precisely for Hegel. Hegel%s $intellectual 
creation no longer belongs to the self-evident content of the present,# Hegel%s world ! 
$is no longer a home, but as historical object for the spirit and heart# of his descendants 
! the second half of the 19th century and the new editions starting from Dilthey%s 
directive. The strangeness towards it is a new and living experience; therefore one 
should not primarily fight for it ! stand up for it or turn against it and confront it !, but 
get to know it first. Get to know ! this means: we do not actually know it, it is strange for 
us. Strangeness means: the living life connection has broken. If we struggle with 
something ! whether for it or against it ! then we know it. Therefore Dilthey%s directive 
is more painful for a Hegelian (as for instance Lukács and the majority of 20th-century 
Hegelian Marxism) than any attack of Hegel%s adversaries against the master. Who is 
attacked, is alive and living. What they want to get to know, becomes (already only) a 
historical object. Gadamer%s formulation characterizes with utmost precision that 
intellectual climate the comprehensive horizon of which has outlined, starting from the 
second half of the 19th century, the new coordinates of relating to Hegel: $The 
intellectual creations of the past [&] no longer belong to the self-evident content of the 
present, but they are objects which must be researched, givennesses by which the past 
can be represented.# ("Die geistigen Schöpfungen der Vergangenheit [&] gehören nicht 
mehr zu dem selbstverständlichen Inhalt der Gegenwart, sondern sind der Erforschung 
aufgegebene Gegenstände, Gegebenheiten, aus denen sich eine Vergangenheit 
vergegenwärtigen läßt.$) 
 It is this spirit which creates and pervades the background and ! explicit or 
implicit, conscious or unconscious ! precondition for the need for new, $evolution 
historical# Hegel-editions. For Dilthey, writes the modern Hegel-researcher, $Hegel%s 
system became historical; the sketches of the young Hegel must not be regarded as half-
finished pre-stages of the system but as independent concepts. This maxim is valid for 
any later evolution historical [entwicklungsgeschichtlich] interpretation of the young 
Hegel.#1 From this point on it is evident what Theodor Haering clearly claimed at the 
end of the 1930s: to be a Hegel-researcher and a Hegelian researcher are two different 
things. Haering settled it from the very beginning: $he shares Hegel%s basic point of 
view under no circumstances,# he is $not a Hegelian in any sense#; his purpose is $a 
step-by-step representation of Hegel%s evolution.# Hegel%s philosophy is for 
contemporary people like that of the Egyptians or Babylonians: they are the crucial 
sources of every future philosophy, but they are $an unknown and unapproachable 
realm# for the modern age.2  
                                                 
1 Klaus Düsing, $Jugendschriften,# in Hegel. Einführung in seine Philosophie, ed. Otto Pöggeler 
(Freiburg/München: Alber, 1977), 28!42; 28: $Hegels System ist historisch geworden; die 
Entwürfe des jungen Hegel dürfen daher nicht nur als unfertige Vorstufen des Systems, sondern 
müssen als eigenständige Konzeptionen betrachtet werden. Diese Maxime gilt auch für alle 
späteren entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Interpretationen des jungen Hegel#. 
2 Theodor Haering, Hegel. Sein Wollen und sein Werk. Eine chronologische Entwicklungs-
geschichte der Gedanken und der Sprache Hegels (2 vols., Leipzig and Berlin: B.G. Teubner, 
1929 and 1938; reprinted: Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1979), vol. 1, VII, 1. 
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 At the same time, reversely, Dilthey also characterized with similar precision 
the difference between the Hegel-disciples% relation to Hegel and his own age%s changed 
relation to the philosopher. As he wrote at the beginning of his cited review, $Since 
these disciples were completely permeated by the historical influence of the [Hegelian] 
system, they could attain, without any kind of a schoolmaster%s pedantry, such an 
influence of his legacy which equalled that of books.#1 The statement of the first part of 
the sentence is very likely highly pertinent and true. The disciples $were completely 
permeated by the historical potency of the system#: the FVA was fully born in the swirl 
of the reception history of Hegelian thinking.2 Posterity however only sought its way to 
Hegel in a $historical# way, the fascination stopped: the new text editions, the collection 
and edition of extant manuscripts and lecture notes are nothing else than the products of 
this search, of the access via the $historical# way.3  
 This part can be concluded with the following remark. It had become clear by 
the 1950s that even the ever so honourable efforts of individual researchers would not 
suffice to complete the tasks of a new Hegel-edition, as claimed in the introduction; 
there is a need for an institutional background and synchronized teamwork. We may 
now add to this: it seems that one generation is not enough even for a whole team, 
several are needed.  
 
                                                 
1 Wilhelm Dilthey, $Briefe von und an Hegel,# in Idem, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 15, 310. 
($Wie diese Schüler von dem Gefühl der geschichtlichen Wirkungskraft des Systems noch ganz 
erfüllt waren, haben sie ohne schulmeisterische Pedanterie dem Nachlass eine Wirkung, die der 
von Büchern gleich käme, zu geben gewusst ...#) 
2 Dilthey%s formulation here is melancholic and distanced. The disciples $were completely 
pervaded by the historical potency of the system#: whoever uses this formulation, hardly stands 
himself any more in the catchment area of this potency. The one who does would hardly say: $I 
am pervaded by this or that potency#. He would rather feel ! just as Hegel%s students might have 
felt ! that they are touched by the truth (and not by the potency of one or another philosophical 
system). 
3 Of course, the chances of this access are hardly any better than the success of the research of 
Jesus%s life (Leben-Jesu-Forschung) with the historical-critical method ! that is, quite low. Seen 
from here, the differentiation between Jesus of the faith and the historical Jesus approximately 
corresponds ! mutatis mutandis ! to the differentiation between Hegel of the system and the 
historical Hegel. Jesus is just as difficult to be found in a merely historical way as Hegel. 
Moreover, so it seems, Hegel himself was also aware of the drawbacks of the historical-critical 
research of Jesus%s life. $If faith wishes to draw from history the mode of founding or at least 
justifying its content of which the Enlightenment speaks,# wrote Hegel in his Phenomenology, 
$and seriously believes at and behaves as if the whole matter depended on it, then it had already 
had himself be seduced by the Enlightenment; and his efforts to found or enforce himself in such 
a way only prove his contamination# (The Phenomenology of Spirit, 286.) Otto Pöggeler referred 
to the negative effect of he historical, or rather evolution-historical life-work editions when he 
remarked that $No matter how important the edition of the classics may be ! they ruin our 
relationship to philosophy: they refer the thoughts of a $great# philosopher from an evolution-
historical point of view only to the complete life-work, and not primarily to the thing itself.# (Otto 
Pöggeler, $Die historisch-kritische Edition in der Wissenschaftsorganisation,# Buchstabe und 
Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte, eds. Walter Jaeschke, Wilhelm G. 
Jacobs and Hermann Krings [Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987], 27!37, 37.) 
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II.  
At first, we started out from the thesis that establishing the text is a first step in the 
traditional (philological-positivist) conception, then as a second steps follows the 
interpretation of the textual variant established and put forth as a result of philological 
work. One of the basic theses of this present work is that the establishment of the text 
does not happen under laboratory conditions, as if in a space void of interpretation, and 
that thus philology and hermeneutics are multiply intertwined.  
 A traditional difficulty in establishing the text is itself of a philological origin, 
insofar as ! in order to establish the text ! the philological-textual critical work going 
back to the edition history of a particular text must often face the fact that some texts 
were published by their authors in several editions, and thus in several variants which 
may more or less differ from one another. What is there to do in such cases? Which 
should then be the canonical text? How can this be established, by restoring [setting-in-
place] or producing [setting-forth]?1 
                                                 
1 By the above formulation I try to represent (albeit necessarily imperfectly) the German 
dichotomy of FeststellenHerstellen. On their differences see, e.g. Paul Ziche, $Editionswissen-
schaft: Historisch-kritisches Edieren. Beispiele aus der Akademie-Ausgabe von Schellings Wer-
ken,# Akademie Aktuell. Zeitschrift der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften vol. 20, 1 
(2007), 27!31; 27.: $Das %Herstellen% oder %Feststellen% eines Textes bildet einen unverzichtbaren 
Arbeitsschritt einer kritischen Edition. Das setzt voraus, dass vor einer solchen editorischen 
Feststellung ein Text nicht wirklich feststeht, sondern erst im Prozess des Edierens entsteht. Eine 
Edition bewahrt oder reproduziert nicht nur etwas bereits Vorliegendes [...].# ($The producing 
[setting-forth] or establishing [setting-in-place]  of a text is an indispensable working stage of a 
critical edition. This implies the precondition that before such an editorial production the text does 
not really exist, but it comes into being in the very process of edition. A certain edition does not 
merely preserve or reproduce something that already exists.#) ! The following explanation may 
be needed for understanding the relationship between $establishment#, $restoration [setting-in-
place]# and $production [setting-forth]#. The $establishment# of the text means its determination, 
fixing, its $setting-in-place#, and in this sense it cannot be clearly separated from $production#, 
$setting-forth#, which ultimately also leads to some kind of fixation in place: this is a process in 
which the text is set so-to-say from the back to the front, to a certain place, to its own (canonical) 
place, and as a result it is there now, it stands steady, still, fixed [steht fest] before us. $Setting-
forth# as a process should be understood about the same way as a manufacturer sets forth a 
product or the police sets forth a suspect: the product did not exist before its production, the 
suspect existed but had been hiding before, or at least had not been previously found, but now ! as 
he was found and stopped, held back (and probably also arrested) ! he is (steadily) held, therefore 
he can be disposed of, for instance, he can be interrogated (or the product can be sold or used). As 
a result of setting-forth, setting-in-place they can be localized, they have their place: the location 
of the text set forth is a paper-based manuscript or a printed book, preserved in a library (archive, 
manuscript collection), the location of the suspect is the prison guarded by the police, the 
product%s location is the warehouse: the object (or subject) set forth can be adequately delivered, 
requested and given back. The identity of the person set forth is verified just like that of a product 
or an established text (textual identity, Wortlaut), after which the identity of both is ensured and 
unchanged. The set-forth is the one who (or which) was sought and, following its identification, it 
is set in its own place ! it is set-in-place (to print or library, to prison or police, to warehouse or 
store). Incidentally, the German verbs $festhalten# and $festsetzen#, similar to $feststellen# in 
their meaning of $fixing#, also possess the sense of $capture#, $detain#, $lay down#. The selected 
example tries to visualize how the $setting-forth# can be at the same time (a sort of) setting-in-
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 There are several far-reaching questions emerging in relation to this, but within 
the confines of this paper I shall only present one single example in some detail. Kant%s 
Critique of Pure Reason is one of the classical works of the history of philosophy, and 
quite likely one of the most outstanding works of modern philosophy. This work was 
published in 1781, and a second, revised edition appeared in 1787. Kant wrote an utterly 
new preface to this second edition, he kept the introduction, but significantly extended it, 
and reworked the text itself as well in some of its parts ! among others, in the section on 
transcendental aestethics !, and almost completely rewrote the chapter on transcendental 
deduction; except for two introductory parts, the thirty-five pages long part of the first 
edition was now replaced by forty new pages of text, and he also made other essential 
changes to the text of the first edition.1 
 During the time elapsed since Kant%s death, each and every edition or 
translation of Kant%s work has necessarily had to face the problem of which edition%s 
text to reproduce (or which to take as the basis for translation), or simply  how to deal 
with the problem of the two editions. The path taken by the edition of the Prussian Royal 
Academy of Sciences in 1911, that they published the texts of both editions in separate 
volumes (as volumes three and four of the academic edition) is evidently only open for 
an academic edition; however, not even this is perfect, since ! as attention has been 
drawn to it, arguably quite legitimately ! this edition makes it highly difficult to 
                                                                                                                              
place as well; however, there is a difference in this process between the production of a product 
(Herstellen) and the $detainment# (Feststellen, festsetzen) of the suspect, inasmuch as the former 
comes into being in the course of its production, while the latter already existed before it, while 
still it comes into being in the real sense through its $production#, its $setting-forth#, that is, it 
changes its mode of being, it changes its legal status, the same as the text of a critical edition also 
becomes $canonical# only after its establishment.  
1 On the differences of the two editions, see for example part V. of the thorough introduction of 
the translators in the new English edition (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. 
Paul Guyer and Allan Wood [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 66!73, mainly 
70ff.) See also Wolfgang Carl, $Die transzendentale Deduktion in der zweiten Auflage,# in 
Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Klassiker Auslegen vols. 17!18, eds. G. Mohr and 
M. Willaschek (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998), 189!216; 189: $For the second edition of the 
Critique, Kant completely rewrote the section on the transcendental deduction of pure rational 
concepts. Although Kant himself only spoke about corrections made only in the $representation#, 
the two formulations clearly differ from each other in their content as well.# See also: Wolfgang 
Carl, Die transzendentale Deduktion in der ersten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Ein 
Kommentar (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992) and Hansgeorg Hoppe, $Die 
transzendentale Deduktion in der ersten Auflage,# in Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 
159!188. Furthermore, see also: Dieter Sturma, $Die Paralogismen der reinen Vernuft in der 
zweiten Auflage,# in ibid., 391!411; 392: $Kant called the reworked parts of the second edition 
only <the change of the way of representation%. [&] This reference suggests that the A- and B-
paralogisms differ just in stylistic issues. This setting is not satisfactory if only for the reason that 
despite any emphatic formulations, B-paralogisms are still not exempt from redundancies and 
obscurities, which attests that the <change of the way of representation% could have had other 
motifs as well. However, if we look at the entirety of B-paralogisms, we shall have the impression 
that the way of argumentation has also changed here.# 
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compare the individual text fragments in the two editions.1 Apart from this, the 
academic edition is not even unbiased, since the editorial method still betrays some kind 
of tacit preference. Seemingly, the publication in two separate volumes does not take 
siedes as to which of the two editions has a better (canonical? final?) text. However, the 
problem of the succession of the texts, that the third volume of the academic edition 
contains the full text of the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, while the 
fourth volume contains the text of the first edition, in a reverse chronological order; and 
that the text of the first edition printed in volume four is not complete and lasts only until 
Kant had no longer altered the text (namely, it contains nearly half of the complete text, 
so in comparison with the 552 pages of the second edition printed in the third volume, 
the fourth volume only counts 252 pages): this double editorial decision tacitly yet 
clearly commits itself to the second edition, while considering the first interesting only 
in a philological and historical respect. This editorial method clearly suggests: the 
canonical text is the text of the second edition, the first is only auxiliary in relation to the 
second for the sake of completeness (which a critical edition must always bear in mind) 
as a textual variant, and it can be of interest as such ! as a historical or philological 
addition. 
 We cannot discuss in detail all the solutions attempted by various Kant-editions 
in the past more than two hundred years. It is enough to say that ! although there have 
been attempts to avoid the forced either!or choice (the decision to rely mainly on the 
text of either the first, or the second edition), that is, attempts at the associated 
typographical reproduction of both editions in some form,2 which, besides its 
advantages, also has its drawbacks or even pitfalls ! the most common or typical 
solution is, these days as well, to take the second edition as the main text and to 
reproduce the first edition%s differences either in the notes or (in case of lengthier 
differences) elsewhere, mostly in appendices or following the corresponding text or the 
second edition (this method was followed by both Hungarian editions, too.)3 
 There are two considerations worth taking into account about this solution. 
Firstly, Kant himself wrote at the end of the preface to the second edition that he made 
no changes concerning the essence, that is, matters of content, compared to the first 
                                                 
1 Paul Guyer and Allan Wood, $Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason,# in Kant, Critique of 
Pure Reason, 74. 
2 See for instance the 1877 Kehrback edition%s revised 1924 version by Raymund Schmidt, and its 
unaltered reprint in 1979 (Leipzig: Reclam). This edition uses the alternation of Gothic and Latin 
letters according to well-defined criteria, in combination with a two-columned typesetting in an 
attempt to simultaneously reproduce the texts of both editions and this way, as can be read in the 
preliminary note, $it can be used as an original textual variant for both the first and the second 
editions# (p. VI.) 
3 Wilhelm Weischedel, the editor of the currently most used twelve-volume Werkausgabe, 
repeatedly reprinted since 1968, summarized the main guidelines of the Kant-interpretations of 
just the past two hundred years when he wrote in his editorial afterword: $The second edition 
mostly revised and altered by Kant himself is preferred in the establishment of the text; the 
differences in the first edition [&] will be indicated in the notes [&]. Where Kant had modified 
lengthier fragments, [&] there both formulations will be printed successively.# (Kant, Werke in 
zwölf Bänden, Theorie-Werkausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
1974], vol. 4, 716 f.)  
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edition, but he improved the mode of presentation, he changed the formulation in several 
misleading places, and hopefully made thus his ideas intelligible. However, were these 
indications not there, it could still be intuitively acknowledged and accepted: if an author 
publishes his work anew years after its first edition in a revised version, then he must 
evidently think that its text is an improved, corrected variant, therefore it should be 
considered as the final version to be reproduced in the future. So ! beyond Kant%s 
concrete case ! it has become, in a sense, a rule of edition technique that the last text 
version published in an author%s lifetime should be considered the authentic text. Editors 
thus, writes Wilhelm G. Jacobs in comment to this thesis, so to speak fulfil the 
deceased%s last will: if a work was published in several editions in its author%s lifetime 
then the editors take the last edition as a basis, as the last word of the deceased with 
respect to the matter.1  
 Obviously, the textual variant eventually chosen for printing significantly 
determines the subsequent interpretation, including the reception history. Conversely, it 
is also valid: the interpretation ! insofar as it must decide which text to publish, which 
variant it considers worthy of print ! anticipates the textual edition, precedes it. At any 
rate, textual edition and interpretation go hand in hand. Those who take as a basis the 
text of the second edition ! this group is more numerous in the reception history of 
Kant%s work ! naturally accept the interpretation that the second edition is better and 
clearer than the first: the new text created by reformulations ! on the basis of the 
reception of the first edition and also in reaction to the judgments and often also 
misunderstandings published in the reviews written in the meantime ! offers a more 
forceful and consistent presentation of the basic idea of the Critique; in other words, it is 
indeed a $corrected edition#.  
 Nevertheless, it is essential that we must also refer to the exceptions, among 
whom most important are Schopenhauer and Heidegger. Schopenhauer wrote that he 
could only understand Kant%s main work and he was only able to dissolve the 
contradictions previously sensed only when he read the work in the first edition already 
difficult to find at that time. Pages 348!392 of the first edition, which, according to 
Schopenhauer, contained a brilliant representation of Kant%s idealism, disappeared in the 
second edition, and were replaced by a set of contradictory statements. $By this, the text 
of the Critique of Pure Reason widely used between 1787 and 1838 became a distorted 
and spoiled text, and the work itself a self-contradictory book the meaning of which 
could no longer be clear and comprehensible for anyone.#2 ! said Schopenhauer. For 
this reason, he felt directly entitled to turn to the reader: $No one should imagine that 
they know the Critique of Pure Reason and that they are able to create a clear picture of 
Kant%s teaching if they only read the work in the second edition or another edition 
                                                 
1 Wilhelm G. Jacobs, $Textüberlieferung und historisch-kritische Edition. Typen von Editionen,# 
Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte, 21!26; 21. 
2 Arthur Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, vol. 1, $Anhang: Kritik der 
kantischen Philosophie#, Idem, Sämtliche Werke, ed. Wolfgang Frhr. von Löhneysen (Frankfurt 
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 586 f. ($Dadurch ist denn der Text der »Kritik der reinen Vernunft«, 
wie er vom Jahr 1787 an bis zum Jahr 1838 cirkulirt hat, ein verunstalteter und verdorbener 
geworden, und dieselbe ein sich selbst widersprechendes Buch geworden, dessen Sinn eben 
deshalb Niemanden ganz klar und verständlich seyn konnte.# [Emphasis mine, I. M. F.]) 
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reproducing the second one; this is completely impossible, since then they only read a 
mutilated, spoiled, in a sense inauthentic (\) text. It is my duty to determinately say it for 
everybody%s warning.#1 In 1837 Schopenhauer turned to Karl Rosenkranz, Hegel%s 
disciple who edited the complete works of Kant, in a letter asking him to publish Kant%s 
critical main work in its original form, that is, in the first edition. Rosenkranz completed 
the request in 1838, and by this, according to Schopenhauer, he $gained unsurpassable 
merits#: $he saved the most important work of German literature perhaps from 
destruction#.2 
According to Heidegger%s interpretation of Kant one of the central parts of the 
work, the chapter on the deduction of pure rational concepts, in the first edition version 
reveals the difficulties deriving from the main problematization of the work in a more 
open and manifest way than the heavily reformulated text of the second edition. What is 
more: the reason of changing the formulation could have been precisely the fact that 
Kant recoiled from the difficulties arising around the concept of transcendental 
imagination and the troubling risks causing the instability of the construct of pure 
reason; in the second edition he radically reinterpreted the concept of transcendental 
imagination and strove to reduce its role to a minimum.3 Attention should not be paid to 
what Kant says but to what happens, what is going on in the course of the new 
foundation of metaphysics attempted by him. And this happening reveals shrinking 
back, retreating or recoiling.4 
 Kant searched the connection of the two branches of human cognizance, 
sensibility as receptivity and passivity, and thinking as activity and spontaneity, in the 
synthesis of imagination, which he was inclined to interpret in the first edition of the 
                                                 
1 Ibid., 587. ($Keiner bilde sich ein, die »Kritik der reinenVernunft« zu kennen und einen 
deutlichen Begriff von Kants Lehre zu haben, wenn er jene nur in der zweiten, oder einer der 
folgenden Auflagen gelesen hat; das ist schlechterdings unmöglich: denn er hat nur einen 
verstümmelten, verdorbenen, gewissermaaßen unechten Text gelesen. Es ist meine Pflicht, Dies 
hier entschieden und zu Jedermanns Warnung auszusprechen.# [Emphasis mine, I.F.M.]) 
2 Ibid., 587. ($In Folge meiner Vorstellungen [...] hat im Jahre 1838 Herr Professor Rosenkranz 
sich bewegen gefunden, die »Kritik der reinen Vernunft« in ihrer ursprünglichen Gestalt wieder 
herzustellen, indem er sie [...] nach der ersten Auflage von 1781 abdrucken ließ, wodurch er sich 
um die Philosophie ein unschätzbares Verdienst erworben, ja das wichtigste Werk der Deutschen 
Litteratur vielleicht vom Untergange gerettet hat; und dies soll man ihm nie vergessen.#) See also 
Karl Rosenkranz, Geschichte der Kant'schen Philosophie, ed. S. Dietzsch [Berlin: Akademie-
Verlag, 1987; 1st ed. Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1840], 160.) 
3 Cf. Heidegger GA 3, 160ff, 164, 168, 214f; GA 25, 279. Transcendental imagination $is only 
nominally present# in the second edition, which loses its function of $an individual fundamental 
ability, which mediates in an original way between sensibility and reason in their possible unity#, 
$its function is taken over by reason# (GA 3, 164 [Die transzendentale Einbildungskraft wäre $in 
der zweiten Auflage nur noch dem Namen nach da$; sie fungiere $nicht mehr als eigenständiges 
Grundvermögen, das Sinnlichkeit und Verstand in ihrer möglichen Einheit ursprünglich 
vermittelt$, $sein Amt ist dem Verstand übertragen.$]; cf. also GA 25, 412).  
4 The term $recoiling# (Zurückweichen) appears in GA 3, 160, 165, 168, 215, but it also appears 
already in § 6 of Time and Being. (Sein und Zeit [Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1979], 23: $Wovor Kant 
hier gleichsam zurückweicht, das muß thematisch und grundsätzlich ans Licht gebracht werden 
[...]#). The 1929 Kant-book can be regarded as a detailed exposition of this concise interpretation 
of Kant raised in a few sentences in Heidegger%s capital work.  
Philobiblon  Vol. XVII (2012)  No. 1 
 ✞ ✄ ✄
Critique as an independent spiritual ability, the common root of the two branches.1 But 
since imagination was considered to refer to sense perception and time, but this Kant%s 
entire enterprise, the preservation of the $pureness# of pure reason, was endangered. 
This way Kant stopped to follow the path he started, and in the second edition of his 
work presented a serious reconsideration of the issue of imagination. Led by the 
ambition to find a new, steady foundation for metaphysics, to base it on the subjectivity 
of the subject, on $pure reason,# what Kant does in fact ! writes Heidegger ! is precisely 
to undermine the foundation he has just wanted to lay; he, so-to-say, digs out the earth 
from underneath it [den Boden weggräbt].2 Recoiling is a result of this. Beneath the 
earth dug out from there an abyss was revealed. Seeing the abyss opening up in front of 
him while he tried to lay the foundations of metaphysics, Kant recoiled and hurried to 
cover it over. The reformulated text of the second edition%s chapter on deduction is a 
result of this cover-up attempt.  
 The traditional ! neo-Kantian ! claim, that Kant cleared the text of the second 
edition from the $psychologistic# reminiscences still their in the first one is ! according 
to Heidegger ! false from its very beginning. The first is just as little $psychologistic# as 
the second is $logical#.3 Since however neo-Kantianism saw Kant%s foremost work and 
its philosophical accomplishment in the (anti-psychologistic) epistemology founding 
positive sciences, although in Heidegger%s view it is primarily an attempt for the 
foundation of metaphysics,4 it is understandable that the primacy of logic, seen from this 
perspective, might have seemed an advantange, and therefore the text of the second 
edition counted as a standard. $That seemingly external question# ! writes Heidegger ! 
$whether the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason deserves to be preferred to 
the first one in its interpretation or it is the other way round, is but a pale reflection of the 
question decisive for the Kantian foundation of metaphysics and its interpretation: is the 
transcendental imagination as a foundation strong enough to define in an original way ! 
in its unity and entirety ! the finite essence of human subjectivity [&]?#5 
 As an in-depth analysis of the various edition-technical attempts of Kant-
editions during the past two hundred years is not our task here, neither is the discussion 
of two hundred years% interpretations of Kant, nor, in connection with this, the polemical 
examination of Heidegger%s interpretation of Kant, in effect truly suggestive and 
conceptual indeed. For the purposes of the problem discussed here, a very weak 
formulation will perfectly suffice. Namely, that Heidegger%s interpretation must not be 
$true# from the point of view of the problem discussed, it is enough that is may as well 
be true in principle ! moreover, Kant also knew this strategy, and called it the polemical 
use of reason.6 If it fulfils this condition ! and I think it does, what%s more, it overfulfils 
                                                 
1 Cf. Heidegger GA 3, 137ff especially 140; GA 25, 276ff.  
2 Cf. Heidegger GA 3, 160ff, 214, 217; GA 25, 276ff.  
3 Heidegger, GA 3, 170. 
4 Heidegger seriously contested already in his early lectures, for example in 1921!22, that Kant%s 
accomplishment would have unfolded primarily in the field of epistemology (cf. GA 61, 97).  
5 Heidegger GA 3, 171. 
6 $By the polemical use of reason I mean that reason defends its theses against their dogmatic 
negation. This is not to say that its statements may not be false, only that nobody can state its 
opposite with apodictic certainty (or even with higher probability).# In extreme cases $we could 
contrast the pompousness of one party with the ! equally legitimate ! pompousness of the other, so 
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it ! then it will be able to destabilize the opposing view, its self-evident, complacent self-
confidence that it has no alternative. In this case Heidegger%s interpretation can 
destabilize the self-evidence of the thesis which says: $later edition > better edition# or 
$the text of the later edition > the better (canonical) text#, $the later textual variant > the 
better textual variant#. No matter what stance we take in the matter, it is obvious: the 
choice of one edition to prefer over the other is very much a matter of interpretation. 
However, this preference depending on interpretation precedes the decision on the 
choice of the textual variant to be printed, seemingly pertaining only to the competence 
of philology. That is to say, interpretation, hermeneutics precedes philology.  
 Heidegger had expounded his preference for the earlier text on other occasions as 
well, approximately one decade before the appearance of his book on Kant. He premised 
his first university lecture on the interpretation of the main work of his former professor, 
the neo-Kantian Rickert, with a short edition-historical survey. He minutely exposed that 
the first edition of 1892 the Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis as a habilitation writing 
consisted of 91 small-sized pages, but by the third edition in 1915 $a whole new book was 
born, which already shows on the outside by the fact that it numbers 456 large-sized 
pages.# In the followings, Heidegger turns against Rickert%s self-interpretation ! just like 
against Kant%s later on: $Rickert says in the foreword of this edition that <the earlier 
editions must not be used any more.% The basic idea, as it was formulated in the first 
edition, should nevertheless be retained, therefore in presenting its short characterization 
and problem-historical connections I shall primarily refer to the first edition, mainly 
because Rickert%s decisive ideas are expressed in even simpler ways here and they are not 
burdened immeasurably by several far-flung, lengthy and often over-elaborate critical 
discussions with unnamed opponents, as it so often happens in the third edition.#1 
 Somewhat later he stresses again: $[The problem] must be understood in its 
main tendency, and in such a way as it arises from historical motivation. Therefore [I 
shall take into consideration] the first edition, despite Rickert%s observation.#2 
                                                                                                                              
that the mind this way would at least be shocked by the attack of the opponent, start to be suspicious 
about the excessive needs and listen to the voice of criticism# (Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A739 
f, A757 > B767 f, B785: $Unter dem polemischen Gebrauche der reinen Vernunft verstehe ich nun 
die Verteidigung ihrer Sätze gegen die dogmatischen Verneinungen derselben. Hier kommt es nun 
nicht darauf an, ob ihre Behauptungen nicht vielleicht auch falsch sein möchten, sondern nur, daß 
niemand das Gegenteil jemals mit apodiktischer Gewißheit (ja auch nur mit größerem Scheine) 
behaupten möchte.#).The polemical use of pure reason serves to destabilize the claims pretending to 
possess the apodictic truth (saying that what I state may have no less right to claim that it is true than 
what you state), and not to be a true statement itself. This use serves as a defence. 
1 Heidegger, GA 56/57, 178. (Emphasis mine, I.F.M.) $Rickert sagt im Vorwort zu dieser Ausgabe 
selbst, $die früheren Auflagen sollten nicht mehr benutzt werden$. Allerdings ist auch hier der 
Grundgedanke, wie er in der ersten Auflage gewonnen wurde, festgehalten, und ich werde daher zu 
seiner kurzen Charakteristik und zur Kennzeichnung des problemgeschichtlichen Zusammenhangs 
mich zunächst an die 1. Auflage halten, zumal auch deshalb, weil hier die entscheidenden Gedanken 
Rickerts noch einfacher zum Ausdruck kommen und noch nicht so übermäßig belastet sind mit breit 
ausladenden, oft umständlichen kritischen Auseinandersetzungen mit ungenannten Gegnern, wie 
das besonders ausgiebig in der 3. Auflage der Fall ist.# 
2 Ibid., 181. $[Das problem] gilt es in seiner Haupttendenz zu verstehen, und zwar so wie es aus 
der historischen Motivation sich ergibt. Daher die 1. Auflage, trotz Rickerts Bemerkung.# 
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 Heidegger%s preference for the first editions in the case of Kant and Rickert is 
possibly connected with the wider dimensions of his philosophy, namely with the 
disposition to return to the original, and is prone to regard tradition ! the derivative, the 
subsequent, as a movement which obscures the origin, and distances from it ! as 
decadence, emptiness, decline. According to Heidegger, tradition is characterized 
precisely by being emptied, levelled, by the fact that it exhausts and the veils over the 
meaning of the original insights of tradition. $Tradition as it becomes dominant makes 
that what it <transmits% primarily and mostly so unaccessible that it much rather obscures 
it.#1 The Husserlian principle of $back to the things# is transformed at Heidegger into 
$back to the origins#, or $back to the historical beginnings,# back to history. Seen from 
this perspective, the initial, most $original# return to the origins, the new enforcement of 
the radiating power of the origin is the true beginning of philosophy or philosophizing, it 
is philosophy itself. Accordingly, philosophers are in fact eternal starters ! or rather 
restarters ! whose questions, not accidentally and precisely because of this, are typically 
directed to the beginnings, to the beginnings of things. No surprise thus that in his 
second period, Heidegger%s intellectual efforts increasingly revolved around a new, 
$different beginning#, $another beginning# ($anderer Anfang#) of European philosophy 
and history. From Heidegger%s point of view, of all great things beginning is the greatest, 
since, as something that cannot be traced back to anything and cannot be deduced from 
anything, is a mystery utterly resisting understanding, and conceals within itself an 
inexhaustable richness; one that in all its unfolding or derivation may necessarily mean 
retrogression, impoverishment, decline.2 The Being and Time begins with the statement: 
the question referring to being which stood in the foreground of the thinking of Plato and 
Aristotle, has fallen into oblivion, became trivial and was reduced to silence. $What they 
once succeeded, with the greatest effort of thinking and albeit only fragmentarily and as 
a first attempt, to grasp of phenomena, has long before become trivial.#3 Philosophers 
are thus in fact beginners, who possess $eternal youth#.4 Reference must also be made to 
                                                 
1 SZ 21.: $Die hierbei zur Herrschaft kommende Tradition macht zunächst und zumeist das, was 
sie »übergibt«, so wenig zugänglich, daß sie es vielmehr verdeckt.# The product of this approach 
is the following statement: we are with Kant against Kantianism. (GA 25, 279.) 
2 Cf. e.g. GA 45, 110, 114, and also the second next note below. 
3 SZ 1§. $Und was ehemals in der höchsten Anstrengung des Denkens den Phänomenen 
abgerungen wurde, wenngleich bruchstückhaft und in ersten Anläufen, ist längst trivialisiert.# 
4 See GA 56/57, 214: [ewige Jugend]. See also Theodore Kisiel%s term $incessant beginners# at 
the end of his study $The Genesis of Being and Time,# Man and World 25 (1992): 35. Heidegger 
wrote in a letter in 1928: $Philosophizing in fact means nothing else than being a beginner# 
[Philosophieren heißt am Ende nichts anderes als Anfänger sein]# (Rüdiger Safranski: Ein 
Meister aus Deutschland. Heidegger und seine Zeit [Munich and Vienna: Carl Hanser], 1994, 
15). Completion: 17. 07. 2010.: a letter dated 30. 05. 1928 to the former rector of the 
Konradihaus, Matthäus Lang, cited by Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger. Unterwegs zu seiner 
Biographie (Frankfurt and New York: Campus Verlag, 1988), 53 f. The preceding sentence 
reads: $Vielleicht zeigt die Philosophie am eindringlichsten, wie anfängerhaft der Mensch ist. 
Philosophieren heißt am Ende nichts anderes als Anfänger sein.# This is only seemingly in 
contradiction with the claim: $Nun können wir Menschen freilich nie mit dem Anfang anfangen ! 
das kann nur ein Gott --, sondern müssen beginnen, d.h. mit etwas anheben, das erst in den 
Ursprung führt oder ihn anzeigt.# (GA 39, 3f.). Such beginners are characterized by a strong 
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Heidegger%s master, Husserl, who thinks that philosophy $is in its essence a science of 
the true beginnings#,1 and who, accordingly, established his own philosophical attitude 
on the level of a $beginner#, and considered that $at least at his old age he reached 
perfect certainty at least for himself about the fact that he could finally call himself a real 
beginner.#2 
 Now, supposedly it may also be regarded as a kind of philological ramification or 
increment of this philosophical approach ! phenomenological-hermeneutical, directed to 
the beginnings ! that in the course of his historical interpretations of philosophy, 
Heidegger sometimes prefers the first edition of the works of certain thinkers. The fact that 
the philological preference may be connected with philosophical considerations, is 
embedded into a philosophical background: this may only seem condemnable or 
detrimental for a positivist conception feeding the illusion of a philology devoid of 
philosophy. In fact, it is mostly an advantage since the philosophical embeddedness makes 
itself visible, and therefore it makes possible its own rational discussion: from a different 
point of view, for instance from a Hegelian one ! for which, as we have seen, $truth is the 
whole#, and the absolute $is only at the end what it is# ! becomes debatable, polemical. 
The Hegelian stance as a philosophical stance at the same time, as we have seen, may 
suggest completely different philological and edition technical consequences, and the 
edition of the disciples quite accurately accomplished with reference to Hegel%s works.  
 However, it is not necessary to share Heidegger%s philosophical point of view ! 
the outlined philosophical background which is supposedly connected to his preference 
for first editions ! in order to take its philological consequences as acceptable or 
plausible. These consequences are valid in themselves. That is to say, if we do not 
exclude the supposition that it is theoretically possible that an earlier text may formulate 
                                                                                                                              
preference to inquire about the beginnings ! i.e. the beginnings of all things, the arkhai ! since 
they are reluctant to simply accept that which has been handed down as self-evident (selbstver-
ständlich) and lives on in the present. That the particular subject of philosophy is exactly that 
what appears as self-evident in everyday life, and that philosophy must be able to sight directly a 
kind of mystery in this alleged self-evidence: these insights had already played a central role for 
Husserl; see e.g. Die Idee der Phänomenologie, Husserliana, vol. 2. ed. W. Biemel (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1973), 19. ($Die Erkenntnis, im natürlichen Denken die allerselbstverständlichste Sache, 
steht mit einem Mal als Mysterium da#); Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die 
transzendentalen Phänomenologie, Husserliana, vol. 6. ed. W. Biemel (The Hague: Nijhoff, 
1976), 183 ff. ($Von vornherein lebt der Phänomenologe in der Paradoxie, das 
Selbstverständliche als fraglich, als rätselhaft ansehen zu müssen und hinfort kein anderes wissen-
schaftliches Thema haben zu können als dieses#) etc. Therefore such beginners are sometimes 
prone to consider the beginning as the greatest, perhaps the greatest of all (future) things. (see e.g. 
Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität. Das Rektorat 1933/34, ed. H. Heidegger 
[Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1983], 12; Einführung in die Metaphysik [Tübingen: Niemeyer, 
1976], 12, 145; GA 5, 64, 327.; GA 34, 15.; GA 45, 110, 114; GA 65, 57.; GA 51, 15). I use the 
term $beginning# here in the meaning of $Anfang# and not $Beginn# (about this differentiation 
see GA 39, 1 f; GA 54, 9f). 
1 Edmund Husserl, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, ed. Wilhelm Szilasi. Frankfurt/M.: 
Klostermann 1965, p. 71 ($Wissenschaft von den wahren Anfängen#). 
2 Edmund Husserl, $Nachwort zu den Ideen# (1930). Husserliana vol. 5, 161. Husserl also added 
here: his efforts can only be understood and appreciated, his work can only be adequately 
approached by he $who struggles for the beginning of philosophy# (ibid., 162.). 
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in a more open and unveiled manner ! as if in statu nascendi ! the thoughts of its author, 
while it may happen that in a later version the original thought becomes obscured, it is 
concealed, palled, becomes unrecognizable, or at least it will not remain as directly 
accessible as it was at its first formulation, then Heidegger%s interpretation of Kant 
would make plausible the possibility that in certain cases the earlier version is to be 
preferred to the subsequent ones. However, in this case it can be said: the statement that 
the later text is the final, authentic version is thus unfounded and by no means can be 
generalized. More accurately, it is itself dependent on the acceptance of various 
philosophical conceptions (e.g. mirroring the Hegelian approach); conceptions which ! 
as philosophical suppositions ! are themselves debatable, that is to say, they are not 
absolute statements beyond any doubt and without any alternative. Whatever may be the 
case, the historical-critical edition in process of the other two outstanding philosophers 
of German idealism, Fichte and Schelling, always uses the first edition (Erstdruck) of the 
writings published in the authors% lifetime, and marks the incidental variations in the 
notes or the critical apparatus.1  
                                                 
1 On Fichte, see: Wolfhart Henckmann, $Fichte ! Schelling ! Hegel,# In Buchstabe und Geist. 
Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer Texte, eds. Walter Jaeschke, Wilhelm G. Jacobs 
und Hermann Krings (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1987), 83!115, 90. (Henckmann refers to 
the fact that the Fichte-edition differs in this respect from the complete works of the philosopher 
edited by his son in eleven volumes. On Schelling, see: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, 
Historisch-kritische Ausgabe der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, eds. Hans Michael 
Baumgartner, Wilhelm G. Jacobs, Jörg Jantzen, Hermann Krings und Hermann Zeltner, 1st series: 
Werke (Stuttgart ! Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog), vol. 1, 1976, 15. On the history of 
Schelling-editions and the new historical-critical edition see the detailed study of Luigi Pareyson, 
$La nuova edizione storico-critica di Schelling,# Filosofia, Nuova Serie XXX/1 (1979), 45!90. 
Due to the influence of certain observations of Pareyson and some other reviews written in the 
meantime, the edition technical principles of the Schelling-edition went through some changes 
between the first and second volumes. These deserve to be presented in some more detail since 
they offer insight into the concrete concepts as well as difficulties or dilemmas regarding the 
bibliographical structure or text formation of the individual volumes of the critical edition. For the 
sake of a better, easier readability the diacritical marks referring to the critical apparatus were 
removed starting with the second volume of the complete edition, and the critical and explanatory 
notes were not formatted as footnotes but as continuous endnotes at the very end of the volume, 
before the indexes, and the references to the adequate text fragments were made by marking the 
page- and line numbers of the primary texts. Thus the footnotes only contained the indications of 
the textual variants, and this was evidently justified by the need to more determinedly distinguish 
the differences between the two textual levels. This was supposed to suggest the modifications or 
variants of the primary text itself (changes between the versions published in Schelling%s lifetime, 
or in certain cases in various copies of the same edition, or even in the first complete edition 
published by Schelling%s son), which must have primacy over the apparatus clarifying and 
explaining the text, containing further references, completions, commentaries, quotations ! that is, 
let%s say, over the level of the articulation of the secondary text. At the same time, the very useful, 
so-called $Editorischer Bericht# has been preserved in an unchanged form in front of each text, 
the structure of which always contains a threefold division. As a first step, the editor of the 
specific text reports, under the title $Zur Edition des Textes#, on the first edition of the text, the 
extant or accessible copies, the condition of the text, on possible second or subsequent reprints, 
offers a ! primarily bibliographical ! description or information, summarizes the transmission of 
the text, attempts a comparison of various editions, and tries to recover the text or manuscript 
Philobiblon  Vol. XVII (2012)  No. 1 
 ✞ ☎ ✠
 Attention should not be paid to what Kant says, but to what happens in the 
course of the new foundation of metaphysics he attempted ! I summarized above a 
cardinal thesis of Heidegger%s interpretation of Kant. Variants A and B of the chapter on 
deduction of Kant%s main work, according to Heidegger, contains a happening (recoiling 
or shrinking back, which is a back-and-forth movement ! that is, the $forth# must be 
preceded by a $back#, but this is not so important at this time). It is worth noting that this 
concept of various textual variants as occurrence ! as we could call this kind of 
interpretation ! has its representatives also in the contemporary literature on Kant. For 
example, the interpretation of Hansgeorg Hoppe, although much less conceptual than 
Heidegger%s, shares the latter%s concept on the inner happening of the text.1 In his 
approach deduction B attempts at taking a step further in order to solve some of the 
problems left open in deduction A, but precisely because of this knowledge of deduction 
A is indispensable for the understanding of the problem as a whole. Seen from here, one 
may legitimately speak of the happening of the text; that is to say, the question of which 
                                                                                                                              
lying at the basis of that particular text edition. In the second run, under the title $Zur 
Entstehungsgeschichte des Textes#, the editor reconstructs the circumstances of the creation of 
the text, the reasons for its being written, its background in terms of biography, the history of 
ideas and of the age, the time of writing (its beginning and end), and places the text within these 
coordinates. Finally ! for texts where this can be the case at all ! under the title $Zur 
Wirkungsgeschichte des Textes# (or some other similar title, such as $Hinweise auf die frühe 
Rezeption#) the reader gains insight into the history of effect or reception history of the writing in 
question. This uniquely structured $Editorische Berichte# is one of the most valuable elements of 
the historical-critical edition. The volumes are concluded by a bibliography of cited works ! 
either by Schelling or by the editors in the apparatus !, various indexes (of places, of persons, of 
subjects), and a $Seiten-konkordanz#, an index of correspondences of the page numbers of 
various editions. It should also be mentioned that the Schelling-edition was the last to be 
published of all the critical editions of the thinkers of German idealism. The new, major edition 
was initiated by the celebrations of the 200 years anniversary of the philosopher%s birth, the first 
volume of the planned eighty was published one year later, in 1976. The enterprise ! as the last 
edition of the three, planned for more volumes than the other two together, therefore most 
ambitious and monumental of all ! could draw on the experiences of the two previous editions; it 
is an extraordinarily accurate and exhaustive edition, with a lengthy critical apparatus: when one 
takes in hand the volumes of the Schelling-edition, one has the impression that he has to do with 
the most exhaustive and accurate edition of the three thinkers% works. At the same time ! and 
possibly in relation to the difficulties about the institutional-financial background of the long-term 
accomplishment of these critical editions, mentioned above ! the planned number of volumes of 
the Schelling-edition has seemed to be decreasing in the last years. While the webpage of the 
publishing institution, the Schelling Committee of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences, the edition 
still appears planned for eighty volumes, a new webpage contains fifty-five volumes, and the 
webpage and catalogue of the publishing house which publishes the edition, the Frommann!
Holzboog, the number is only forty. In more details about individual volumes of the Schelling-
edition, see István Fehér M., $A történeti-kritikai Schelling-kiadás újabb kötetei a német 
idealizmus- és a Schelling-kutatás kontextusában# (New volumes of the historical-critical 
Schelling-edition in the context of German idealism and Schelling-research), Existentia 6!7 
(1996!97), 383!391. 
1 Hansgeorg Hoppe, $Die transzendentale Deduktion in der ersten Auflage,# In Immanuel Kant: 
Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Klassiker Auslegen, vols. 17!18, eds. G. Mohr, M. Willaschek 
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998), 159!188: 187 ff. 
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comes first of the two textual variants of deduction is simply eliminated. Should we 
think that the later variant must be preferred, we still cannot disregard the earlier one, 
since only on the basis of this ! the earlier ! can we understand, and appreciate 
accordingly, the later. The question of either!or is an incorrect and false question. This 
question can only be formulated in a meaningful way in the event of perceiving the text 
as a formation (Das Gebilde) ! torn out from its possible evolution history ! frozen at a 
certain moment and thus made timeless. It would suffice to make a short reference to the 
fact that one of the classical cases of text happening is the relationship of the Old and the 
New Testament, where the latter writes further and thus reinterprets or completes the 
text of the former.1 The traditional dilemma of Hegel-research, namely that the 
researcher cannot be certain, from a philological point of view, even about the title of the 
Phenomenology, also belongs to the same circle of problems: some bound copies still 
bear the original title given by Hegel, Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewußtseins, 
                                                 
1 Tradition has had an important role in the formation ! and also the further evolution ! of the 
texts of the Old and New Testaments. See for this more recently: Karl Kardinal Lehmann, 
$Norma normans non normata? Bibel im Begründungszusammenhang von Theologie und 
Lehramt,# zur debatte. Themen der Katholischen Akademie Bayern 38/5 (2008): 1!4, mainly 2: 
the Bible itself $has been created through a long process of tradition. This tradition has in 
important share in the collection of the writings in the so-called obligatory $canon#. In the course 
of this we recognize the actual participation of the Bible in this collection and delimitation.# In the 
end, we arrive to the functional connection that $there is no writing without tradition, and there is 
no tradition without the Church, and no Church without the former two.# (p. 3). It is also worth 
mentioning that the historical-critical exegesis strongly connected to the historical-critical edition 
from a hermeneutic perspective ! seen from the point of view of application ! is a highly 
committed genre. As Martin Ebner writes: $Ever since its beginnings, the historical-critical 
exegesis has had a church-historical orientation. It independently and completely consciously 
turns against the ecclesiastical educational institution, and reads the founding documents of the 
church against the background of contemporary praxis and preaching as a counter-control. 
Inasmuch as it is the meaning of the writings that interests the ecclesiastical educational 
institutions, then historical criticism primarily inquires one-sidedly about the original meaning of 
the writings [&] In this respect historical criticism feels itself to be the advocate of the 
strangeness [Fremdheit] of our fundamental writings. However, by no means does it happen out 
of pure historical interest. The true concern lies in the fact that it confronts today%s readers [&] 
with the beginnings of the movement. That it reveals precisely that what makes questionable our 
ideas about the beginning and our reading habits. [&] The programme says: placing the text back 
to its age and leaving it to make its effect ! however, not for the reason of archiving, but for 
enforcing an early Christian text in its confrontation with contemporary praxis, in such a way that 
contemporary theological thinking and contemporary ecclesiastical structures should be able to 
stand responsibly in front of the witnesses of the early times. By its insistence on the original 
meaning, historical criticism tries to enforce the individual right of fundamental writings, and 
wishes to induce a salutary shock in the contemporary readers of these texts: there were many 
other things at the beginning. This is accompanied by the impulse: it can be different again in the 
future. ! In order to reach this shock induced by the strangeness of texts, historical criticism 
operates in two interconnected ways: it situates the text historically, and reveals the historical 
stratification of the texts.# In Antiquity, authoritative texts carried there creation history within 
themselves. The authenticity of a text increased by feeding on a previous preliminary text. M. 
Ebner, $Grundoperationen der historisch-kritischen Exegese,# zur debatte. Themen der 
Katholischen Akademie Bayern 38/5 (2008), 7 f. 
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changed only in the course of printing, and it is not at all a mere philological, but an 
utterly hermeneutical problem, implying the meaning of the entire work, the happening 
of the text, how the $science of the experience of consciousness# became, in the course 
of the work%s intellectual-bibliographic production, $The phenomenology of spirit#.  
 The first paragraph of the commentaries over the problem of application of 
Gadamer%s major work, that I have examined in more detail elsewhere, can be 
mentioned as a special case of the inner happening of the text. In my interpretation what 
happens here is the connection between the disappearance in all subsequent editions of a 
footnote appearing in the first two editions of the work, and the textual deterioration of 
the following footnote1 ! however, we shall only find it out if we compare the texts of 
the various editions and we are able to conceive the text lying in front of us as if in a 
frozen state as a station of the happening of the text (we can trace down mainly 
eliminated or erased texts this way). Since the Collected Works edition of Gadamer%s 
major opus is in fact the fifth edition of the work, which takes as its basis the text of the 
fourth edition, this happening of the text remains thus hidden for the readers of the final, 
ten-volume edition of Gadamer%s work, and could only become accessible in case of its 
comparison with the texts of the first two editions.  
 Similarly, in Kant%s case as well ! this is the minimal requirement of 
Heidegger%s interpretation ! one must be familiar with both versions of the chapter on 
deduction in order to be able to judge the nature of the modifications. Text deterioration 
is itself a happening of the text ! a special case of it ! one that eo ipso questions the 
conviction that the text of the last or later edition is (more) authentic in comparison with 
the earlier ones. 
 Some further cases are also worth listing, in which the thesis that the last or 
latest textual variant published in the author%s lifetime can be regarded as the authentic ! 
or more authentic ! text also cannot be maintained. I have in mind the various textual 
modifications made from one edition to the next in certain works of Heidegger, that I 
have discussed in more detail elsewhere, therefore I shall only briefly refer to them here. 
In § 44 c. of Being and Time there are certain interesting remarks on the sceptic, 
scepticism, and the refutation of scepticism. In the seventh edition of the work, 
Heidegger made modifications in a key sentence of this section, and this new text was 
published in all subsequent editions of the work, which witnessed fourteen editions in 
Heidegger%s lifetime. By this modification, the former $nie# (never) was replaced by 
$je# (once), and this is of course not an insignificant change. The question of which of 
the two versions can be regarded as the authentic version (a question which in a 
traditional sense, that is, in the sense of $Textherstellung#, can be regarded as 
philological) leads to no significant results unless completing it with hermeneutical 
effort. Apparently, the textual modification lends a completely new meaning to the text, 
                                                 
1 Cf. István Fehér M., $Hermeneutika és filológia ! pietizmus és felvilágosodás# (Hermeneutics 
and philology ! pietism and Enlightenment), Irodalomtörténeti Közlemények 1 (2004): 56!109, 
mainly 70 ff.; rewritten and extended version: $Hermeneutika és filológia ! pietizmus és 
felvilágosodás. A humántudományok diskurzusának összefüggései egy esettanulmány tükrében# 
(Hermeneutics and philology ! pietism and Enlightenment. Connections of the discourses of 
humanities in the mirror of a case study), Hermeneutika, esztétika, irodalomelmélet, eds. István 
Fehér M. and ErnĘ Kulcsár Szabó (Budapest: Osiris, 2004), 368!447; here: 388. 
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but a more careful analysis rather shows a shift of emphasis.1 Just like in the case of the 
other two textual modifications usually discussed in the literature on Heidegger, where 
the problem also appears primarily as a philological question. However, at a first sight 
the modification in these cases (at least philologically) is even more radical: it reverses 
the meaning of the text. In paragraph 4 of § 3 of Being and Time, the term $durchsich-
tig# was changed in the complete edition into $nicht durchsich-tig#2 on the one hand, 
and one sentence of the afterword of $What is Metaphysics?# went through a radical 
change on the other hand: the sentence fragment which prior to the fourth edition 
                                                 
1 Cf. István Fehér M., Heidegger és a szkepticizmus. A szkeptikus kételyen át a hermeneutikai 
kérdésig (Heidegger and scepticism. From sceptical doubt to hermeneutic question) (Budapest: 
Korona Nova, 1998.), 23.: $The key sentence in question of the Heideggerian text [&] can be 
meaningful in the case of both textual variants ! that is to say, the either!or alternative of 
meaningfulness can be avoided, or it does not exist !, at most the emphasis lies elsewhere in the 
two variants.# See also 45.: $It can be epitomized that the two textual variants created by the 
modification lying at the centre of our analysis delineates two meanings, distinct in their 
emphases, within the analyzed text: various, equally sensible formations of meaning are 
delineated in the analyzed text depending on our interpretation along one or the other version, 
depending on which variant we include in the chain of thought.#  
2 $Die eigentliche »Bewegung« der Wissenschaften spielt sich ab in der mehr oder minder ra-
dikalen und ihr selbst [nicht]durchsichtigen Revision der Grundbegriffe# (SZ 9.) This 
modification appears in the Gesamtausgabe-edition of Being and Time ! and in the individual 
editions following the GA, that is, beginning with the 15th edition of the series of individual 
editions !; this is an editorial modification made on the basis of Heidegger%s note in his own copy. 
See: Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins. Eine 
Erläuterung von Sein und Zeit, vol. 1. »Einleitung: Die Exposition der Frage nach dem Sinn von 
Sein« (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann, 1987), 86 f. Tibor Schwendtner discusses in detail Von 
Herrmann%s editorial interference in his book Heidegger tudományfelfogása (Az 19191929-es 
idĘszak írásainak tükrében) (Heidegger%s concept of science [In the mirror of his writings from 
the 1919!1929 period]) (Budapest: Osiris, 2000), 118 ff. ! In my view, it is about the 
grammatical!syntactic question whether the scope of the expression $mehr oder minder# ($more-
or-less#) extends to only one or both of the two adjectives ! or in fact an adjective and an 
adjectival structure ! following, and connected to it. If it does, then the modification if 
superfluous and it rather causes textual deterioration. If it does not, then the textual modification is 
justified. I have as yet tried to discuss this problem with several German university colleagues, 
among whom also Germanists, but I received no definitive, certain answer, which may lead to the 
conclusion that this is a stylistically ambiguous structure.! Heidegger%s note in his own copy is 
also difficult to interpret. Should we see it as an intention of text emendation, or a subsequent 
commentary, rethinking or completing the original text? ($A revision more-or-less transparent for 
itself: well, at a deeper thought, rather less than more, so one could also say: a more-or-less not 
transparent revision&#). Finally, it cannot be disregarded that the $more-or-less# ! inasmuch as 
its scope also includes $revision# ! somehow tempers the significance of the counterpoint; what 
can $more-or-less# be stated to be $x#, that can ($more-or-less#) be stated to be $not-x# as well. 
What is $partly# transparent, that is also $partly# non-transparent ! and this is not a contradiction 
to such an extent that it can even be attached to the text, too ($partly transparent, partly non-
transparent#), but even if it is not attached, and the text transforms from $partly transparent# to 
$partly non-transparent#, what happens is not the reversion of meaning, but rather the shift of 
emphasis, of the weights. In a certain sense the case is similar to the replacement of $ever#!
$never#, which also covers a shift of emphasis. 
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appeared as $[...] daß das Sein wohl west ohne das Seiende, daß niemals aber ein Seien-
des ist ohne das Sein#, changed, from the fifth edition onwards, to $[...] daß das Sein nie 
west ohne das Seiende, daß niemals ein Seiendes ist ohne das Sein# (in an approximate 
translation: $although there is being without beings, but there are no beings without 
being#, and: $there never is being without beings, there never are beings without being.)1 
Just like the classic philological question referring to the authentic variant in the case of 
Kant%s major work ! is it the first or the second edition of The Critique of Pure Reason 
that can be regarded as authentic variant? ! cannot be unequivocally answered, 
similarly, it seems like an unproductive or mistaken problematization to investigate 
whether, with regard to the Heideggerian modification, it is the earlier or later textual 
variant that should be preferred.  
 The above mentioned modification of the afterword of What is metaphysics? 
yields an opportunity for a short attempt of explanation. It can be equally said that ! with 
certain simplification and extrapolation ! there is being without beings, and there is no 
being without beings, insofar as both statements are, in their own way ! seen form a 
certain (restricted) perspective ! valid, while they are imperfect from different 
perspectives: the imperfectness and onesidedness of the one is counterbalanced or 
$equalled# by the imperfectness and onesidedness of the other. Every philosophy which 
is characterized by the rejection of the subject-object dualism, must fight with its 
linguistic predicament ! Hegel had already complained about it as well.2 As I have tried 
                                                 
1 See GA 9, 306. In relation to the philological-hermeneutical debates about the textual 
modifications, having the ambition to critically assess or dissolve the difficulties or contradictions 
caused by these modifications, see Max Müller, Existenzphilosophie im geistigen Leben der 
Gegenwart (Heidelberg: Kerle, 1949), 50, 75 f. (M. Müller: Existenzphilosophie. Von der 
Metaphysik zur Metahistorik, 4th, extended edition, ed. A. Halder [Freiburg/München: Alber, 
1986], 55 f, 84 f.); Walter Schulz, $Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers,# 
Philosophische Rundschau 1953/54, 65!93., 211!232; 212 f. Reprint edition: Heidegger. 
Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werks, ed. O. Pöggeler (Köln/Berlin: Kiepenheuer = Witch, 
1969) (2nd edition: Königstein/Ts.: Athenäum, 1984), 95!139; 118 f.; Karl Löwith, Heidegger. 
Denker in dürftiger Zeit, In Löwith, Sämtliche Schriften, 8 vols. (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1984; 1st ed. 
1953), 160 ff. György Lukács, Az ész trónfosztása (The dethronement of the mind) (Budapest: 
MagvetĘ, 1978), 742.  
2 See Hegel: A szellem fenomenológiája, 19.: $They take the subject as a constant point, to which 
the predicates are attached as to their support.# In addition, see primarily the thoughts concerning 
the $speculative theorem#, in particular, the following fragment: $The philosophical theorem, 
because it is a theorem, triggers the impression that we are dealing with the ordinary relation of 
subject and predicate and the common behaviour of knowledge# (ibid., 41.). Also see the 
following specific place of the young Hegel%s Frankfurt fragment of a system: $if I say that it 
[being] is the connectedness of opposition and relation, then this connectedness itself can also be 
isolated and dissaprooved its opposition to non-connectedness; thus I would have to say: being is 
the connectedness of connectedness and non-connectedness. Every single term is a product of 
reflexion [...]# (Hegel, $Rendszertöredék# (Fragment of a System), in Ifjúkori írások. Válogatás 
(Works from the age of youth. A collection), trans. Gábor Révai (Budapest: Gondolat, 1982), 
140.) The identicalness and non-identicalness of being and consciousness, respectively the 
disclosure of negative dialectics struggles with the same shortness of language; about this, see 
footnote 56. of my article with the title $Lukács és Sartre. Két gondolati út metszéspontjai és elá-
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to show elsewhere, philosophy has, in a particular sense, no $language# of its own.1 In 
Heidegger%s case the relation of being and beings can only be $one-sidedly#, that is, 
imperfectly expressed by any kind of statement, and here lies the explanation of the 
$equalling# of one one-sidedness with another ! contrary ! one-sidedness. The question 
of an authentic or preferable textual variant, here as well as elsewhere, is highly 
dependent on interpretive operations: it happens in a space dependent of interpretation 
just as much as the questioning of the meaning of the question itself. This operation 




Insofar as the concept of text happening means being opposed to the concept of a text 
frozen into timelessness, and implies a kind of destruction!deconstruction of the concept 
of text, and if this thesis has been founded above primarily by the references to the two 
editions of Kant%s Critique, then in any case the self-identity of the text seemed to have 
been preserved in an unchanged form at least with respect to individual editions. It 
cannot be superfluous to make one step further and say that in certain cases even the 
self-identity of the texts of the $first edition#, $second edition# may as well become very 
volatile, that is, questionable. And on top of it, this happens not so much in the ! 
according to some interpreters ! ideal-idealistic, volatile interpretive space of 
hermeneutics, but rather in its roughly material mediality. In this sense the following 
part should be titled: $Textual criticism and radar technology#.  
 Paul Ziche, one of the editors of the historical-critical edition of Schelling%s 
lifework, wrote not long ago: the $setting-forth# or $establishment# of the text is an 
indispensable work stage of a critical edition. This presupposes of course that prior to 
such an editorial establishment there is no text ! it only comes into being in the course of 
preparation for print. Then he continued: $The idea of an unequivocal, abstractly 
existing text, materially accomplished in different copies cannot be maintained from the 
point of view of 18th century printed works.#2 This is not only to say that the text of the 
first editions contains many printing errors: the history of printing had its contacts with 
criminality much more often than an unsuspicious reader ! a $non-critical text user# or 
$the user of non-critical texts# ! would kindly presume. Pirate editions published 
without permission, claiming to imitate a legitimate edition, were quite frequent; and 
although they were not criminal in nature, the resetting or reprint of certain texts or parts 
                                                                                                                              
gazásai# (Luke and Sartre. The intersections and junctions of two conceptual roads) (Magyar 
Filozófiai Szemle XXVIII, 1984/3!4: 379!413, here: 396f.). 
1 See István M. Fehér.: $Irodalom és filozófia ! irodalmi szöveg és filozófiai szöveg# (Literature 
and philosophy ! literary text and philosophical text), Irodalomtörténet LXXXIX / XXXIX., 
2008/2, 155!187. Primarily see the text passages around footnote 58. (page 167.). 
2 Paul Ziche, $Editionswissenschaft: Historisch-kritisches Edieren. Beispiele aus der Akademie-
Ausgabe von Schellings Werken#, Akademie Aktuell. Zeitschrift der Bayerischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, Heft 20, 2007/1, 27!31, here:27.: $Das %Herstellen% oder %Feststellen% eines Textes 
bildet einen unverzichtbaren Arbeitsschritt einer kritischen Edition. Das setzt voraus, dass vor einer 
solchen editorischen Feststellung ein Text nicht wirklich feststeht, sondern erst im Prozess des 
Edierens entsteht. [...] Die Idee eines eindeutigen, abstrakt existierenden, in den Exemplaren bloß 
noch material realisierten Textes ist für Druckwerke des 18. Jahrhunderts nicht haltbar.# 
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of texts was a frequent complicating factor for orientation between the various editions. 
With just a bit of exaggeration, it can be said ! claims Ziche ! that the first edition of a 
work published around 1800 hardly had any copy completely identical with another one.1 
 It has been mentioned before: in the course of the edition of individual authorial 
works, a historical-critical edition must take into account all the editions of the work in 
question published in the author%s lifetime, and, regardless of what edition technique it 
would apply in the end ! whether the text of the first, second, or some later edition, or 
the very last edition published in the author%s lifetime ! some way it must reproduce the 
minor or major textual alterations of various editions. Now we must ask the question 
how, through which operations the establishment of the text of various editions may 
actually happen. The answer seems simple: copies of the different editions must be 
acquired and read simultaneously (collated, $kollationieren#). But if we want to operate 
really thoroughly, then we obviously recognize: it is not only the copies of various 
editions that must be collated, but several copies of the same edition must also be 
acquired, and the comparison of these must result in the text (textual identity, or the 
establishment of the text or textual identity) of the edition in question (first, second, etc.) 
This is exactly the procedure followed by the Schelling-edition; several copies were 
acquired of each edition, and their comparison resulted in the surprising recognition: the 
texts of Schelling%s various works showed differences of various degrees even in the 
several copies analyzed.  
 Interestingly, this result was born with the use of the instruments of radar 
technology, astronomy, and military technology. English Shakespeare-philologist 
Charlton Hinman, who set out to compare more than eighty copies of first editions of 
Shakespeare%s works, made use of his experiences gained in WWII, when he had to 
uncover and identify suspicious establishments using radar images. For this, an earlier 
procedure was used, developed for the astronomic researches of the 1920s and 1930s for 
discovering moving objects, which also served to discover the planet Pluto. During this 
procedure two snapshots taken at different times and placed precisely over each other 
are compared by alternately illuminating them, while the essential differences ! in 
astronomy and military technology the movements ! become directly apparent. Hinman 
constructed a machinery, which was later called $Hinman-Kollator#, for making this 
technology also applicable to civil, that is, scientific, purposes. The two copies to 
compare are projected over each other in such a way that the two copies are lit in a rapid 
sequence one after the other, and this makes clearly visible as a moving object even the 
slightest difference ! such as a missing comma ! between them. The textual differences 
between the individual editions of Schelling%s works were discovered and analyzed with 
                                                 
1 Paul Ziche, $Editionswissenschaft: Historisch-kritisches Edieren. Beispiele aus der Akademie-
Ausgabe von Schellings Werken#, 27.: $Ncht nur enthält der tradierte Text der Erstdrucke Fehler, 
die zu berichten und, nach kritischer Abwägung, zu berichtigen sind; die Druckgeschichte 
tendiert, wie Robert Darnton gezeigt hat, weit öfter, als dem unkritischen Textnutzer oder dem 
Nutzer unkritischer Texte lieb sein kann, ins Kriminelle. Unerlaubte Raubdrucke, die eine 
legitime Ausgabe zu imitieren suchen, waren gängig; nicht kriminell, aber üblich und das Edieren 
komplizierend war ein Neusatz und Neudruck einzelner Texte oder Textstücke im ganz normalen 
Herstellungsprozess. Mit nur geringer Zuspitzung kann man sagen, dass kaum ein Exemplar des 
Erstdrucks eines um 1800 verlegten Buches einem anderen gleicht.# (My emphasis, I. F. M.) 
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the help of this technique. Ziche mentioned a characteristic example about an essential 
textual variant discovered in an 1800 edition of Schelling%s work The System of 
Transcendental Idealism, which he illustrated with a facsimile image. Thus, the 
expression $freyen Handeln# of one copy was replaced in the other one by $Anschauen# 
(this change can hardly be regarded as the correction of a printing error), and only the 
latter makes a meaningful text. Now, the historical-critical edition has the task, states 
Ziche, to reconstruct the textual $movements# in a way similar to the $Hinman-
Kollator#.1  
 The text was repeatedly modified during printing, if for no other than technical 
reasons. The lead types used for typesetting were not enough, therefore the individual 
printing sheets were typeset, paginated, and printed separately, and corrected during 
printing. After printing, the paginated sheets were taken apart, the types were used for 
printing the next sheet, and the printed sheets were heaped up. This way the work was 
never printed as a whole, and therefore the proof of the whole work was never produced 
as a whole either. In the next phase, the sheets of the many heaps were bound together 
randomly to form the individual copies (randomly choosing from the corrected or 
modified sheets and the original sheets alike). This also meant that the textual identity of 
the copies coming from the very same printing press was not ensured.  
 This is to say that the identity of the text in the mentioned case is uncertain even 
on the level of individual editions,2 and the assessment of the textual alteration within 
the same editions needs further interpretation. So the question which is the preferable 
variant ! and in this case not even for the purpose of establishing the final text of the 
work itself (its authentic text), but only that of one of its editions ! can hardly be 




                                                 
1 Paul Ziche, $Editionswissenschaft: Historisch-kritisches Edieren. Beispiele aus der Akademie-
Ausgabe von Schellings Werken,# ibid., 27f. It will not be useless to quote the Schellingian 
fragment in question: $So wie man also sagen kann, daß ich, indem ich anzuschauen glaubte, 
eigentlich handelnd war, so kann man sagen, daß ich hier, indem ich auf die Außenwelt zu 
handeln glaube, eigentlich anschauend bin, und alles, was außer dem Anschauen im Handeln 
vorkommt, gehört eigentlich nur zur Erscheinung des einzig Objektiven, des Anschauens/freyen 
Handelns, und umgekehrt, vom Handeln alles abgesondert, was nur zur Erscheinung gehört, 
bleibt nichts zurück als das Anschauen# (Schelling, System des transzendentalen Idealismus, 
Schellings sämmtliche Werke, ed. K.F.A. Schelling (Stuttgart/Augsburg: J. G. Cotta, 1856!61), 
Vol. 3, 566. > Schelling, Historisch-kritische Ausgabe. Reihe I, Werke. Vol. 9, 1!2: System des 
transscendentalen Idealismus, eds. Harald Korten and Paul Ziche, 2005, 9, 1, 264.). 
2 We are wondering what results an examination with a Hinman collator would have regarding 
the two editions of Kant%s Critique. After all, the edition of the Royal Prussian Academy of 
Science is from the 1910s, when the Hinman collator had not been known, consequently, a 
similar comparison could not be done, and as far as I know, it has not been done posteriorely 
either. Is it possible that an examination of this type would attenuate the tacit assumption 
regarding the identicalness of the first and the second edition of the Critique? 
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IV. 
A paper entitled $Textual Criticism, Edition History, Interpretation# should indeed deal 
with, if only within the range of certain remarks, Heidegger%s philological!hermeneutic 
observations on the edition of Aristotle. At the beginning of the 1920s Heidegger started 
working on a phenomenological (phenomenological-hermeneutic) interpretation of 
Aristotle; although the number of the manuscripts grew, and after the while the work 
reached an advanced stage ! so much so that in a letter written to Roman Ingarden on 14 
December 1922 Husserl reported that in volume VII of the Jahrbuch für Philosophie 
und phänomenologische Forschung edited by him $appears Heidegger%s fundamental 
[&] work on Aristotle#,1 and it seems that the work was ready for print in the summer 
                                                 
1 Edmund Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden. Mit Erläuterungen und Erinnerungen an Husserl, 
ed. Roman Ingarden (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1968), 25. 
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of 19251 ! the promised interpretation of Aristotle has never been published in print, 
either then, in the 1920s, or ever after. What is available for us today of this work, is the 
famous $Natorp!account#, an approximately forty typewritten pages long abstract 
bearing the title Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der herme-
neutischen Situation),2 and the university lectures of the 1920s.3 Although Heidegger%s 
interpretation of Aristotle has never been published, it is not unimportant that his major 
work, the Being and Time published in  1927, grew out of this intellectual endeavour 
after various modifications. This way there is a direct relationship between the planned 
interpretation of Aristotle and the Being and Time. In a retrospective summary of this 
work, Gadamer wrote about Heidegger%s approach and the structure of the planned work 
that $Heidegger has found indeed a new and unusual access to Aristotle. He approached 
it, so-to-say, from below, from actual life. His first lectures did not treat Aristotle%s 
Metaphysics or Physics, but his Rhetoric. The subject of these lectures on Aristotle was 
a major aspect of all rhetoric, described first by Plato in Phaedrus, namely that in order 
to persuade the audience, we must first know it. Aristotle%s Rhetoric became for 
Heidegger an introduction to philosophical anthropology. In the second book of 
Rhetoric, Heidegger%s attention was primarily drawn to the discussion of the affects, the 
pathe. These affects signal the audience%s inclination towards, or reaction against, the 
rhetor%s speech. It was with regard to this Aristotelian pattern, completed with his own 
life experience, that Heidegger gained insight into what he later termed, in Being and 
Time, <Befindlichkeit%.#4 Indeed, there are some laconic references to this in Heidegger%s 
major work. In § 29, dealing with $Befindlichkeit#, Heidegger notes: $Aristotle 
discusses pathe in the second book of his Rhetoric. This work ! in opposition to the 
traditional orientation of the notion of rhetoric to some kind of <discipline% ! must be 
perceived as the first systematic hermeneutics of everyday being-together.#5 Now, with 
the newly published text of the 1924 university lectures as volume 18 of the complete 
works, there is a chance to study this meaningful, yet enigmatically concise reference 
against a much wider textual basis. The broader context of Heidegger%s ideas is formed 
by the critical reconsideration of the historical shaping of philosophical disciplines that 
Heidegger calls destruction. This is about the reconsideration, guided by 
phenomenological-hermeneutical inquiries, of the set map of philosophical disciplines, 
                                                 
1 See Thomas J. Sheehan, $«Time and Being»; 1925!27#, in Thinking About Being. Aspects of 
Heidegger's Thought, eds. R. W. Shahan, J. N. Mohanty, Norman (Oklahoma: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1984), 180. 
2 See now as the appendix of GA 62. In Hungarian: Fenomenológiai Aristotelész-interpretációk 
(A hermeneutikai szituáció jelzése) (Phenomenological Aristotle-interpretations [The indication of 
the hermeneutical situation]), Existentia VI!VII, 1996!1997, Supplementa, vol. 2; for more on 
the manuscript, see István Fehér M., Martin Heidegger. Egy XX. századi gondolkodó életútja 
(Martin Heidegger. The life of a thinker from the 20th century), 2nd extended edition (Budapest: 
Göncöl, 1992), 55!58. 
3 Primarily GA 61: Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die 
phänomenologische Forschung; GA 62: Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter 
Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik and GA 18: Grundbegriffe der 
aristotelischen Philosophie. 
4 Gadamer: Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 3, 399. 
5 Sein und Zeit, 29. §. 138. See the quoted Hungarian translation, 167. 
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the loosening of the conceptuality of tradition, with the purpose of a positive 
appropriation of tradition (neither its servile acceptance, nor its unthoughtful rejection). 
This reconsideration neither leaves untouched the foundations of the historically created 
philosophical disciplines as well. In this case we are speaking about rhetoric. Heidegger 
formulates the provocative thesis ! which may also shed light on the cited reference of 
the Being and Time ! that the traditional disciplinary approach to rhetoric is not helpful 
at all in understanding Aristotelian rhetoric, on the contrary, it directly hinders its 
understanding. In Heidegger%s view the confusion around rhetoric ! and this is the point 
where the philological notes that interest us follow ! was apparent already at the time of 
the edition of Aristotle%s Rhetoric, inasmuch as it was placed at the very end of the 
Berlin academic edition of Aristotle, prepared by Bekker in the 1830s, a time when the 
understanding and appreciation of rhetoric was at its lowest. $They didn%t know where 
to place it, so they put it at the end\ A brilliant proof of perfect helplessness\# ! 
complains Heidegger.1 Tradition has long lost its understanding of rhetoric, he 
continues; it was degraded into a school discipline already in the time of Hellenism and 
in the early Middle Ages. The original meaning of rhetoric has long fallen into oblivion. 
In contrast, rhetoric is nothing else, Heidegger claims, $than the discipline in which the 
self-interpretation of the concrete human being-here explicitly happens. Rhetoric is none 
other than the interpretation of the concrete human being-here, the hermeneutics of 
being-here.#2 Consequently there is an inner relationship between rhetoric and 
hermeneutics for Heidegger, and besides the rehabilitation of rhetoric it also becomes 
visible how organically the planned, but never published interpretation of Aristotle (or 
more accurately the dialogue with Aristotle, since the Greek philosopher was not so 
much an object of interpretation for Heidegger, than a partner in a dialogue) was 
embedded into the approach of his major work, how deeply it influenced Heidegger%s 
hermeneutic perspective and with it, the basic structure of the Being and Time. It is 
understandable thus that Heidegger was disappointed about the Rhetoric%s placement at 
the very end of the corpus, and considered it a sign of philosophy%s loss of orientation in 
the 19th century. At the same time, the fact that Heidegger preferred the $life-
philosophical# Aristotle ! his aesthetic, rhetorical, and ethical writings ! to the 
$scientific# Aristotle ! his writings in logic, metaphysics, and natural philosophy, and 
tried, if at all, to approach, or bridge the gap between, the latter by means of the former, 
or, as Gadamer formulated, $from below, from actual life#, from practical philosophy: 
well, this sheds particular light precisely over Heidegger%s own philosophical stance. 
This approach had, of course, not been ready from the beginnings, but was shaping, as if  
in its way to itself, in the course of years precisely through the theoretical 
reconsiderations of, among others, Aristotle, and eventually found itself in the 
philosopher%s major work.3 It highlighted that particular approach which led to the 
                                                 
1 Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, GA 18, 109f. 
2 Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie, GA 18, 110. Additionally, see Heidegger, Sein 
und Wahrheit, GA 36/37, 158.: $the science that is concerned with the capacity of speaking, 
namely rhetorics is the basic science of man, the political science.# 
3 Regarding this, see Franco Volpi%s basic monograph: Heidegger e Aristotele (Padova: Daphne, 
1984); mainly the pages 90!116., and id.: $Dasein comme praxis: L%assimilation et la radica-
lisation heideggeriene de la philosophie pratique d%Aristote#, Heidegger et l!idee de la phénomé-
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breakup with, and radical turning away from, the usual ways of philosophizing of the 
age, eminently with the epistemological and scientific orientation of neo-Kantianism,  
and to an opening towards $the actual life#. Seen from here, we have good reason to 
assume a similarity between the ruling philosophical spirit of the 19th century and the 
Aristotle-edition published in this period reminiscent of the one claimed to exist between 
the Hegelianism of Hegel%s disciples and the principles governing the edition of the 
FVA. (The difference might only be grasped in some shift of emphasis: there, the 
similarity was lying in-between the editorial principles ! the philological establishment 
of the texts ! and the spirit of the philosophy edited, and here, between the editorial 
principles ! the establishment of the sequence of the texts ! and the spirit pervading the 
age, and the age!s scientific thinking.) If Heidegger opposed the ruling philosophical 
spirit of the age, then he must have opposed the Aristotle-edition pervaded by this spirit 
as well as the interpretation of Aristotle, defined by both of these aspects. However, just 
like in the case of his interpretation of Kant, it is unnecessary for us to discuss in more 
depth Heidegger%s interpretations with regard to the $correctness# of his understanding 
of Aristotle and its connections with his own system of thinking. It is a historical fact 
that rhetoric has lost its importance during modernity.1 If Heidegger%s complaint is 
accurate, then his remark may highlight the philological fact that Bekker%s Berlin edition 
of Aristotle%s works, the standard edition to this day, and the sequence of the 
manuscripts in the printed version was significantly pervaded by the philosophical and 
science theory climate of its own age, the modernity. The climate defined by the 
victorious breakthrough of the method of mathematical natural sciences, the formation 
of the paradigm of scientific methodology, and the related devaluation of the humanities, 
stretching back to Bacon and Descartes, one result of which was the playing down and 
discrediting of rhetoric. (Descartes turned the verisimilar, which has to do with rhetoric, 
almost into a synonym of falseness).2 So, the fact that the Berlin edition placed the 
Rhetoric to the very end of the corpus, must have had its effects on several generations 
of the late 19th ! early 20th-century readers, pervaded in other respects as well by the 
spirit of the age; the decision about the sequence of texts meant just as much a tacit 
stance influencing interpretation in the case of the importance of certain writings as the 
publication of the two editions of Kant%s Critique of Pure Reason as part of the 
academic edition of Kant ! as we have seen above ! which tacitly preferred the second 
edition. Gadamer%s cited remark that Heidegger%s first lectures ! in an $unusual 
approach# [ungewöhnlicher Zugang] ! did not treat Aristotle%s Metaphysics or Physics, 
negatively imply that the usual approaches of the standard interpretations of the age 
(and of the 19th century) did exactly that, and the philological organization of Aristotle%s 
                                                                                                                              
nologie, eds. Franco Volpi et al. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), 2!41.; in 
English: $Being and Time: A %Translation% of the Nicomachean Ethics?#, in Reading Heidegger 
from the Start. Essays in His Earliest Thought, eds. Th. Kisiel and J. van Buren (Albany/New 
York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 195!212. 
1 See for example: Jean Grondin, $Die Hermeneutik und die rhetorische Tradition#, in id.., Von 
Heidegger zu Gadamer. Unterwegs zur Hermeneutik (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buch-
gesellschaft, 2001), 17!45, here: 19., with other references. 
2 Related to the topic, see Samuel IJsseling: Rhetorik und Philosophie. Eine historisch-
systematische Einführung (Stuttgart ! Bad Cannstatt: Frommann!Holzboog, 1988), 92ff. 
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texts in the Bekker-edition ! over and above its character defined by the spirit of the age 
! might have also had a role in it. This state of affairs may be meaningful for a paper 
with the title $Textual Criticism, Edition History, Interpretation# insofar as in the light of 
Heidegger%s remarks, and reconsidering these remarks ! similarly to the FVA edition of 
Hegel ! the thesis that edition history and interpretation mutually define each other can 
also be valid for Aristotle%s work as well: on the one hand, edition history is itself an 
operation guided by preliminary understanding, interpretation (in our case by a 
worldview and understanding pervaded by the spirit of the age), which, on the other 
hand, significantly influences the future history of effect and interpretation of the edited 
author. At any rate, the establishment of the text ! in this case: the organization and 
sequence of writings in the textual corpus preserved ! did not happen here either under 
laboratory conditions, in a space void of interpretation.  
 Heidegger confronted the standard interpretation of Aristotle in another point as 
well, and since this confrontation also contained philological elements ! and since the 
spirit of the age also had a considerable role here, too ! it is worth discussing it in 
somewhat more detail. The issue here is the relationship of being and time, of a 
paramount importance for Heidegger%s entire path as a thinker, the fundamental 
reference point for which was the final chapter (10) of book IX (1>theta) of Aristotle%s 
Metaphysics. This chapter is found at the end of a book ! Heidegger noted in 1925/26 ! 
which is one of the most difficult books of the treatises collected under the title 
Metaphysics. $The understanding of Greek ontology and thus the problem of truth 
depends on the possibility of access to this chapter#,1 formulates Heidegger in his 
important addition. Heidegger as a thinker had repeatedly returned to the detailed 
interpretation of this chapter, and developed his own interpretation in a theoretical-
critical dialogue with the standard traditional interpretations of Aristotle. 
 Now, tradition has had a hard time interpreting this final chapter; not once, the 
opinion that this manuscript appears in the wrong place has also been formulated. The 
well-known researcher of Aristotle, Werner Jaeger, in his 1912 work entitled Studien zur 
Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles, in conclusion of the preliminary 
works of H. Bonitz and others, stated that this edition justaposed individual treatises, 
lecture manuscripts, and introductions, which all dealt with ontological issues but were 
not necessarily interconnected either in content or in methodology. Jaeger settled that 
books Z, H, and 1 belonged together, and exposed that he considered these books most 
relevant from an ontological point of view ! for this very reason it became questionable 
for him that 1 10 belonged to 1. In reference to Schwegler and Christ, who thought that 
this chapter did not fit into the conceptual context, Jaeger only made a short 
commentary, saying that $this chapter stands there lacking any connection#, it is nothing 
else than $a kind of attachment#. W. D. Ross in this fundamental edition published in 
1924 commented on this section in a similar manner: this chapter $has little to do with 
the rest of book# (Oxford, 1924, vol. 2, 274.) In his later major work, the Aristoteles. 
Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung published in 1923, Jaeger changed 
his mind ! influenced by Bonitz%s 1849 commentary, who did not dispute the placement 
of the chapter, but in Heidegger%s view his arguments were just as invalid as Jaeger%s 
                                                 
1 Martin Heidegger, Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, GA 21, 174. About the following ones, 
see ibid., 171ff. 
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counter-arguments !, but he did not justify this change appropriately. For Heidegger, the 
uncertainty and obscurity in what regards the place and content of this chapter can be 
explained by the fact that the relationship of being and truth is disregarded; moreover, it 
is not even observed as at all. $We must understand in advance the inner relation of the 
interpretation of being and truth [&]#, he said in 1925/26, $that is, we must clarify 
philosophically the subject matter of the texts in question, before we would proceed to 
make obscure philological assumptions about their contentual connections.#1 
 Philosophy (hermeneutics, interpretation) must therefore precede philology. 
The question whether the text of the chapter at issue belongs there or not ! a question 
which refers to editing the texts and manuscripts into a coherent textual corpus, and is 
thus an eminently textual critical, philological question ! can only be answered 
substantially (and sound assumptions can also be only formulated) if we have 
understood first and interpreted in an appropriate way what it is about. It is again 
unnecessary to go deeper into Heidegger%s more than twenty pages long interpretation 
following the mentioned introduction ! just like in the case of his Kant-interpretation 
above or that of his interpretation regarding the place of rhetoric !; it is enough to see the 
strong interconnectedness of philosophy (hermeneutics) and philology. The question of 
where to include a certain textual fragment when collating several manuscripts, and 
whether that certain part indeed belongs where it was originally placed, presupposes 
interpretation, it cannot be decided on merely philological grounds. (The question 
regarding the text, Heidegger formulates in 1930, is connected to the question regarding 
the object).2  
 Preliminary interpretation, however, is also influenced one way or another by 
the spirit of the age. Now, since in modernity, and primarily in the 19th century, truth has 
gained an eminently epistemological meaning, that is, it was understood as the truth of 
proposition, or cognition ! and not of being !; well, it was only in this governing spirit 
of the age that the philological uncertainty regarding the placement of the chapter in 
question could have occurred at all as a problem. A chapter of logic cannot pertain to 
metaphysics, thinks Schwegler, and Jaeger even goes one step further, when he claims 
to enforce the chapter%s strangeness from the book by saying: the main obstruction of the 
chapter%s pertinence to the book is not only that its subject is the true being, but also that 
it denotes this being as an $actual# being.3 This, according to Jaeger, would be a highly 
implausible idea, not typical for Aristotle. This characterization should accordingly be 
either deleted from the text ! as does Ross !, or fundamentally reinterpreted ! as does 
Schwegler. That the discussion of truth and falseness ! writes Heidegger in 1925/26 ! 
$forms the highest peak of ontological investigations [&], is meaningless and 
impossible for traditional philosophy. Because truth [according to the ruling approach of 
modernity] pertains still to judgment and thinking [&], therefore it is hardly the 
definition of the being of beings, and by no means its $most authentic# definition; hence 
                                                 
1 Martin Heidegger, Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, GA 21, 174. (My emphasis, I. F. M.). 
2 Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie, GA 
31, 80. ($Zusammenhang von Textfrage und Sachfrage#). 
3 Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie, GA 
31, 82. 
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comes the uncertainty and variation about the pertinence of this chapter [&].#1 Because, 
as he returned to the problem in 1930, $every beginner in philosophy knows that the 
problem of truth pertains to logic, not to metaphysics, and especially not to the treatise 
which discusses the fundamental problem of metaphysics.#2 In consequence, it has yet 
little significance how the interpreters answer the question referring to its pertinence ! 
whether they think it belongs there or not. Just like in the case of the interpretation of 
Kant above, we could refer here to the method of the polemic use of the mind used by 
Kant.3 Heidegger%s influential interpretation on the relationship of being and truth must 
not necessarily be $true# in order to shatter the traditional interpretation of Aristotle, and 
highlight their being bound to their  age, and thus question their indubitable authority.  
 The issue discussed here differs from the problem of rhetoric inasmuch as, in 
the case of rhetoric, it was the science theoretical evaluation of rhetoric in the spirit of 
the age which included Aristotle%s writing to the end of the corpus, while here the 
approach of modernity regarding the relationship of metaphysics!ontology and 
epistemology created a philological (or pseudo-philological) problem: whether a text 
referring to the definition of truth can be placed next to metaphysical or ontological 
texts, whether it belongs there or not. This latter dilemma is also a typically modern one. 
However, it is a common feature of both questions that the philological problem is 
preceded by some kind of hermeneutical-philosophical operation: in the first case, the 
contemporary understanding, preliminary interpretation of rhetoric ! namely, that it 
enjoyed no high regard ! decides the editorial technique applied, in the second case the 
approach of the philosophy of the age suggests the philological questions regarding the 
revision of the Hellenistic disposition of Aristotelian writings. And it does this starting 
from the naïve presupposition that Aristotle must have thought about the concept of 
truth the same way as we think today, and if a text fragment contradicts it, then we are 
entitled to doubt its pertinence to the work in question.4  
 
V.  
A paper entitled $Textual Criticism, Edition History, Interpretation# cannot afford 
leaving out (it should indeed be treated as a separate study) one of the major and most 
authoritative lifework-editions, both in length and in contents, of the past decades: the 
complete edition of Heidegger%s works begun in the last twenty-five years of the past 
century. The project of this endeavour started in 1975 has repeatedly changed and been 
extended compared to the initial plans: the complete edition of Heidegger, which, with 
its one hundred and two planned volumes according to the present, updated project, and 
seventy-seven actually published volumes (the decisive majority of which contain 
previously unpublished writings, several appearing already in the second or third 
                                                 
1 Martin Heidegger, Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, GA 21, 171. 
2 Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Einleitung in die Philosophie, GA 
31, 81. 
3 See note 6 on page 155. 
4 For more on the correlations of being and truth in Heidegger%s conception, see István Fehér M., 
Martin Heidegger. Egy XX. századi gondolkodó életútja, 29f, 160!165., and Heidegger és a 
szkepticizmus. A szkeptikus kételyen át a hermeneutikai kérdésig (Heidegger and scepticism. 
Through sceptical doubt to the hermeneutical question) (Budapest: Korona Nova, 1998), 51!64. 
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edition), is one of the most remarkable lifework-editions in the contemporary literary 
panorama. All the more so since the volumes of the complete edition ! despite the well-
known linguistic difficulties connected to the translations of Heideggerian texts ! are 
also published in English, French, Italian, and Spanish editions following the original 
ones, and this is a practically singular thing in the academic world (so far twenty-six 
volumes were published in English, sixteen in French, thirty-six in Italian, and twenty-
seven in Spanish, and twenty!twenty-five more are forthcoming).1 
 Martin Heidegger, who was born in 1889 and died in 1976, has long been 
considered one of the most important thinkers of the 20th century; however, it has 
increasingly become the prevailing opinion that Heidegger is the greatest thinker of the 
century. This opinion is largely influenced by the writings of the philosopher%s legacy, 
published in the period following his death. Heidegger%s lifework is decisive for the 
philosophical debates in many parts of the world; besides its influence in Germany, let 
us only think of the fact that contemporary French philosophy would be completely 
unconceivable without Heidegger%s influence and the critical dialogue with him, that 
outstanding attention has been given to him in Japan ever since the 1930s, that his 
thoughts have raised great interest in Italy and the neo-Latin countries since the 1950s, 
and that the confrontation with the Heideggerian ideas has lately increasingly become a 
decisive part of philosophical consciousness in the USA as well. It is significant from 
this perspective that in the year of the 100th anniversary of Heidegger%s birth, in 1989, 
conferences and symposia were organized all over the world, approaching one hundred 
in number. 
 When Martin Heidegger died in 1976, at eighty-seven years of age, it had 
already been clear for many that one of the greatest thinkers of the 20th century passed 
away. However, it could hardly have been predicted that the philosopher%s thoughts 
have not lost their strength even after his death, but maintained, and what is more, even 
increased their influence. In the last years of his life, Heidegger was organizing his 
manuscripts with the help of some friends and disciples, and was thinking about the fate 
of his legacy. Slowly, the project of the complete edition of his works was formed, and 
Heidegger could still live to see, in 1975, the first published volume of the series. The 
editorial works started vigorously, and as a result of the hard work, two or three volumes 
have been published each year for the last over thirty years (which is approximately the 
opposite of the editions of idealist philosophers treated above, which usually come out 
with one volume each two or three, or even more, years.) Since most volumes contain 
unpublished writings, over the last few years the interpretation of Heidegger has been 
placed upon new foundations across the world.  
 It is only possible to truly assess how little Heidegger published in his lifetime if 
we see the dimensions of his unpublished legacy. This notable reticence is the result of 
several reasons, and therefore the fate of the legacy has not been certain either. In the last 
decades of his life, Heidegger published so few writings also because he thought that his 
age could not understand him. This opinion of his did not change then until his death. He 
considered that it were fatal to publish the manuscripts of his legacy since his age would 
have deeply misunderstood and misinterpreted them to such an extent that it would have 
been completely misled the future generations. And it is still better than 
                                                 
1 See Heidegger Studien 24, 252ff. 
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misunderstanding if the writings remained unaccessible for a while, until the children of 
a happier age would read them with fresh eyes and without bias. When will this age be 
mature enough for receiving his writings, is of course impossible to know; one thing is 
certain: this age will not cease from one day to the next.  
 When the future fate of his manuscripts came into discussion, Heidegger first 
expressed his will to block his legacy for one hundred years. This was followed by 
various debates, considerations, and persuasions with the family and friends. One of the 
most serious arguments was that in an atomic war ! the possibility of which was very 
plausible in Heidegger%s analysis of the age ! his writings could be easily destroyed, and 
therefore it should really be reconsidered whether it is advisable to block them for such a 
long time. This argument was not really convincing for Heidegger. There are atomic-
safe shelters, bunkers, he said, it should only be seen to it that his writings be transported 
to such places and preserved there. Finally, the decisive argument was that although his 
writings could survive an atomic war ! it is not impossible !, but it could very well 
happen that there would not be any survivors left to read them. Eventually, Heidegger 
reluctantly accepted this argument. Characteristically, the only argument to convince 
him to publish his unpublished legacy was that perhaps there will be no people one 
hundred years later. That is to say, had he seen any guarantees that people were still 
living on earth one hundred years from now, he would have not allowed his writings to 
be accessible in the present.   
 $Ways ! not works#: this was the motto placed by Heidegger in front of his 
works some days before his death. This is not about publishing an author%s opinions, 
presenting his stance, or organizing these in a historical order ! claimed one of the 
proposed introductions of the complete edition ! but about the issue of thinking. The 
former is of course quite possible in our age, the age of information, but from the point 
of view of accessing the issue of thinking, it lacks any significance. The task of the 
complete edition is to assist in asking, understanding, profoundly questioning the 
question ! in facing the issue of thinking.1 
 Accordingly, the complete edition of Heidegger%s lifework is not a historical-
critical edition,2 but one corresponding to Heidegger%s last will: $Ausgabe letzter Hand#, 
                                                 
1 GA 1, 438. 
2 Behind the conception of the historical!critical edition there is a research program, as Hans 
Gerhard Senger claims, whose history has not been written yet ! it also has a historical continuity 
which exceeds the historicism of the 19th century that has been considered its source medium until 
now. More precisely, it dates back to the Renaissance humanism, or directly to the age of 
Alexandrian philology; the term $critique# was first used in the 17th century in the sense of 
judging and differentiating with the aim of creating historically valid texts and filtering out the 
unhistorical projections. As far as the philological apparatus is concerned, there already existed 
registers in the 16th century. (Hans Gerhard Senger, $Die historisch-kritische Edition historisch-
kritisch betrachtet#, in Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition philosophischer 
Texte, eds. Walter Jaeschke, Wilhelm G. Jacobs and Hermann Krings (Hamburg: Felix Meiner 
Verlag, 1987), 1!20.: 2, 5, 7f.). About the humanists% philological interest, also see Ulrich 
Muhlack, $Zum Verhältnis von Klassischer Philologie und Geschichtswissenschaft im 19. 
Jahrhundert#, in Philologie und Hermeneutik im 19. Jahrhundert. I, ed. H. Flashar et al. 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck = Ruprecht, 1979), 225!239., here: 225f. ! The historical!critical 
edition, as Wilhelm G. Jacobs says, does not interest them, thus they pay identical attention to 
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$the last edition according to the author(<s last will)#.1 This means, explains the editorial 
announcement of the complete edition, that the individual volumes appear in the form in 
which the philosopher published his writings in his lifetime: without a critical apparatus 
and indexes. The philological apparatus of historical-critical editions repelled Heidegger 
(the deterrant example for him was the Stuttgart edition, Großoktavausgabe, of 
Hölderlin%s works); he thought that the apparatus suppresses the text itself: intruding into 
the foreground, it always draws attention upon itself, and guides the reader towards 
previously defined readings and definitive questions (e.g. the comparison of textual 
variants, historical-philological analysis of connections raised by the commentaries, etc.) 
And that what is truly essential: the $thing# itself, remains in the background. Similarly 
(with one single exception) we find no kind of indexes (name, subject, or other) at the 
end of the complete edition%s volumes; these only assist a superficial reading, and there 
is a possibility that the reader will approach the text from the indexes.2 As a kind of 
substitute for the missing indexes, and in assistance of the reproduction of the line of 
thought, he considered useful a detailed table of contents compiled by the editors, of 
help for a better orientation in the volumes of lectures. Last but not least, his argument 
against critical editions was that the slowness in time of such endeavours breaks the 
reception and effect of the ideas, and makes almost impossible to follow up the 
unfolding of ideas: the edition must be completed within approximately one generation, 
supposing that the lifework expects an at least somewhat appropriate reception ! a 
consideration which (as we have seen in the case of the Hegel-edition) is hardly 
unfounded, and can be completely agreed with. (Especially if taken into consideration 
that, as mentioned above, the elaboration of the editorial principles alone of the 
                                                                                                                              
each written manifestation, each data is considered edendum; thus the historical!critical edition is 
a complete edition by principle, a Gesamtausgabe. In this respect, the Heidegger-edition is closer 
to the principle of the historical!critical edition than the new Hegel edition. Jacobs%s opinion that 
the editor knows that his understanding of the author overshadows the edition, but he tries to 
make this shadow as clear as possible (Wilhelm G. Jacobs, $Textüberlieferung und historisch-
kritische Edition. Typen von Editionen#, in Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung und Edition 
philosophischer Texte, 21!26., here: 21f.). 
1 $Ausgabe letzter Hand# lexically means $the last edition edited by the author# (ElĘd Halász, 
GermanHungarian Dictionary (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1967), Vol. 1., 923.), while 
according to the Duden Stilwörterbuch: $letzte vom Autor selbst besorgte Ausgabe# (Duden 
Stilwörterbuch der deutschen Sprache. Die Verwendung der Wörter im Satz, 6th completely revized 
and expanded edition, ed. Günther Drosdowski, Der Duden in 10 Bänden, Vol. 2 (Mannheim ! 
Wien ! Zürich: Dudenverlag, 1970), 334. Both explanations should be understood cum grano salis 
in Heidegger%s case, as only regarding the works published in his lifetime (and, stricktly speaking, 
published in more than one edition) can we say that they are $last editions edited by the author 
himself#, while this does not hold to the unpublished manuscripts that were left as part of the legacy. 
These are not edited by the author, but there can be authorial instructions regarding the edition, that 
is why it seems adequate to replace $the last edition edited by the author# with $the author%s last 
will# or his $testament#, and translate the German expression accordingly.  
2 Within certain limits, an index of names could even be useful, but a subject index hardly fits into 
the nature of the Heideggerian phenomenological!hermeneutical thinking (and its considerations 
and problems raised related to the philosophy of language); see my restrictive remarks preceding 
the subject index of my Heidegger volume (István Fehér M., Martin Heidegger. Egy XX. századi 
gondolkodó életútja, 2., 379.). 
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university lectures series in the new Hegel-edition took up almost three decades.) 
Besides, a critical edition comes in question primarily in the case of authors who already 
have a lifework edition (and this criterion is fulfilled for all three discussed authors of 
the age of idealism). Heidegger%s decision is based on his assumption ! says the 
publisher%s announcement ! that the time is not ripe as yet for a historical-critical edition 
of his lifework. An additional remark of the 1991 brochure which is missing from later 
announcements claims that, on account of the nature and scope of his philosophical 
legacy, the accomplishment of a historical-critical edition of Heidegger%s works would 
not be possible for the next fifty years.1 
 The first editorial announcements refer to the structure of the complete edition, 
but even as late as the beginning of the 1990s, the projected number and content of the 
volumes of the four planned series was only concretized for the first two series and the 
first two volumes of the third series (vols. 1!16, 17!63, 64!65.), while for the third and 
fourth series only the major thematic units were distinguished, without marking the 
numbers of volumes. At this time, the complete edition was assumed to comprise 
seventy!eighty volumes; then the project of the 102 volumes gained shape by the mid-
1990s.2 The most important change or completion ! on the influence and for the 
satisfaction of the international scholarly community3 ! happened at the beginning of 
the1980s, in the most comprehensive and greatly interesting second series of the 
complete works, Heidegger%s university lectures; namely, the early Freiburg lectures 
(1919!1923), as long as they were still available, were announced to  be published at the 
end of the second series, $in accordance with the decision of legacy%s guardian in 1982, 
following Heidegger%s instructions#.4 This way the chronological principle was clearly 
                                                 
1 It is worth adding that the Heidegger complete edition ! similarly to the FVA Hegel edition ! is 
a private undertaking, meaning that it does not belong to an institution. It is supported by the 
caretaker of the legacy, Hermann Heidegger and the family, co-operating with Friedrich-Wilhelm 
von Herrmann. With one exception, there are no permanent paid functions ! contributors or 
editors. In opposition to this, behind a historical!critical edition usually there is some kind of 
institution that more or less finances the undertaking, and it makes the scientific!professional 
decisions from time to time. This is the situation in the case of the edition of the philosophers of 
idealism, which is institutionally supported by the provincial academies (the Hegel edition is 
supported by the Rhine-Westphalia Acedemy, while the Fichte and Schelling edition is supported 
by the Bavarian Academy of Sciences). 
2 The structure of the complete edition of four series is as follows: I. Abteilung: Veröffentlichte 
Schriften (1910-1976), Vols. 1!16; II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1919!1944, Vols. 17!63 (Mar-
burger Vorlesungen 1923!1928, Vols. 17!26; Freiburger Vorlesungen 1928-1944, Vols. 27!55; 
Frühe Freiburger Vorlesungen 1919!1923, Vol. 56/57!63); III. Abteilung: Unveröffentlichte 
Abhandlungen ! Vorträge ! Gedachtes, Vols. 64!81; IV. Abteilung: Hinweise und Aufzeichnun-
gen, Vols. 82!102. As we can see, the works published through Heidegger%s life ! issued in the 
first series ! add up to less than one quarter of the complete edition. 
3 See Theodore Kisiel, $Heidegger%s Early Lecture Courses#, A Companion to Martin 
Heidegger!s !Being and Time!, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Washington DC: University Press of 
America, 1986), 22!39., republished: Kisiel, Heidegger's Way of Thought. Critical and 
Interpretative Signposts, eds. A. Denker and M. Heinz (New York ! London: Continuum, 2002), 
137!148., here: 137. 
4 See Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe. Ausgabe letzter Hand (Frankfurt/Main: Klostermann: 
1991), 7. 
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broken. While the lectures between 1923 and 1944 follow chronologically in volumes 
17 to 55 of the complete works, the early Freiburg lectures held between 1919 and 1923 
are published as an attachment in volumes 56 to 63.1 The covers and title pages of the 
second series volumes have also been changed accordingly. Previously, the title was: 
$II.  Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1923!1944#, but now it changed to: $II.  Abteilung: 
Vorlesungen 1919!1944#, or simply: $II.  Abteilung: Vorlesungen#. 
 The first two editorial announcements, instead of a historical-critical edition, 
mentions a $lesbare Werkausgabe#, following the principle of chronology. The third 
editorial brochure published in March 1978 contains the designation $Ausgabe letzter 
Hand#, and in 1982 appears the formula $Edition ohne Interpretation#.  
 However, it is not so easy to escape interpretation. To mention one single 
example: the hermeneutic difficulty to interpret the abbreviations cannot be neglected. 
For example, $ex.# may mean $existentiell# or $existenzial#, $Fkt# may equally mean 
$Funktion#, $Fiktion#, or $Faktum#. A place of the 20th volume of the complete works is 
a good example for proving how much of an interpretive operation is the decoding of 
abbreviations, it says: $in der theoretischen noch unmodifizierten Erfahrung#.2 The 
knowledge of Heidegger%s thought in the 1920s makes this formulation questionable, 
and the manuscript reveals an abbreviation on the corresponding place: $theor.# 
Grammatically, it can equally be an adjective or an adverb, and it is the duty of an 
interpretive reading to decide how to decode it. Consequently, it is obvious that the 
correct reading is the following: $in der theoretisch noch unmodifizierten Erfahrung#3 
(the difference in English: $in the not yet modified theoretical experience# versus $in the 
theoretically not yet modified experience#). 
                                                 
1 An edition based on the principle of chronology and development history (more or less like the 
Heidegger complete edition or the Hegel-edition) stands in opposition to an edition based on 
thematic categorization like the Husserl complete edition, the Husserliana. An edition of this type 
basically determines the interpretations and the choice of interpretation topics (e.g. time 
consciousness, intersubjectivity). An edition based on thematic categorization is disputable in this 
case, because it can level the differences in the development history ! see for example Husserliana, 
vol. 10: Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins (1893-1917): the manuscripts of 25 years 
related to the same topic get published together, or the Zur Phänomenologie der 
Intersubjektivität.(Husserliana, vols. 13!15) containing three volumes, which collects the 
manuscripts of three decades, similarly to the edition of Hegel%s lectures issued by his students, 
though ! we have to mention here that ! int he case of the Husserliana we are not talking about 
compilations, and the manuscripts belonging to different periods maintain their independence. In 
spite of this, an edition of this type is already decisive with respect to the history of interpretation; it 
only offers a view on the development of thoughts related to some specific topics, and on the 
development of the philosopher%s thoughts in general, in a chronological order. Of course, the 
edition of the Husserlian oeuvre (containing approximately fourty volumes) has its own specific 
problems. First of all, ! as the director of the Husserl-Archive stated ! there is the fact that the legacy 
in Husserl%s case is voluminous, as well: approximately 40000 pages of manuscript written in 
shorthand. The edition itself admittedly does not follow a chronological order (see Samuel IJsseling, 
$Das Husserl-Archiv in Leuven und die Husserl-Ausgabe#, Buchstabe und Geist. Zur Überlieferung 
und Edition philosophischer Texte, 137!146., here: 139, 145.). 
2 GA 20, 152. 
3 Th. Kisiel, $Edition und Übersetzung. Unterwegs von Tatsachen zu Gedanken, von Werken zu 
Wegen#, 93. 
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 The edition takes as its basis the last textual variant. Nevertheless, it must be 
added that it does not follow the editorial practice of Hegel%s FVA since the editorial 
afterword at the end of the individual volumes offers a correct philological explanation 
on the creation and compilation of the text of the published volumes. In addition, the 
first series of the complete edition systematically publishes the marginal notes found in 
Heidegger%s own copy, through which the reader may follow, if not the creation of the 
text, but its authorial afterlife as well.  
 Taking into account the text%s stages of evolution corresponds to what I have 
previously termed the happening of the text. Naturally, it can be absolutely useful to 
trace it, but we can only find out about the happening of the text if some trace of an 
earlier text or variant is preserved. Let me enforce this with a further example. Several 
researchers formulated it as a requirement in the 1980s to publish the famous 1920/21 
lectures on the phenomenology of religion, which had not been preserved in manuscript, 
and was circulating for decades in the form of student notes among the researchers, as a 
kind of underground, valuable and secret sensation. The lecture was then published in 
1995, as volume 60 of the complete works, on the basis of the reconstruction of student 
notes.1 The title of the volume is: Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens. The editorial 
afterword reveals that the title of the volume comes from a note on the cover of a school 
notebook, used by Heidegger to bound his notes on the phenomenology of religion. 
Another bookcover contains the original title: Phänomenologie des religiösen 
Bewußtseins. Heidegger later crossed out the word Bewußtsein, and replaced it with 
Leben. For whoever is familiar with Heidegger%s ideatic development after WWI, and 
within it his profound theoretical reckoning with Husserlian phenomenology, the 
recognition comes as obvious: this terminological replacement in its laconic form is 
suitable for describing Heidegger%s entire hermeneutic turn and development in the 
1920s. In short: the neo-Kantian!Husserlian concept of $consciousness# is replaced by 
$life#. A word is deleted, and another word takes its place. Now, even if we do not know 
about this development or happening, the title (Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens) 
remains meaningful nonetheless, but being aware of the deleted variant yields a piece of 
extra information by which the text can be understood in more detail, more accurately, 
as a result (or stage) of an inner happening. In this respect it is useful therefore to publish 
the deleted versions as well. Naturally, the question also rises: what if the deletion was 
only made in the author%s thoughts (and not on paper)? Then of course nothing will be 
preserved of the changes (just like on a computer, unless the track changes function is 
on, but then corrected misspellings and other errors are visible as well). But is it not 
what usually happens? When we formulate something, we are permanently deleting or 
modifying the text, that is, we reformulate it, most often without leaving any corrected 
or deleted written notes behind.  
                                                 
1 When asked about the Hegel-edition, Heidegger reminded us about his previous remark 
according to which the students% notes on lectures are nothing but $obscure sources# (Unterwegs 
zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), 91.: $Nachschriften sind freilich trübe Quellen#), and ! 
referring to the publishment of the Hegel-lectures ! he gave utterance to his hope that this practice 
would not apply to him (Hartmut Buchner: $Fragmentarisches#, Erinnerung an Martin 
Heidegger, ed. G. Neske, (Pfullingen: Neske, 1977), 47!51., here: 50f.). However, irrespectively 
of our judgement on the editions in question, it can be stated: it applied to him. 
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 ✞ ✝ ✞
 It has been said that the longest and most interesting part of the complete works 
of Heidegger is the lectures published in the second series. However, their preparation ! 
in this respect similarly to the Hegel-edition of GW ! causes several difficulties and 
raises several questions. Let us conclude this paper by adding even more questions, 
inquiring the foundations by directing the question to the object of edition itself.  
 The lecture series of both the Hegel- and Heidegger-editions has to face the 
difficulty that the manuscripts of the delivered lectures, although to various degrees, but 
are only available in very incomplete form, and the use of students' lecture notes gains 
importance in this context, as a kind of substitute. However, one must ask the question: 
what is it that we must really publish? What is really a lecture? Is it a written or oral 
manifestation? Strangely enough, the recurrent complaint about the incompleteness of 
the lecture notes presupposes that the lecture is not a performance, but a written 
manifestation. This assumption however is not at all obvious. At any rate, only the word 
can be efficient, the written, but perhaps undelivered manuscript can hardly have any 
influence. If it is called a $lecture#, then it is perhaps that what the author $lectures# (in 
speech, how else) that should be published. Even if we have access to the entire 
manuscript at the basis of the lecture, how do we know, in lack of student notes, that the 
written text was delivered in that particular form ! and completeness ! in speech? 
Evidently, it can be argued what is  worthier of being published: a manuscript or the 
transcript of a tape? The manuscript can of course be published, but possibly in a series 
entitled $writings from the legacy# of the complete works edition; but a series entitled 
$Lectures#, if taken literally (and how else should we take it?) should aim at the 
reconstruction of the oral delivery. Consequently, if Heidegger (whether or not similarly 
to Hegel) has become known due to his influential lectures held after WWI ! while he 
published nothing in print for around a decade ! then the student notes preserved should 
mirror the effect of the delivered word just as much as a possibly fragmentary 
manuscript, which cannot be verified to have indeed been delivered in speech. If the 
main thesis of this paper claims that the establishment of the text does not take place 
within laboratory conditions, in a space void of interpretation, then we should now ask: 
whose text should we now establish in preparation for print? The text of the manuscript 
at the basis of the lecture, or that of the delivered lecture? For the series title of the 
complete edition announces, after all, $Vorlesungen# (lectures), and not $Vorlesungs-
Manuskripte# or $Vorlesungs-Texte# (lecture-manuscripts, lecture-texts).  
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